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ABSTRACT 
 
IN THE SHADOW OF ANXIMANDER:  PHILOSOPHICAL TEMPERAMENTS AND 
SCHOPENHAUERIAN PESSIMISM IN NIETZSCHE‘S PHILOSOPHY IN THE TRAGIC AGE 
OF THE GREEKS 
 
 
 
By  
Christopher R Mountenay 
December 2013 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Patrick Lee Miller. 
 Friedrich Nietzsche‘s unfinished 1873 manuscript, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks, has been long overlooked by scholars.  The piece is ostensibly a philological work, 
detailing the lives of Pre-Platonic philosophers.  What I show in my work, however, is that 
Nietzsche is actually using the figures of the early Greeks to deal with philosophical problems 
that remain germane throughout his entire corpus, notably the relation of temperament to one‘s 
philosophical outlook and the attempt to deal with the pessimism of Schopenhauer.  The former 
problem is examined by viewing the Pre-Platonic philosophers as ―philosophical archetypes‖ 
whose ―unmixed‖ outlooks are the result of their monolithic characters.  These primordial 
philosophical types have recurred throughout the history of philosophy, albeit in diluted forms.  
The first of these archetypes to be examined is Anaximander, whom Nietzsche sees as the 
original pessimist: a proto-Schopenhauer.  Nietzsche‘s Anaximander poses the question of why 
v 
 
things pass away and then insists that it is because they deserve to be annihilated.  Those who do 
not wish to be gloomy pessimists in the Schopenhauerian vein henceforth must find a way to 
justify the seeming injustices of the world of becoming.  Nietzsche provides two contrary 
characters to show how philosophers have dealt with the Anaximandrian problem.  The first is 
Heraclitus, for whom Nietzsche is unambiguous in his admiration.  Heraclitus celebrates the 
vicissitudes of becoming, seeing the conflict and impermanence as being justice itself.  This 
leads to the Heraclitean metaphors of justice as competition, fire, and a child at play.  
Nietzsche‘s writing on Heraclitus is particularly interesting since it shows Nietzsche‘s own 
attempts to escape from the Schopenhauerian worldview that he had long held, but ultimately 
would reject.  The other figure who attempts to deal with the problem of Anaximander is 
Parmenides.  While Heraclitus dealt with becoming by celebrating it, Parmenides denies it, 
reducing the world of perception to a mere illusion and inventing a second world of being where 
the horrors of becoming are absent.  According to Nietzsche, this misstep has informed most 
subsequent philosophers, causing them to prefer eternal being over temporal becoming.     
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Introduction 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche‘s unfinished 1873 manuscript, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks(PTAG), has had the misfortune of being largely overlooked.  Despite the abundance of 
translations of Nietzsche‘s major works, PTAG has not received a new English translation in 
over fifty years.
1
  The book was meant to be released shortly after The Birth of Tragedy, but was 
instead abruptly abandoned as Nietzsche refocused his attention on The Untimely Meditations.
2
  
Nietzsche never wrote a proper conclusion, nor did he write planned chapters on Empedocles, 
Democritus, the Pythagoreans, and Socrates.
3
   
He did manage, however, to include a meditation on lost books in the early chapters of 
PTAG. Read with hindsight, this meditation seems prophetic: 
 
It is a veritable misfortune that we have so little extant of the works of the ancient 
masters and that not a single one of their works was handed down to us complete.  We 
are involuntarily influenced by this loss, measuring therefore with false standards, and 
letting ourselves be disposed more favorably toward Plato and Aristotle by the sheer 
accident that they never lacked connoisseurs and copyists.  Some go so far as to assume a 
special destiny reserved for books, a fatum libellorum.  Such a fate would have to be 
malicious indeed to deprive us of Heraclitus, of the wonderful poetry of Empedocles, and 
of the writings of Democritus, thought by the ancients to be Plato‘s equal and, so far as 
ingenuity is concerned, his superior, slipping us instead the Stoics the Epicureans, and 
Cicero.  Very likely the most impressive part of Greek thought and its verbal expression 
is lost to us, a fate not to be wondered at if one remembers the misfortunes that befell 
Scotus Erigena and Pascal and the fact that in even this enlightened century the first 
edition of Schopenhauer‘s Welt als Wille und Vorstellung had to be sold for 
wastepaper[… ]  Mankind so rarely produces a good book, one which with bold freedom 
sounds the battle-cry of truth, the song of philosophic heroism.  And yet the most 
wretched accidents, sudden eclipses of men‘s minds, superstitious paroxysms and 
antipathies, cramped or lazy writing fingers, down to book worms and rainfall, all 
                                                             
1 Cowan‘s translation, which is quoted throughout this work, was originally published in 1962.  
2 Pletsch, 164-65. 
3 Unpublished Writings, 23, 3.  
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determine whether or not a book will live on another century or turn into ashes and 
mold.
4
 
 
While Nietzsche is being somewhat hyperbolic in supposing that Plato and Aristotle‘s 
success was by virtue of ―sheer accident,‖ his description of the loss of great swaths of ancient 
thought remains poignant.
5
  Moreover, not confining the cruelty of happenstance to the ancient 
world, Nietzsche speaks of the lot of Schopenhauer in ―this enlightened century.‖6  It does not 
seem far-fetched to imagine that Nietzsche was aware that a similar fate may be possible for his 
own works.  
 Luckily, the bulk of Nietzsche‘s work as a whole has yet to fall into the same abyss as 
that of Heraclitus and Empedocles.  Yet PTAG is still relatively obscure.  The culprit in this 
matter however is not ―worms and rainfall,‖ but a much more deliberate agent of fate, namely 
Richard Wagner.  Nietzsche had intended to finish PTAG by the end of the Lenten season of 
1873.
7
  Academic works have a tendency to take longer than one might hope and Nietzsche was 
still writing the Anaxagoras chapter when he visited the Wagners at Bayreuth for Easter.  He 
brought a copy of the unfinished manuscript to read to the Wagners, but the work received a 
chilly reception from Richard.
8
  The work struck Wagner as being overly academic and he 
suggested that Nietzsche write something that had more relevance to contemporary matters.
9
  
Wagner had probably hoped for a book that would be directly relevant to his primary interests, if 
not openly about Wagner himself, as The Birth of Tragedy was. He was also experiencing 
numerous professional annoyances, and so was not in the mood to meditate upon Heraclitus and 
                                                             
4 PTAG, 35-37. 
5 A similar theme is explored in his late work, The Antichrist, albeit with an added emphasis on the role of 
Christianity in the loss of philosophical works.  Antichrist, 59. 
6 PTAG, 36. 
7 Unpublished, 23, 6. 
8 Pletsch, 164. 
9 Ibid. 
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Parmenides.
10
  It is safe to assume that Nietzsche took this to heart; he almost immediately wrote 
an embarrassingly obsequious letter to Wagner, begging for his forgiveness.
11
  Nietzsche then 
began work on The Untimely Meditations and his notebooks show an abrupt cessation of work 
regarding early Greek philosophy.
12
 
 Wagner‘s condemnation was thus internalized by Nietzsche, but it was an unfair reaction 
to PTAG.  Nietzsche might have said that although Wagner may not find Greek philosophy 
interesting, many do, and that Nietzsche, as a professional philologist, should be expected to 
write about such matters.  But to imagine this response would be to assume that what Nietzsche 
did in PTAG was provide a simple work of philology.  Wagner‘s dismissal of the piece seems to 
have been based on a superficial reading of it.  In fact, Nietzsche‘s sister suggested that Wagner 
did not even bother to listen to Nietzsche‘s reading of PTAG when he heard the topic of the 
book.
13
  Had he paid closer attention, Wagner would have realized that PTAG is not merely a 
recounting of the doctrines of ancient philosophers, but rather a work that deals with timeless 
problems of philosophy and showcases Nietzsche‘s evolution as a philosopher. 
 Thus my intention in this work is to provide an analysis of PTAG that shows both its 
importance to Nietzsche scholarship and also to philosophy in general.  To accomplish this, I 
shall examine the three figures in PTAG whom Nietzsche most fully develops: Anaximander, 
Heraclitus, and Parmenides.
14
  What I hope to show is both how PTAG stands as an interesting 
transition from Nietzsche‘s early to middle works and how it illuminates his later works.  
                                                             
10 Cate, 172. 
11 Selected Letters, 51. 
12 Compare notebook 26, dated Spring 1873 and notebook 27, dated Spring-Autumn 1873.  Unpublished 143-80. 
13 Förster-Nietzsche, 168.  As is good practice, the testimony of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche is taken with a grain of 
salt. 
14 To keep my analysis focused, I have not included his sections on Thales and Anaxagoras. The first is more 
concerned with the notion of the philosopher as such than with Thales in particular. The section on Anaxagoras does 
not appear to be complete and thus could not be fairly compared to the preceding sections.  Both sections are 
fascinating in their own right, but I have chosen to remain focused on those philosophers who are answering the 
pessimistic problem of Anaximander. 
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Moreover, I wish to show how PTAG also represents one of Nietzsche‘s most interesting 
investigations of the problem of pessimism.  In this work he makes some of his first attempts to 
renounce the philosophical pessimism of Arthur Schopenhauer.  Finally, I wish to show how 
Nietzsche accomplishes this goal by examining the personalities of the philosophers he examines 
and through this creates philosophical archetypes with which to understand later thinkers. 
 Nietzsche lays out his goal for PTAG very plainly in its Preface.   He explains that 
―philosophical systems are wholly true for their founders only,‖ which is why this is not merely 
going to be a display of the doctrines of the ancients.
15
  If we were to look at this project as 
merely a collection of philosophical systems, then Wagner‘s criticism would have seemed more 
apt, as some of these systems have been long since disproven, which would make them seem as 
if they are only of interest to the antiquarian.
16
  But Nietzsche actually states that a strength of his 
work is that it contains ―a very small number of doctrines,‖ which from the standpoint of the 
antiquarian would be a definite weakness.
17
  He does not believe that we should be examining 
these systems for their truth value, but rather for the character of the great men who created 
them.  He says that ―whoever rejoices in great human beings will also rejoice in philosophical 
systems, even if completely erroneous.‖18  What makes a system so fascinating is the ―personal 
mood‖ and ―color‖ of it.19  A philosophical system is useful in Nietzsche‘s eyes since it can ―be 
used to reconstruct the philosophic image‖ and lead us to the person behind the philosophy, the 
soil from which the system grew from.
20
  Thus the system may be refuted, but the philosophers 
                                                             
15 PTAG, 23. 
16 Even then, Wagner‘s dismissal seems overly far-reaching.  For instance we shall see that Nietzsche is able to 
support many of Heraclitus‘s claims with modern science.  Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 60-63. 
17 PTAG, 25. 
18 Ibid. 23. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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themselves will always remain as those ―we must ever love and honor,‖ ―great individual human 
beings.‖21 
The Greek philosophers before Plato provide a special insight into this sort of thought, 
according to Nietzsche, because they are ―the archetypes of philosophic thought.‖22  These early 
philosophers were remarkable in their thought, both because of its purity and its fullness. 
 
 
All other cultures are put to shame by the marvelously idealized philosophical company 
represented by the ancient Greek masters Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, 
Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus, and Socrates.  These men are monolithic.  Their 
thinking and their character stand in a relationship characterized by strictest necessity.  
They are devoid of conventionality, for in their day there was no philosophic or academic 
professionalism.  All of them, in magnificent solitude, were the only ones of their time 
whose lives were devoted to insight alone.  They all possessed that virtuous energy of the 
ancients, herein excelling all men since, which led them to find their own form and to 
develop it through all its metamorphoses to its subtlest and greatest possibilities.  For 
there was no convention to meet them halfway.  Thus all of them together form what 
Schopenhauer in contrast to the republic of scholars has called the republic of creative 
minds: each giant calling to his brother through the desolate intervals of time.
23
 
 
Note here that the earliest philosophers are portrayed by Nietzsche as being ―monolithic‖ figures, 
whose thought was uninhibited by preexisting roles for philosophers.  Nietzsche also noted that 
these early figures did not establish any sort of schools, leading to no sort of sectarianism, which 
he sees as antithetical to Greek culture.
24
  Nietzsche‘s diagnosis may not be entirely historically 
accurate: these philosophers did tend to teach students their doctrines. Yet these foundational 
figures of philosophy did not establish schools to instruct future students.  Instead, they 
developed models of life their descendants could emulate. Additionally, the early Greek 
philosophers, according to Nietzsche, were not concerned with salvation for individuals or small 
                                                             
21 Ibid. 24. 
22 Ibid. 31. 
23 Ibid. 31-32. 
24 Ibid. 35. 
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groups, but instead sought ―the healing and the purification of the whole.‖25  He is vague here, 
perhaps purposefully. Although he seems to be speaking of Greek culture as a whole, we shall 
see that a philosopher‘s work concerns the judgment of existence as a whole.  
 The philosopher is also a figure who is unmixed.  Nietzsche says that while later thinkers 
have criticized the ―older masters‖ as ―one-sided,‖ he sees this as a mark of their intellectual 
purity.
26
  The problem of philosophical mixing occurs initially with Plato, not only in terms of 
philosophies, but also in philosophical personality types. 
 
 
Plato himself is the first mixed type on a grand scale, expressing his nature in his 
philosophy no less than in his personality.  Socratic, Pythagorean, and Heraclitic 
elements are all combined in his doctrine of Ideas.  This doctrine is not a phenomenon 
exhibiting a pure philosophic type.  As a human being too, Plato mingles the features of 
the regal exclusive and self-contained Heraclitus with the melancholy compassionate and 
legislative Pythagoras and the psychologically acute dialectician Socrates.  All 
subsequent philosophers are such mixed types.
27
  
 
It is not merely that Plato‘s philosophy is an amalgam, with its Heraclitean lower world and 
Pythagorean upper world, but also his character.  Nietzsche would later describe the Platonic 
Socrates as ―Plato at the front, Plato at the back, Chimaera in the middle,‖ 28 but even Plato 
seems to be Pythagoras at the front, Socrates at the back, Heraclitus in the middle in PTAG.   
The philosophers who follow Plato are all mixed types, adopting his eclecticism in favor of the 
monolithic heroic stances of the earliest Greeks.
29
   
Since Nietzsche is appropriating much of what he says about the philosophers before 
Socrates from Diogenes Laertius‘s Lives of Eminent Philosophers, a work not known for its 
                                                             
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 34. 
27 Ibid. 35. 
28 Beyond Good and Evil, 190. 
29 PTAG, 35. 
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veracity, a critic could claim that Nietzsche‘s diagnosis of these figures is suspect.  But 
Nietzsche is less concerned with the philological questions in PTAG than he is with what we can 
do with the figures the philosophers left behind.  
 
 
Diogenes Laertius offers much more about the existential characters of the earliest 
philosophers, something that Nietzsche also adopted as a strategy for investigating what 
the person had done or achieved in the course of life.  It is easy to dismiss this question of 
character as a non-rigorous psychobiographical approach for the evaluation of a 
philosopher, yet such a method of inquiry need not lapse into arbitrary ad hominem 
arguments, nor be fueled by a spurious dogmatism or voyeurism.  Such concerns are 
relevant for Nietzsche‘s unpopular question: Is the philosopher‘s worldview a 
psychological coping mechanism?
30
 
 
The truthfulness of the accounts is less important to Nietzsche than how the accounts transmit 
the personalities of the philosophers.
31
  The accounts of Diogenes Laertius may be exaggerations 
and at times outright falsehoods, but Nietzsche is concerned with constructing a ―simplified‖ 
story that can give us a portrait of great philosophers and demonstrate the legacy that survives in 
later accounts of them.    
And so in PTAG, he uses them to demonstrate the ―psychological coping mechanisms‖ of 
those who faced what he saw as ―the profoundest problem in ethics‖: ―How can anything pass 
away which has a right to be.‖32  This is the problem of pessimism.  Nietzsche quotes 
Anaximander as saying ―Where the source of things is, to that place they must also pass away, 
according to necessity, for they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices, in 
accordance with the ordinance of time.‖33  As we shall see, this raises the question of why it is 
that things go out of existence.  If they truly deserved to exist, would they not be eternal?  If they 
                                                             
30 Swift, 19. 
31 PTAG, 25. 
32 Ibid. 48. 
33 Ibid. 45. 
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are not eternal and no eternal things can be said to exist, can life be worth living? As we shall 
see, this profound problem shall serve as the perpetual challenge to philosophers.  
The coping mechanisms described above are the philosophies that arose from the great 
thinkers who faced the Anaximandrian problem.  These philosophies are not interesting because 
of their systematic thinking, but rather because of how they illuminate the characters of their 
creators.
34
  In his recent examination of philosophical practices, You Must Change Your Life, 
Peter Sloterdijk states that Nietzsche is not a philosopher of modernity, but one of antiquity, and 
one who does not see us as having progressed beyond the ancients.
35
  Following this approach, 
Nietzsche introduces the philosophy of the ancients as a remedy for later philosophical attempts 
at changing one‘s life. ―Askesis‖ is not necessarily self-denial, but merely exercise, especially 
the exercise of the philosopher in living his philosophy.
36
 
 
 
When Nietzsche speaks of the ascetic planet, it is not because he would rather have been 
born on a more relaxed star.  His antiquity-instinct tells him that every heavenly body 
worth inhabiting must – correctly understood – be an ascetic planet inhabited by the 
practicing, the aspiring, and the virtuosos.  What is antiquity for him but a code word for 
the age in which humans had to become strong enough for a sacred-imperial image of the 
whole?  Inherent in the great worldviews of antiquity was the intention of showing 
mortals how they could live in harmony with the ‗universe,‘ even and especially when 
that whole showed them its baffling side, its lack of consideration for individuals.  What 
one called the wisdom of the ancients was essentially a tragic holism, a self-integration 
within the great whole, that could not be achieved without heroism. Nietzsche‘s planet 
would become the place whose inhabitants, especially the male ones, would carry the 
weight of the world anew without self-pity.
37
 
 
PTAG is a catalog of such heroes.  Nietzsche has given us a gallery, albeit an incomplete one, 
where we can see how great thinkers proved their strength in carrying the heavy weight that the 
                                                             
34 Ibid.24.  
35 Sloterdijk, 31-33. 
36 Ibid. 33. 
37 Ibid. 35. 
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universe in its incomprehensibility put upon them.  While PTAG is not explicitly an account of 
philosophers‘ exercises, it does attempt to deal with the problem of the philosopher living within 
his own philosophy, rather than having it be something distinct from his daily life. 
 In sum, this work will be a close reading of PTAG, but one that will explore important 
themes in Nietzsche‘s work and philosophy in general. One of the major themes shall be the 
problem of pessimism, as it was introduced by Anaximander, but also how it influenced 
Nietzsche by way of Schopenhauer.  The other theme, complementing this one, will be 
Nietzsche‘s analysis of philosophers by way of their characters.  As we shall see, the character of 
the philosopher is often the most important element in determining how he responds to the 
problem of Anaximander.  Through this examination, we shall see how PTAG gives birth to 
many thoughts that would grow in Nietzsche‘s later works, making it an important element in 
understanding the evolution of Nietzsche‘s thought.   
1 
 
1.  Anaximander 
 
1.1 The First Philosophical Author 
 
Having established the basic archetype of the philosopher with Thales, Nietzsche 
proceeds to describe the ―image of his great successor, Anaximander.‖1  The transition is 
a natural one, Anaximander being the next figure in the traditional history of philosophy 
chronologically.
2
  Thales is typically credited as the first philosopher, but Anaximander 
was ―the first philosophical author.‖3  What is more striking about Anaximander, 
however, is that while Thales introduced the idea of the philosopher, Anaximander began 
the struggle that Nietzsche saw as being the central one not only in pre-Platonic 
philosophy, but also in the discipline‘s entire history.  Anaximander was ―the first Greek‖ 
to tackle ―the profoundest problem in ethics,‖ that is, ―How can anything pass away 
which has a right to be?‖4  With this began the conflict of being and becoming.5  Of the 
figures presented in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Anaximander is the one 
of whom Nietzsche gives the most idiosyncratic reading.  More than any of the other pre-
Platonic philosophers, Anaximander is used as a stand-in for another position in the 
history of philosophy, specifically that of Schopenhauer. 
                                                             
1 PTAG, 45.  
2 McKirahan, 32. 
3 PTAG, 45. 
4 Ibid. 48. 
5 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 37.  
2 
 
Nietzsche, having established the basic archetype of the philosopher in Thales,
6
 now has 
the opportunity to examine specific philosophical archetypes.  Nietzsche made his 
purpose clear in ―The Later Preface,‖ stating the following.  
 
 
This attempt to tell the story of the older Greek philosophers is distinguished from 
similar attempts by its brevity.  This has been attained by mentioning, for each of 
the philosophers, but a very small number of doctrines—in other words, by its 
incompleteness.  But I have selected those doctrines which sound most clearly the 
personality of the individual philosopher, whereas the complete enumeration of 
all the transmitted doctrines, as it is the custom of ordinary handbooks to give, has 
but one sure result: the complete silencing of personality.  That is why those 
reports are so dull.  The only thing of interest in a refuted system is the personal 
element.  It alone is what is forever irrefutable.  It is possible to present the image 
of a man in three anecdotes; I shall try to emphasize three anecdotes in each 
system and abandon the rest.
7
 
 
Does Nietzsche accomplish this task that he has laid out for himself?  It is only fair to 
remember that this is an unfinished work and thus the preface might have been revised to 
match the completed work.  Yet as this is the most explicit description of Nietzsche‘s 
project, it is interesting to see where he does and does not follow the guidelines that he 
lays out for himself.  In the chapter on Anaximander, Nietzsche breaks with some of the 
details of his format, but still emphasizes the importance of the philosopher‘s personality 
and also the abandoning of those doctrines that do not aid in elucidating that personality.  
 
1.1.1 What Nietzsche Does and Does Not Say About Anaximander 
 
Perhaps the place where the format of the preface proves to be the most problematic is in 
the laying out of the three anecdotes.  More so than any other of the philosophers on 
                                                             
6 PTAG, 45.  
7 Ibid. 25. 
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whom Nietzsche focuses in PTAG, there are very few surviving legends regarding 
Anaximander.  Of these figures, Diogenes Laertius‘s chapter on Anaximander is by far 
the shortest.  The usually loquacious Diogenes has next to nothing to say about 
Anaximander.  We learn his basic biographical information such as his parentage, place 
of birth, and years of birth and death.
8
  Diogenes also lays out his doctrines regarding the 
shape of the universe and his creation of the gnomon and the globe.
9
  The only anecdote 
that reveals anything regarding the personality of Anaximander is as follows: ―There is a 
story that the boys laughed at his singing, and that, when he heard of it, he rejoined, 
‗Then to please the boys I must improve my singing.‘‖10  While this anecdote would 
count towards the requisite three that Nietzsche requires, it would not contribute to the 
image of the regal pessimist that Nietzsche cultivates in PTAG; improving one‘s singing 
to conform to the tastes of children hardly seems fitting for a tragic hero.  Diogenes 
Laertius does mention Anaximander in one other section of his Lives of Eminent 
Philosophers.  In his chapter on Empedocles, he relates that Diodorus of Ephesus claimed 
that Empedocles emulated Anaximander by ―displaying theatrical arrogance and wearing 
stately robes.‖11  This image of Anaximander, as we shall see, provides a basis for 
Nietzsche‘s archetypical view of Anaximander.  
 Although Nietzsche is limited in some places by lack of information regarding the 
historical, or even legendary, Anaximander, there are other places where Nietzsche 
himself provides the limits of what should be said.  As he says in the preface, he has no 
interest in ―refuted systems,‖ unless he can show something about the ―personal element‖ 
                                                             
8 Diogenes Laertius II, 1.  
9 Ibid.  The gnomon is the portion of the sundial that casts a shadow. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. VIII, 70. 
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of the philosopher.
12
  Thus elements of Anaximander‘s cosmology that had long been 
disproved by the Copernican revolution are completely absent from Nietzsche‘s chapter 
on Anaximander in PTAG.  The cylindrical Earth which Hippolytus and Pseudo-Plutarch 
attribute to Anaximander appears in numerous other works on Anaximander,
13
 the sort 
that Nietzsche is trying to get away from with this book.  Hegel mentions the cylindrical 
Earth in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy,
14
 as does Zeller in his Outlines of the 
History of Greek Philosophy.
15
  In fact, Nietzsche himself pays attention to this ―refuted 
system‖ in his own lectures on Pre-Platonic philosophy, though they are left out of 
PTAG.
16
  Likewise, Anaximander‘s description of the stars as being the venting of the 
circle of fire outside of the dark mist that surrounds the Earth
17
 is present in Hegel,
18
 
Zeller,
19
 and Nietzsche‘s lectures,20 but totally absent from PTAG.   
While such theories are interesting, and even have a certain poetic beauty to them, 
they had long since been refuted by 1873.  More importantly, though colorful, they would 
say very little about the philosophical character of Anaximander.  Nietzsche has boiled 
away any element of doctrine that does not assist him in showing Anaximander as the 
author of ―justice and punishment universal‖21 or as ―the first pessimistic philosopher.‖22  
Nietzsche is acting as a philosopher and not a scientist in the sense that he described in 
                                                             
12 PTAG, 25. 
13 DK 12A10–11 as cited in McKirahan, 38.  Also, note that this description of a cylindrical Earth does 
contradict Diogenes Laertius‘s claim that Anaximander constructed the first globe.  Charles Kahn attributes 
this description to ―Hellenistic confusion‖ arising out of the ambiguity of ―strongylous‖ or ―round,‖ which 
can apply to a sphere as well as to a flat disk.‖ (Kahn, 56) 
14 Hegel, 188. 
15 Zeller, 29. 
16 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 37. 
17 DK 12A11, as cited by McKirahan, 38. 
18 Hegel, 188. 
19 Zeller, 29. 
20 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 36. 
21 Unpublished, 19, 134. 
22 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 37. 
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the preceding chapter on Thales.  Selectivity and taste play a role in philosophy, 
separating it from mere science, which allows any piece of true information into its 
discourse.
 23
  This selectivity separates PTAG from his lectures, rendering the former 
more akin to philosophy and the latter more akin to a science, namely philology.  That 
this distinction should be noticeable in the chapter on Anaximander seems particularly 
apt because in his notes Nietzsche describes Anaximander (along with Heraclitus and 
Empedocles) as being concerned with the ―Control for the drive of knowledge 
[Nietzsche‘s emphasis] — or strengthening the mythic-mystical, the artistic.‖24  With his 
philosopher‘s book, Nietzsche is doing a very similar thing.  The information transmitted 
is to be selected in the service of strengthening the mythic figure of the philosopher.  
Nietzsche does not want a list of dead doctrines, but rather wishes to show the 
archetypical figure that dwells in the philosophy of the early Greeks. 
After having ruled out much of what Nietzsche does not want to include in PTAG, 
what can we say that he does wish to include?  Unlike Heraclitus, Parmenides, or 
Anaxagoras, Anaximander only warrants a single chapter, so Nietzsche has the ability to 
be extremely selective in his discussion of him.  The chapter includes a description of the 
philosophical figure that Anaximander represents through his bearing and style.  
Nietzsche also chooses to examine two central doctrines of Anaximander which, he 
believes, give us the essence of Anaximander‘s thought: eternal justice (as described in 
the sole surviving fragment of Anaximander) and the apeiron (translated by Nietzsche as 
―undefined‖25). 
                                                             
23 PTAG, 43. 
24 Unpublished, 23, 14. 
25 ―Unbestimmten‖ 
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The preceding chapter regarding Thales introduces the archetype of the 
philosopher himself, but not with the same lucidity we see in the specific archetype of 
Anaximander.  ―While the archetype of the philosopher emerges with the image of Thales 
only as out of shifting mists,‖ Nietzsche writes, ―the image of his great successor already 
speaks much more plainly to us.‖26  The language here is particularly interesting, 
describing Thales literally ―being singled out‖27 of the undefined ―mists,‖28 while 
Anaximander is the first to differentiate himself plainly from those mists.  Anaximander 
also, being the first philosophical writer, is possessed of an ―innocence and naiveté,‖ 
literally ―un-self-consciousness,‖29 having not been confronted with ―alienating 
demands.‖30  Not unlike his own apeiron, Anaximander‘s character is literally undefined.  
Nietzsche‘s Anaximander is therefore a figure of purity and one who is often 
metaphorically laying down his new doctrine in stone.  He writes in ―graven stylized 
letters,‖31 laying down new ―milestones,‖32 and giving his fragment ―lapidary 
impressiveness.‖33  Nietzsche finally has Anaximander as pronouncing his pessimistic 
proclamations over the ―boundary stone‖34 of philosophy.  The first philosophical 
writings to survive antiquity have been laid in stone Nietzsche seems to be saying, as if 
coming down from Sinai.   
 
 
 
                                                             
26 PTAG, 45. 
27 ―heraushebt‖ 
28 Literally ―Nebeln.‖  While Cowan translates this as ―swirling mists,‖ it could also be read as fog or, even 
―nebulae.‖  
29 ―Unbefangenheit‖ 
30 PTAG, 45. 
31 ―großstilisirter Steinschrift‖ 
32 ―Meilensteine‖ 
33 ―lapidarischen Eindringlichkeit‖ 
34 ―Grenzsteine‖ 
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1.1.2 The Bearing of Anaximander 
 
As for the messenger of this proclamation, Nietzsche also must describe the bearing of 
the man.  As mentioned above, Anaximander was ―the great model for Empedocles,‖35 
which Nietzsche brings up without crediting Diodorus by way of Diogenes Laertius.
36
  
The only other biographical fact that Nietzsche makes use of in this section is that 
Anaximander‘s ―fellow citizens elected him to lead a colony of emigrants,‖37 a fact that 
he attributes to the Roman rhetorician, Aelian, in his lecture notes.
38
  From the single 
sentence from Diogenes and the colony account of Aelian, Nietzsche is able to construct 
an entire persona for Anaximander.   He embellishes Diodorus‘s description of ―theatrical 
arrogance and stately robes.‖ 
 
 
We can easily credit the tradition that he walked the earth clad in an especially 
dignified garment and displayed a truly tragic pride in his gestures and customs of 
daily living.  He lived as he wrote; he spoke as solemnly as he dressed; he lifted 
his hands and placed his feet as though this existence were a tragic drama into 
which he had been born to play a hero.  In all these things, he was a great model 
for Empedocles.
39
 
 
Presenting us with this picture of a simultaneously flamboyant and morose 
philosopher, Nietzsche suggests that ―perhaps [his fellow citizens] were glad to honor 
him and get rid of him at the same time.‖40    In his unpublished writings, Nietzsche 
                                                             
35 PTAG, 49. 
36 Diogenes Laertius VIII, 70. 
37 PTAG, 49. 
38 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 31.  
39 PTAG, 49. 
40 Ibid.  Nietzsche is ignoring the accounts of Parmenides drafting laws that were followed in Elea for 500 
years.  McKirahan, 157. 
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explains that ―none of the great Greek philosophers was a leader of the people.‖41  He 
claims that Anaximander, like his successors, Heraclitus and Empedocles, attempts to 
legislate through his greatness; through ―mythic-mystical‖ and artistic drives.42  
However, this great tragic figure is unable to lead the people and thus is cast away.   The 
philosopher not appreciated in his own time, by his own people, a theme that appears 
often in Nietzsche,
43
 but also in the life of Schopenhauer, who, as I shall show, Nietzsche 
sees as Anaximander‘s heir.  Besides the physical colonization that occurred in 
Anaximander‘s life, Nietzsche describes a more metaphorical intellectual colonization.   
 
 
His thought, too, emigrated and founded colonies.  In Ephesus and in Elea, people 
could not rid themselves of it, and if they could not make up their minds to remain 
where it had left them, they also knew that they had been led there by it, and it 
was from there that they would travel on without it.
44
  
 
The colonies founded in Ephesus and Elea are the philosophies of Heraclitus and 
Parmenides (and his followers) respectively.  Anaximander‘s fragment was enough to 
colonize the thought of those who succeeded him by forcing them to answer ―how 
anything can pass away which has a right to be‖45 and to continue Thales‘ project of 
discovering ―the one.‖46 
 
                                                             
41 Unpublished, 23, 14. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Numerous examples of this can be found in Nietzsche‘s work.  In the preface to Nietzsche Contra 
Wagner, he laments that while he is read abroad, he has no readers in Germany (265).   In Ecce Homo: Why 
I am a Destiny, he predicts that his name ―will be connected with the memory of something tremendous‖ 
(143).  In the ―Maxims and Arrows‖ section of Twilight of the Idols, he identifies himself as the 
―posthumous‖ man (157).  Even his allegorical characters suffer this fate, such as the madman in Gay 
Science 138 who came too early in announcing the death of God or Zarathustra who realizes that he is not 
―the mouth for these ears‖ after speaking to the people of the town (Zarathustra 1: Prologue, 5).  Even the 
title of the work written immediately after PTAG, Untimely Meditations, echoes this sentiment.  
44 PTAG, 49. 
45 Ibid. 48. 
46 Ibid. 49. 
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1.1.3 The Fragment 
 
Before starting to uncover the meaning that Nietzsche finds in Anaximander‘s fragment, 
we should look at the actual wording that Nietzsche uses.
47
  In his eponymous essay on 
the Anaximander Fragment, Martin Heidegger opens with ―the generally accepted text‖ 
in German, which happens to be that of ―the young Nietzsche‖ from Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks.
48
  Cowan translates Nietzsche‘s German translation as ―Where 
the source of things is, to that place they must also pass away, according to necessity, for 
they must pay penance and be judged for their injustices, in accordance with the 
ordinance of time.‖49  This translation however is ―scarcely distinguishable,‖ according to 
Heidegger, from Hermann Diels‘ 1903 slightly ―more literal‖ translation.50  In David 
Krell‘s translation of Heidegger‘s work, the Diels fragment reads ―But where things have 
their origin, there too their passing away occurs according to necessity; for they pay 
recompense and penalty to one another for their recklessness.‖ 51  Heidegger is correct in 
saying that these translations are similar, particularly when compared to the final iteration 
of his own attempts at translating it: ―… along the lines of usage; for they let order and 
thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder.‖52  That a well-
trained philologist such as Nietzsche comes up with a translation that is nearly identical 
                                                             
47 The original Greek that Nietzsche uses reads ―ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεζίρ ἐζηι ηοῖρ οὖζι, καὶ ηὴν θθοπὰν εἰρ ηαῦηα 
γίνεζθαι καηὰ ηὸ σπεών· διδόναι γὰπ αὐηὰ δίκην καὶ ηίζιν ἀλλήλοιρ ηῆρ ἀδικίαρ καηὰ ηὴν ηοῦ σπόνος 
ηάξιν.‖  Heidegger, 13. 
48 Ibid. 
49 ―Woher die Dinge ihre Entstehung haben, dahin müssen sie auch zugrunde gehen nach der 
Notwendigkeit; denn sie müssen Buße zahlen und für ihre Ungerechtigkeiten gerichtet werden gemäß der 
Ordnung der Zeit.‖ PTAG, 45. 
50 Heidegger, 14. 
51 ―Woraus aber die Dinged das Entstehen haben, dahin geht auch ihr Vergehen nach der Notwendigkeit; 
denn sie zahlen einander Strafe und Buße für ihre Ruchlosigkeit nach der festgestzten Zeit.‖  Ibid, 13. 
52 Ibid. 57. 
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to that of another great classicist should not come as a surprise.  Despite his reputation as 
a revolutionary philosopher, in 1873 he was still employed as a philology professor at 
Basel.  Yet even though this translation may seem traditional, Heidegger‘s description of 
Nietzsche‘s ―interpretations of the texts‖ as ―commonplace, if not entirely superficial‖53 
is unfair, as the rest of this chapter aims to show.  Nietzsche‘s originality in his Pre-
Platonic scholarship is not through his translations being radically unique, but through the 
conclusions he draws from them.  What even Heidegger admits is that Nietzsche ―does 
establish a vibrant rapport with the personalities of the Preplatonic philosophers.‖54   
 
1.2 Eternal Justice and Apeiron  
 
1.2.1 The Only Serious Moralist 
 
The ―vibrant rapport‖ that Nietzsche shows with Anaximander is primarily exhibited in 
his linking of the Milesian philosopher with ―the only serious moralist of our century,‖ 
Arthur Schopenhauer.
 55
  After asking how to interpret Anaximander, Nietzsche 
immediately gives the following quotation. 
 
 
The proper measure with which to judge any and all human beings is that they are 
really creatures who should not exist at all and who are doing penance for their 
lives by their manifold sufferings and their death.  What could we expect of such 
creatures? Are we not all sinners under the sentence of death?  We do penance for 
having been born, first by living and then by dying.
56
 
                                                             
53 Ibid. 14.   
54 Ibid. 
55 PTAG, 46. 
56 Ibid.  Peculiarly, the E.F.J. Payne translation of Parerga and Paralipomena does not contain this 
paragraph, nor the preceding one, in section 156a of the chapter, ―Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of 
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Nietzsche then posits a hypothetical man, who, having read this extremely 
pessimistic passage ―can recognize the basic poor quality of any and all human life in the 
very fact that not one of us will bear close scrutiny.‖57  As a brief aside, Nietzsche 
accuses the present era‘s ―biographical plague‖ of having given the opposite opinion of 
man, a dignified view of mankind.
58
  The hypothetical man, though, has been inoculated 
against this plague by Schopenhauer and ―India‘s clear air,‖ having heard ―the holy word 
of the moral value of existence.‖59  He finds himself unable to resist taking this 
―anthropomorphic metaphor‖ of a world with actual moral value to ―extract that 
melancholy doctrine from its application to human life and project it unto the general 
quality of all existence.‖60  The Schopenhauerian man judges coming-to-be as 
―illegitimate‖ as it is ―an illegitimate emancipation from eternal being‖ and only through 
destruction can it find penance.
61
   Our hypothetical man has carried the string of 
Nietzsche‘s thought from Schopenhauer to his Ionian forebear.  At no further point in the 
chapter is Schopenhauer referred to directly (and note that he is not mentioned by name 
at all in the chapter), but Nietzsche‘s reading of Anaximander nonetheless draws its 
conclusions from Schopenhauerian doctrines.  His Anaximander is essentially a pre- 
modern Schopenhauer, as an examination of both Nietzsche‘s reading of Anaximander 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the Suffering of the World,‖ while the German edition does contain Nietzsche‘s entire quotation in the 
addendum to section 156 on page 327 (as cited in Nietzsche‘s original manuscript).  No reason for this 
omission is given in the English edition. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Nietzsche‘s own rather biographical, almost hagiographic, readings of the Pre-Platonic philosophers 
suggest this is intentional irony 
59 Ibid.  Bear in mind that while Schopenhauer has an extremely pessimistic view of the world, he still sees 
it as having inherent moral significance. In Parerga and Paralipomena, he says ―that the world has only a 
physical and not a moral significance is a fundamental error, one that is the greatest and most pernicious, 
the real perversity of the mind (Volume 2, 201). 
60 PTAG, 46. 
61 Ibid. 
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and Schopenhauer‘s own doctrine of eternal justice and of the nature of reality shall 
reveal.  
 
 1.2.2 A Mephistophelean Doctrine 
 
Schopenhauer was not the first author since Anaximander to have expressed a view that 
eternal justice would consist of the passing away of all existence.  Schopenhauer‘s 
―intellectual hero‖62 and sometimes mentor, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, had more 
than a decade before the first edition of World as Will and Presentation included a 
passage that echoes the Anaximander fragment in his magnum opus, Faust.  Not only is 
Faust perhaps the most famous piece of German literature, but Nietzsche had quoted or 
referenced Goethe‘s Faust several times in earlier works,63 so it is likely that he may have 
had the following passage in mind, where Mephistopheles answers Faust about who he is. 
 
 
The spirit which eternally denies! 
And justly so; for all that which is wrought 
Deserves that it should come to naught;  
Hence it would be best if nothing were engendered.
64
 
 
This passage can be seen to have had a great deal of influence on Schopenhauer, who 
references it twice in The World as Will and Presentation.
65
  This poetic proclamation 
from the Devil himself contains the essence of the relationship between Arthur 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche‘s reconstructed version of Anaximander.   
                                                             
62 Cartwright, 169. 
63 Birth of Tragedy, 22, 46, 51, 66, 86, and 88.  In his following work, Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche 
actually compares the Schopenhauerian man to Mephistopheles, albeit based on a different line (Untimely 
Meditations, 153)  
64 Faust I, 1338–1341. 
65 The World as Will and Presentation Volume II, 573 and 656. 
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1.2.3 Justice as Destruction  
 
From this groundwork, we can see why Nietzsche presented the two great philosophers as 
being such kindred spirits.  Both Anaximander and Schopenhauer posit a world that has 
an eternal and internal form of justice in that it annihilates that which participates in 
becoming.  Moreover, the attitude of both men according to Nietzsche is inherently 
pessimistic.  Finally, both present a world of duality consisting of an undifferentiated, 
eternal substance and the ever-changing veil that covers it. Nietzsche‘s Anaximander is 
the first Greek to ask what Nietzsche considers to be ―the profoundest problem in ethics,‖ 
that is, ―How can anything pass away which has the right to be?‖66  This question 
presupposes that there are things which have the right to be, a position that Schopenhauer 
would deride as optimism.  In his critique of Christianity, for example, Schopenhauer 
mocks the Judeo-Christian God: ―But that a God Jehovah creates this world of misery 
and affliction animi causa and de gaieté de coeur and then applauds himself with a panta 
kala lian, this is something intolerable.‖67  Schopenhauer is much glibber about the world 
not deserving to exist than Nietzsche‘s very serious Anaximander, but ultimately the 
solution will be the same.  The world must be annihilated to account for the injustice of 
its coming into being. 
 The injustice of the world‘s existence, according to Schopenhauer, shall be 
punished by eternal justice.  Schopenhauer introduces the concept initially at the end of 
the sixtieth chapter of the first volume of The World as Will and Presentation, after 
                                                             
66 PTAG, 48. 
67 ―Because he feels inclined to,‖ ―out of sheer wantonness,‖ ―everything was very good,‖ Parerga and 
Paralipomena Vol 2, 156 (p.308). 
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discussing the role of the Hindu god, Shiva, in the cycle of life and death.  Shiva 
represents the balance between generation and destruction, even being represented by the 
lingam,
 
 linking sexual reproduction with death.
68
  Thus he introduces eternal justice. 
 
 
Most people… persistently affirm life without clear thoughtful awareness.  As a 
mirror of this affirmation there stands the world, with countless individuals, in 
endless time and endless space, and endless suffering, between procreation and 
death without end.  In this matter, however, no further complaint can be raised 
from any side; for will is performing the great tragicomedy at its own expense, 
and is also its own spectator.  The world is precisely such as it is because will, 
whose phenomenon it is, is such as it is, because this is how it is willing.  The 
justification for sufferings is the fact that, even in this phenomenon, will is 
affirming itself; and this affirmation is justified and balanced out by the fact that it 
is bearing the sufferings.  In fact, there opens itself up to us here a glimpse of 
eternal justice with respect to the whole…69 
 
Following two chapters on temporal justice,
70
  Schopenhauer fully covers the concept of 
eternal justice.  This is the justice that ―does not hold sway over the state but the world‖ 
and is ―infallible, firm, and sure.‖71  Eternal justice, being eternal, is outside of time and 
thus ―cannot be retributive justice, thus cannot, like the latter, allow of delays and 
deadlines, and only balancing bad deeds with bad consequences.‖72  For how could there 
be any retributive justice for acts that occur within time, if eternal justice by its very 
nature exists outside time?  The world of representation, being bound to the Principle of 
Sufficient Ground and thus the laws of causality, exists temporally.  The will from which 
all things arise, however, exists outside of time.  The inner nature of the world as will is 
therefore atemporal and eternal.  Thus Schopenhauer sees eternal justice as not being 
                                                             
68 The lingam is the phallus of Shiva in Hindu iconography.  
69 World as Will and Presentation Volume 1,390. 
70 Temporal justice encompasses all the forms of justice in the world as representation, notably criminal 
and civil justice.   
71 Ibid. 414. 
72 Ibid. 
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something that exists outside of the world, but is rather immanent; ―eternal justice 
actually lies in the essence of the world.‖73   
 Schopenhauer‘s explanation for how this sort of eternal justice could be found in 
the structure of the world follows. 
 
 
The phenomenon, the objectivization of the one will for life, is the world in all the 
plurality of its parts and forms.  Existence itself and any mode of existence, in the 
whole as in every part, is only on the basis of will.  It is free; it is omnipotent.  In 
every thing, will makes its appearance precisely as it determines itself to do, in 
itself and beyond time.  The world is only the mirror of this willing. And all the 
finitude, all the suffering, all the torments it contains belong to the expression of 
that which it wills, are as they are because it wills as it does.  It is with the strictest 
justice, accordingly, that every being bears existence in general, and then the 
existence of its species and of its own peculiar individuality, just as it is and in the 
surroundings as they are, in a world such as it is, ruled by chance and by error, 
temporal, transitory, constantly suffering; and in all that befalls it, indeed can ever 
befall it, justice is always done to it.  ‖74 
 
Eternal justice can only exist in the will itself.  Only the will is free since it is outside of 
time and is thus not subjected to the laws of cause and effect.  Moreover, the world as it 
is represented to us is ―the mirror of this willing,‖ so any explanation of why eternal 
justice occurs can only be answered by examining the will, not through our representation 
of it.  Since this justice is being carried out in the will, by the will, and against the will, 
Schopenhauer says that ―the world itself is world court of justice.‖75  As stated above the 
will affirms itself through punishing itself and then pays the penalty of that punishing 
through its own suffering.
76
 
 
                                                             
73 Ibid. 414. 
74 Ibid. 415.  
75 Ibid. 415. 
76 Ibid. 390. 
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1.2.4 Apeiron as Will 
 
The will for Schopenhauer is extremely similar to the apeiron as presented in Nietzsche‘s 
interpretation of Anaximander, while the world as representation corresponds to the 
world of becoming.  Nietzsche has Anaximander determine that those things which 
possess ―definite qualities‖ will pass away and thus cannot be the true ―first principle of 
things.‖77  There must be something more primal than the definite. It is here that 
Nietzsche reinterprets Anaximander‘s apeiron. 
 
 
That which truly is, concludes Anaximander, cannot possess definite 
characteristics, or it would come-to-be and pass away like all other things.  In 
order that coming-to-be shall not cease, primal being must be indefinite.  The 
immortality and everlastingness of primal being does not lie in its infinitude or its 
inexhaustibility, as the commentators of Anaximander generally assume, but in 
the fact that it is devoid of definite qualities that would lead to its passing.  Hence 
its name, ―the indefinite.‖  Thus named, the primal being is superior to that which 
comes to be, insuring thereby eternity and the unimpeded course of coming-to-be.  
This ultimate unity of the ―indefinite,‖ the womb of all things, can, it is true, be 
designated by human speech only as a negative, as something to which the 
existent world of coming-to-be can give no predicate.
78
 
 
Thus Nietzsche gives an account of the apeiron that resembles Schopenhauer‘s will as 
described in the above-quoted passage on eternal justice.  
 For Schopenhauer, the ―phenomenon‖ of the world of representation is the result 
of the principium individuationis, the individuating principle through which the 
singularity of the will is presented as plurality.
79
  Only through this principle do definite 
characteristics, absent from the will itself, appear in the world of representation.  
                                                             
77 PTAG, 47. 
78 Ibid. 
79 World as Will and Presentation, Volume 1, 416. 
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Schopenhauer also referred to this principle by its Indian name, ―Maya,‖ and sees it as 
being nearly as old a problem as Nietzsche does, attributing it to how ―Heraclitus 
bemoaned the eternal flow of things‖ and how ―Plato denigrated its object as that which 
is perennially becoming, but never is.‖80  To the person who is behind the veil of Maya, it 
is impossible to see the ―essence of things which is one,‖ but instead sees ―its 
phenomena, as separate, distinct, innumerable, most diverse, indeed in opposition to one 
another.‖81  Only those who can see through the veil of Maya can know the true nature of 
things. 
 
 
But eternal justice will be comprehended and grasped only by one who rises 
above cognizance that advances under the direction of the Principle of Sufficient 
Ground and is bound to individual things, one who is cognizant of Ideas, 
penetrates the principium individuationis, and becomes aware that the forms 
pertaining to the phenomena do not pertain to the thing in itself.
82
 
 
One must remember that Schopenhauer says that ―the thing-in-itself is solely will,‖83 so 
all references to the will in his work are references to the thing-in-itself and vice versa.  
This further connects Schopenhauer‘s will to Anaximander‘s apeiron as Nietzsche says 
―We may look upon it as the equal of the Kantian Ding an sich.‖84  Nietzsche‘s 
Anaximander is thus the man who has grasped Schopenhauer‘s eternal justice.  
Anaximander comprehends a dual world that is broken up between an undifferentiated 
something and that which emanates from it.  The former is necessarily eternal and 
                                                             
80 Ibid. 9.  It is interesting to note at this point that Schopenhauer at no point mentions Anaximander in 
neither The World as Will and Presentation, nor Parerga and Paralipomena.  In fact, Anaximander is the 
only figure covered in PTAG (including Empedocles, Democritus, and Socrates) not mentioned in either of 
Schopenhauer‘s major works.   
81 Ibid. 416. 
82 Ibid. 418. 
83 Ibid. 131. 
84 PTAG, 47. 
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constant, while the latter is immanent, temporal, and transitory.  And from this, he builds 
a moral judgment of the world.   ―From this world of injustice, of insolent apostasy from 
the primeval one-ness of all things,‖ writes Nietzsche, ―Anaximander flees into the 
metaphysical fortress from which he leans out, letting his gaze sweep the horizon.‖85 
 
1.2.5 The Debt of the World 
 
Yet Nietzsche seems less concerned with the actual composition of the apeiron than he is 
with the ethical ramifications.  His Anaximander asks us ―How can anything pass away 
which has the right to be?‖ and ―What is your existence worth?  And if it is worthless, 
why are you here?‖86  The answer that Nietzsche has Anaximander state is that nothing 
does have the right to be.  ―‗Your guilt, I see, causes you to tarry in your existence.  With 
your death, you have to expiate it… Who is there that could redeem you from the curse of 
coming-to-be?‘‖87  This sentiment is shared by Schopenhauer, who states, ―We are 
fundamentally something that should not be; therefore we cease to be.‖88  Man ―owes 
nature a death‖ and this proves to Schopenhauer that ―our existence is a debt.‖89  In fact 
Schopenhauer uses the metaphor of a debt to explain human existence. 
 
 
For human existence, far from bearing the character of a gift, has altogether that 
of a contracted debt.  Its settlement appears, imposed by that existence, in the 
form of urgent needs, tormenting desires, and endless hardship.  As a rule, our 
entire lifetime is expended in the paying off of this debt; yet with that, only the 
                                                             
85 Ibid. 48. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 World as Will and Presentation, Volume 2, 579. 
89 Ibid. 650. 
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interest is paid back.  Payment of the principal occurs through death.  — And 
when was this debt contracted?  — At the time of procreation.90 
 
Schopenhauer in fact goes as far as to describe the world as ―just a hell and in it human 
beings are the tortured souls on the one hand and the devils on the other.‖91  Thus the 
world is both suffering and punishing itself for the suffering that it inflicts on itself.  ―The 
tormentor and tormented are one.  The former errs in believing he does not share in the 
torment, the latter in believing that he does not share in the guilt.‖92  Since the individual 
is ―mere phenomenon,‖ then his differentiation from other individuals does not exist in 
the will itself.
93
  Eternal justice, which as we have seen must exist in the will itself 
because of its atemporality, thus carries itself out against the world as a gestalt rather than 
against individuals.  This is the natural state of the world according to Schopenhauer, and 
is in fact perfectly just.  He states that if the crimes of existence and the suffering that 
befalls all were to be place on a scale, the scale would be perfectly evenly balanced.
94
   
To answer Nietzsche‘s Anaximander (―Who is there who could redeem you from the 
curse of coming-to-be?‖), Schopenhauer would say that the guilty himself shall, but in 
the process accrue more debt, thus keeping the process going.  Thus the world actually 
manages to justify itself by constantly destroying itself, though this process must 
continue as an eternal cycle as the punishment itself calls out for recompense.  
  
 
 
                                                             
90 Ibid. 663. 
91 Parerga and Paralipomena, Volume 2, 300. 
92 World as Will and Presentation, Volume 1, 418. 
93 Ibid. 417. 
94 Ibid. 418. 
20 
 
1.2.6 Zarathustra Contra Anaximander  
 
The ghosts of Anaximander and Schopenhauer make themselves known once again in the 
second book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra.    When talking to a group of malformed 
individuals, the eponymous hero of the work describes the sickness of those who attempt 
to will backwards.  In their impotence in being able to affect the past, they try in vain to 
fix what was by way of revenge.  Note the language by which Zarathustra describes this 
phenomenon. 
 
 
The spirit of revenge: my friends, that so far has been what mankind contemplate 
best; and wherever there was suffering, punishment was always supposed to be 
there as well.  For ―punishment‖ is what revenge calls itself; with a lying word it 
hypocritically asserts its good conscience.  And because in willing itself there is 
suffering, based on its inability to will backward — thus all willing itself and all 
living is supposed to be — punishment!  And now cloud upon cloud rolled in over 
the spirit, until at last madness preached: ―Everything passes away, therefore 
everything deserves to pass away!  And this itself is justice, this law of time! That 
it must devour its own children‖ — thus preached madness. ―All things are 
ordained ethically according to justice and punishment.  Alas, where is 
redemption from the flux of things and from the punishment called existence?‖ 
Thus preached madness. ―Can there be redemption, if there is eternal justice?  
Alas, the stone ‗it was‘ is unmoveable; all punishments too must be eternal!‖ Thus 
preached madness.  ―No deed can be annihilated; how could it be undone through 
punishment?  This, this is what is eternal about the punishment called existence, 
that existence must also eternally be deed and guilt again!‖95 
 
The language of justice here all but quotes the declaration of Eternal Negation given by 
Mephistopheles.  At this point in Nietzsche‘s career, he has recognized that the 
pessimistic character is born of some pathology.  Yet to truly diagnose it, he requires 
some idea of how the healthy individual could cope with the problems of Anaximander.    
                                                             
95 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Book II, On Redemption. Emphasis mine.  
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And the Nietzsche of PTAG is still struggling to not become this pessimistic figure who 
he will diagnose a decade later.   
  
1.2.7 Anaximander’s Shadow  
 
Nietzsche does not believe the pessimistic figure of Anaximander satisfactorily answers 
his own questions concerning this injustice.  Anaximander introduced the problem of 
reconciling the becoming in the world with eternal being.  Yet his answer to this problem 
does not satisfy Nietzsche, who gives a rather gloomy end to a gloomy figure. 
 
 
Here Anaximander stopped, which means he remained in the deep shadows which 
lie like gigantic ghosts upon the mountains of this world view.  The closer men 
wanted to get to the problem of how the definite could ever fall from the 
indefinite, the ephemeral from the eternal, the unjust from the just, the deeper 
grew the night.
96
 
 
The call for illumination in this night is immediately answered in the first paragraph of 
the next chapter by Heraclitus.  Thus Nietzsche sets up the opposition between both 
Anaximander and Heraclitus, but also between Schopenhauer and himself.  Dale 
Wilkerson in Nietzsche and the Greeks gives this summary of the conflict between the 
two pairs: 
 
 
While Heraclitus refuted or stood outside conventional beliefs and intellectual 
trends, his thought ‗advanced‘ against Anaximander; against the pessimism 
activated in Anaximander‘s thought; against the separation of the apeiron from 
the world of time, space, and causal distinctions; against the judgment that 
‗injustice‘ characterizes the transformation of things into their opposites.  I will 
simply note, here, that Nietzsche perceived himself also to be advancing against 
                                                             
96 PTAG, 50. 
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the pessimism of Schopenhauer, while refuting or standing outside the common 
beliefs and intellectual trends of his own time.  Hence it is not difficult to detect in 
the contest Nietzsche draws between Heraclitus and Anaximander an analogy for 
that intellectual struggle Nietzsche saw himself carrying out against 
Schopenhauer.
97
 
 
While in his previous work, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche had provided ―a bulwark 
against Schopenhauer‘s pessimism,‖98 in his reading of Anaximander, Nietzsche 
provided a thinly veiled version of Schopenhauer‘s pessimistic philosophy to be defeated 
by the combined efforts of Heraclitus and himself. 
 Yet his reverence for Schopenhauer nevertheless shines through.  He is still 
referred to as the ―only serious moralist of our century‖99 and the pessimistic philosopher 
is always described as a bold, tragic figure.  While he is not able to answer the questions 
that he raises to the same extent as the affirmative philosopher (whether Heraclitus or 
Nietzsche himself), he still shows more bravery and honesty than any previous man.  A 
year after penning the Anaximander chapter, Nietzsche wrote that ―the Schopenhauerian 
man voluntarily takes upon himself the suffering involved in being truthful.‖100  The 
pessimist shows honesty and fortitude in his denial of the world.  Yet the archetypical 
pessimist must remain in darkness until someone who is willing to create, rather than 
deny, is willing to illuminate the way.  
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2. Heraclitus 
 
2.1 A Divine Stroke of Lightning  
 
Having left Anaximander in the deep shadows of the towering problem of cosmodicy, 
Nietzsche introduces the most dynamic figure of Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the 
Greeks.
1
  His introduction is accordingly dramatic: ―Straight at that mystic night in which 
was shrouded Anaximander‘s problem of Becoming, walked Heraclitus of Ephesus and 
illuminated it by a divine stroke of lightning.‖2  After being left in the dark at the end of 
the last chapter, Nietzsche‘s new champion brings us light, and not just light.  Heraclitus 
illuminates the night sky by means of the ―divine stroke of lightning,‖3 that is to say, the 
thunderbolt.  Besides having the evocative power of inaugurating Heraclitus as the Zeus 
of Nietzsche‘s philosophical pantheon, he also invokes the famous saying of Heraclitus, 
―The thunderbolt pilots all things.‖4  The proclamations of Heraclitus will not merely 
illuminate Anaximander‘s problem, but they will bring a form of order to them.  And just 
as Heraclitus will attempt to overcome Anaximander‘s pessimistic conclusions, so will 
Nietzsche try to dispel the pessimism of Schopenhauer.   
 
2.1.1 Early Interpretations of Heraclitus 
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4 Heraclitus, B 64.  Note that all translations of Heraclitus are taken from Kahn.  
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Nietzsche continues a long tradition of holding Heraclitus up as the exemplar of the 
philosopher, and also as identifying Heraclitus‘s views as being in line with one‘s own 
doctrines.  In antiquity the Stoics saw Heraclitus as a forerunner to their own philosophy. 
Nietzsche mentions this legacy in Ecce Homo, stating that the Stoics ―inherited almost all 
of their fundamental ideas from Heraclitus.‖5  Extant writings of the Stoics support this 
claim.  In the fifteenth section of his Enchiridion, for example, Epictetus instructs his 
followers to treat life as a banquet and not reach for that delicacy which has not yet 
arrived.  To join in the gods‘ company, one must adopt a similar attitude to ―children, 
wife, wealth, and status‖ and if one goes on to decline such things altogether one joins in 
the gods‘ power.6  The two figures who have behaved in such a way according to 
Epictetus are Diogenes of Sinope and Heraclitus; thus they ―came to be called, and 
considered, divine.‖7  Here we see Heraclitus held up as an extreme paragon for the Stoic 
in the same way that their Cynic forebears were.  Marcus Aurelius in his writings also 
reminds his reader to ―remember the words of Heraclitus‖ and goes on to impart 
quotations regarding the cycle of the elements and the lofty standards that Heraclitus (and 
subsequently the Stoics) had for men.
8
  The Stoics saw Heraclitus as being a sort of 
proto-Stoic, though Nietzsche thought they had ―reinterpreted him on a shallow level.‖9  
The Stoics were not the only Roman-era philosophical faction to claim Heraclitus as one 
of their own.  Justin Martyr, a first-century Christian apologist, claimed Heraclitus as a 
                                                             
5 Ecce Homo, ―Why I Write Such Good Books: The Birth of Tragedy,‖ 3. 
6 Epictetus, 15.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Marcus Aurelius, 4:46.  
9 PTAG, 65. 
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proto-Christian, along with Socrates, for his understanding of the Logos.
10
  Even in 
antiquity, then, many would claim Heraclitus, as one of their own.  
Philosophers after antiquity have also found much in the writings and life of 
Heraclitus that they wish to interpret through their own lenses.  Speaking of the scholars 
of Heraclitus since the early nineteenth century, Guthrie says ―some of these writers have 
been painstaking scholars, others philosophers or religious teachers who found in the 
pregnant and picturesque sayings of Heraclitus a striking anticipation of their own 
beliefs.‖11  Perhaps the most striking claim of this sort comes from one of the most 
renowned philosophers of the nineteenth century.  In his History of Philosophy, Hegel 
says that Heraclitus is the first philosopher to speak of the Absolute and was ―thus 
universally esteemed a deep philosopher and even was decried as such.‖12  Hegel goes 
even farther in placing Heraclitus within his system by proclaiming that ―there is no 
proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic.‖13  Hegel also devotes 
some of his history to biographical information, notably Heraclitus‘s ―relations to his 
countrymen the Ephesians.‖14  According to Hegel, Heraclitus ―began the separation and 
withdrawal of philosophers from public affairs and the interests of the country, and 
devoted himself in his isolation entirely to Philosophy.‖15 He thereby drew a clear 
distinction between himself and the ―seven sages as statesmen, regents and lawgivers‖ 
and ―the Pythagorean aristocratic league.‖16  This antipathy that Heraclitus has for his 
fellow citizens will prove to be a defining characteristic in Nietzsche‘s reading of him.   
                                                             
10 Justin Martyr, I: 46.  
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12 Hegel, 279.  
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
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2.1.2 Schopenhauer on Heraclitus 
 
A philosopher who shared Heraclitus‘s disdain for the state and the common man, Arthur 
Schopenhauer, also filtered the thought of Heraclitus through a very particular lens.  
Schopenhauer did not share Hegel‘s view of Heraclitus as a proto-Hegel, since 
Schopenhauer hardly thought of Hegel as a philosopher at all.  In fact, he held such 
disdain for Hegel that he was alarmed to learn that both enjoyed Mozart‘s Magic Flute.17 
Because of his own appropriation of the Ephesian as a predecessor,
18
  he could not see 
Heraclitus as a forerunner to such a rival.  While Hegel devotes a sizeable portion of his 
History of Philosophy to Heraclitus, Schopenhauer hardly mentions him in his own 
―Fragments for the History of Philosophy.‖  In the section entitled ―Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy,‖ Heraclitus is merely mentioned in passing as teaching ―the ceaseless 
movement of all things‖ in reaction to the Eleatic philosophers.19  By contrast, 
Schopenhauer presents us with a detailed anecdote about Pythagoras.
20
  The bulk of his 
own writing regarding the Pre-Socratics, in fact, is dedicated to Anaxagoras and 
Empedocles. 
It is only in his principal work, The World as Will and Presentation, that 
Schopenhauer makes explicit his own peculiar views regarding Heraclitus.  In the forty-
sixth chapter of the second volume, ―On the Vanity and Suffering of Life,‖21 
                                                             
17 Cartwright, 367. 
18 World as Will and Presentation, Volume I, 9. 
19 Parerga and Paralipomena, Volume I, 33. 
20 Ibid. 40. 
21 This quotation appears amidst a host of other quotations, including the verse from Faust that played such 
a major role in my last chapter.  World as Will and Presentation, Volume II, 656. 
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Schopenhauer quotes Heraclitus, albeit in a peculiar manner.  The quotation appears 
between lines by Plato and Theognis which are intended to convey that most of the great 
thinkers in history have agreed with Schopenhauer‘s pessimism.  Schopenhauer presents 
both the original Greek line and a Latin translation of it.  The quotation is translated in 
English editions of Heraclitus as ―The name of the bow is life; its work is death,‖22 but 
Schopenhauer‘s Latin translation comes out to ―Vitae nomen quidem est vita, opus autem 
mors,‖ or ―In name, life is life, but in effect it is death.‖23  The standard translation picks 
up on a Greek homonym that means ―bow‖ or ―life‖ (depending on where the accent 
occurs),
24
 yet the Latin translator has ignored the wordplay and translated both words as 
―life,‖ which helps Schopenhauer identify Heraclitus as a pessimist.  He refers to two 
original sources of the text, both in Greek.
25
  As David Carus and Richard Aquila note, 
this mistake seems to come from Schopenhauer‘s unfortunate habit of generally omitting 
accents and breathing marks from Greek quotations.
26
  As he is the author of the Latin 
translation, the mistranslation may be intentional, though it could also be the result of his 
sloppiness in reporting Greek texts.  Later in the same volume, Heraclitus is listed along 
with several other ancient thinkers, including Empedocles, Plato, and the Sibyls, who 
Schopenhauer says ―deeply lamented the sorrowful character of the world, hence taught 
pessimism.‖27  His Heraclitus lives up to the ancient reputation of the ―Weeping 
                                                             
22 Heraclitus, B48. 
23 World as Will and Presentation, Volume II, 671, n. 
24 Kahn, 201. 
25 World as Will and Presentation, Volume II, 671.  The texts in question are Etymologicum magnum and 
Eusathius ad Iliad. 
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27 Ibid. 711. 
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Philosopher‖ who despises and bewails the nature of the world.28  In fact, early in the first 
volume of the same work, Schopenhauer says that ―Heraclitus bemoaned the eternal flow 
of things.‖29 
As I stated in the last chapter, Schopenhauer had literally nothing to say regarding 
Anaximander, despite the fact that Nietzsche saw the latter as a proto-Schopenhauer.  
Despite this omission, Schopenhauer‘s interpretation of Heraclitus as a forerunner to his 
own philosophical pessimism resembles Nietzsche‘s Anaximander a great deal.  While 
Nietzsche sees Heraclitus as the antidote to the pessimism of Anaximander (and thus 
Schopenhauer), Schopenhauer sees Heraclitus as part of the Greek tradition of 
philosophical pessimism.
30
   
Both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche continue the philosophical tradition of seeing 
themselves as the natural progression of Heraclitean philosophy.  That said, Nietzsche 
exerts some effort to distance Heraclitus from a Schopenhauerian reading, and in doing 
so distances himself and all others who would do philosophy in his way.  In his Nietzsche 
and Philosophy, Giles Deleuze clearly outlines the goal of Nietzsche‘s reading of 
Heraclitus: ―Thus Nietzsche opposes [Heraclitus] point by point to Anaximander, just as 
Nietzsche himself is opposed to Schopenhauer.‖31  I agree with Deleuze‘s reading, but I 
will say that even though Nietzsche is stepping out of Schopenhauer‘s philosophical 
shadow, he still often works within a Schopenhauerian framework.  In his 1886 ―Attempt 
                                                             
28 His melancholia is described in Diogenes Laertius, IX, 6.  For references to Heraclitus as the archetypical 
―Weeping Philosopher,‖ see Lucian‘s ―Philosophies for Sale‖ and Montaigne‘s essay, ―On Democritus and 
Heraclitus.‖ 
29 The World as Will and Presentation, Volume I, 9. 
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at Self-Criticism,‖ written as a preface to later editions of Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche 
discusses his earlier dedication to the Kantian/Schopenhauerian schema. 
 
 
I now regret very much that I did not yet have the courage (or immodesty?) at that 
time to permit myself a language of my very own for such personal views and acts 
of daring, labouring instead to express strange and new evaluations in 
Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulations, things which fundamentally ran 
counter to both the spirit and taste of Kant.
32
 
 
While there are times when Nietzsche‘s allegiance to Schopenhauer still makes 
itself known, through the figure of Heraclitus Nietzsche is able to develop this immodest 
courage and forge the new language that he needs.  It is worth noting, though, that it is 
not necessarily the metaphysical content that separates the Heraclitean from the 
Schopenhauerian; often Nietzsche is still working in a distinctly Schopenhauerian 
framework.  Besides his doctrines regarding time and reason, which I shall examine with 
more detail in the coming pages, Nietzsche‘s metaphysics bears a distinctly 
Schopenhauerian stamp in not only Birth of Tragedy, but also his later works.
33
  Even 
Nietzsche‘s doctrine of the Will to Power bears more than a passing resemblance to 
Schopenhauer‘s Will to Life, but with an emphasis put on affirming the Will rather than 
denying it.
34
  Likewise what Nietzsche believes separates the Heraclitean view from that 
of Schopenhauer is how one aesthetically interprets these truths.  Nietzsche‘s Heraclitus 
thus adds three aspects to the Nietzschean philosopher: metaphysics of Becoming, the 
notion of aesthetic justification, and the noble bearing of the philosopher. 
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2.2 Becoming 
 
Demonstrating that Heraclitus has answered the challenge thrown down by 
Anaximander‘s proclamation of the guilt of the world, Nietzsche isolates the new aspects 
of the Heraclitean worldview. 
 
 
From such intuition Heraclitus derived two connected negations.  Only through 
comparison with the doctrines of his predecessor can they be illuminated.  One, 
he denied the duality of totally diverse worlds – a position which Anaximander 
had been compelled to assume.  He no longer distinguished a physical world from 
a metaphysical one, a realm of definite qualities from an undefinable ―indefinite.‖ 
And after this first step, nothing could hold him back from a second, far bolder 
negation: he altogether denied being.
35
   
 
This double negation contrasts itself both with Anaximander‘s philosophy before it and 
the legacy of Parmenides and Plato that follows it.
36
  Moreover, Nietzsche‘s later 
philosophy would be marked by these two negations, reaching its apex in one of his last 
works, Twilight of the Idols, showing these ideas to be central both to Nietzsche‘s early 
and to his later thought.
37
    It is worth mentioning that while Nietzsche has presented the 
negations as distinct entities, conceptually they are interwoven and overlap a great deal. 
  
2.2.1 The First Negation 
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The first of the two negations is the denial of ―the duality of totally diverse worlds.‖38 
This idea of a second world, distinct from the regular world of perception, appeared in 
the chapter concerning Anaximander.  Faced with a world of Becoming and passing 
away, Anaximander envisions a second, more real world.  This second world, the apeiron 
or ―indefinite,‖ lacks qualities and thus is immune to the vicissitudes of Becoming.39  
While Heraclitus rejects such a second world, similar concepts are found throughout the 
history of Western philosophy.  Nietzsche is not merely setting up Heraclitus as a 
bulwark against Anaximander‘s aperion, but also against Plato‘s theory of Forms, Kant‘s 
noumena, and Schopenhauer‘s Will, in addition to Indian and Christian ideas of spiritual 
worlds.
40
  In a page-long section of Twilight of the Idols, titled ―How the ‗True World‘ 
Finally Became a Fable,‖ Nietzsche provides a brief history of the increasingly 
unobtainable ―true world,‖ beginning with Plato, moving on to Christianity, Kant, and 
eventually positivism, which renders knowledge of the ―true world‖ completely 
unfeasible. Therefore Nietzsche proclaims defeat of this ideal.  ―The ‗true world‘ – an 
idea that is of no future use, not even as an obligation, – now an obsolete, superfluous 
idea, consequently a refuted idea: let‘s get rid of it!‖41  Heraclitus, however, was the one 
philosopher to escape such mistakes.  He knew that ―the ‗apparent‘ world is the only 
world: the ‗true world‘ is just a lie added on to it…‖42  Avoiding the pitfalls of later 
philosophers, according to Nietzsche, Heraclitus keeps ―the Greek view of the world 
[that] in no way distinguished body from spirit as matter and nonmatter‖ because for him, 
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―opposition between matter and the nonmaterial simply does not exist, and that is 
proper.‖43 
 
 
2.2.2 Heraclitean Intuition  
 
Heraclitus‘s ability to avoid the error of the ―true world‖ is tied not only to his denial of 
Being, but also to ―his extraordinary power to think intuitively.‖44  Nietzsche claims that 
Heraclitus arrives at such beliefs as ―everything forever has its opposite along with it,‖ 
not through reasoning of the sort that involves ―concepts and logical combinations,‖ but 
through pure intuition.
45
  This faculty of intuition Nietzsche describes as the ability to 
embrace ―the present, many-colored and changing world that crowds in upon us in all our 
experiences‖ and the conditions that make it possible, ―time and space.‖46   
This intuitive thinking is said by Nietzsche to have led Aristotle to label him as 
the worst type of criminal against reason: he violated the principle of non-contradiction, 
and was actively hostile toward reason.
47
  The principle of non-contradiction, according 
to Aristotle‘s Metaphysics is ―the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not 
belong to the same subject in the same respect.‖48 Immediately following this 
proclamation, Aristotle makes an explicit reference to Heraclitus, stating that some 
believe the Ephesian philosopher to believe that this is not the case, but that people do not 
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always believe what it is that they say.
49
  In other words, Aristotle believes that 
Heraclitus does actually believe in the principle, since to do otherwise would be madness, 
but merely stated such.  Aristotle believes that holding a ―Heraclitean‖ perspective leads 
to two unsavory positions.  One could be like Heraclitus himself, and state that absolutely 
everything is true, since every proposition and its negation must be true, thus literally 
everything is true.
50
  Worse, however, are those disciples of Heraclitus, such as Cratylus, 
who claim that since absolutely everything is in flux, that absolutely nothing can be 
stated.
51
  While Nietzsche invokes Aristotle‘s allegations against Heraclitus and his 
breaking of the most primal of all laws, his line of argument does not seem to want to 
pursue the more troubling aspects of this philosophical conundrum.  In fact, Nietzsche 
shows himself to be concerned with a different problem than Aristotle‘s reported 
Heraclitean nemeses.  Nietzsche is not concerned with the actual truth proposition of the 
principle of contradiction, but rather the way in which such propositions are made.  
Nietzsche‘s Heraclitus is not concerned with either proving or disproving the principle 
since that would be dwelling in the realm of the rational.  Heraclitus supposedly is a 
thinker of the intuitive, rather than the rational variety, so Nietzsche attempts to show him 
to be working in an entirely different framework.   
 
2.2.3 Schopenhauerian Intuition 
 
Interestingly enough, Nietzsche‘s description of the intuitive thinker versus the rational 
thinker closely mirrors Schopenhauer‘s view of feeling versus abstract reason.  What is 
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reason to Schopenhauer?  To understand his answer, a brief examination of 
Schopenhauer‘s epistemology is helpful.  Schopenhauer‘s overall project is an explicitly 
bifurcating one that makes clear distinctions between opposing elements.  Most notably, 
he divvies up the world into will and presentation.
52
  Though this is obvious to anyone 
who has even read the title of his principle work, what is perhaps less obvious is that 
these bifurcations rarely cut the world into even halves.  Rather, they separate the 
different elements of the world into categories where one might consist of the majority of 
experience, while the other is virtually empty.  Going back to the separation of will and 
representation, here we see a division that is, at least phenomenologically, largely one-
sided.  The opening sentence, ‗the world is a presentation to me,‘ initially suggests a 
monist view.
53
  Upon further examination of that brief sentence though, we see that the 
phrase, ―to me,‖ has great significance.  The world as presentation makes up the vast 
majority of what we experience.  Nearly every sentence that has ever been uttered, even 
in a philosophy text, has been referring to the world as presentation. The only direct 
experience we can have of the will is our own embodiment as corporeal beings.  
Schopenhauer calls this ―objectivization of the will.‖54  It is this firsthand experience of 
Being that gives us our only venture outside of the Principle of Sufficient Ground.  
Schopenhauer therefore says ―will is cognizance a priori of the body, and the body is 
cognizance a posteriori of will.‖55 Thus we can easily at least apprehend what reason 
cannot possibly be.  Reason is not cognizance of the will.  Direct cognizance of the will, 
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which is the thing-in-itself, is only available through the experience of the body.  As the 
world is only world and presentation, reason must have presentation as its object.   
 And what class of presentations does Schopenhauer subjugate to reason?  When 
introducing the sections on reason in World as Will and Presentation, Schopenhauer says 
this. 
 
 
But first we need to consider the class of presentations that pertains to human 
beings alone, the material for which is concepts and the subjective correlate of 
which is reason, just as the subjective correlate of the presentations so far 
considered was understanding and sensibility, which are also attributable to all 
animals. 
56
 
 
Thus we see that reason is that which distinguishes man from all other animals.  In fact 
Schopenhauer says that all differences between the two are the product of abstract 
reasoning.
57
  The class of presentations that make up reason is the abstract, while all other 
presentations are intuitive.
58
  Reason rules over the abstract, feelings over the intuitive.  
Thus for Schopenhauer, feeling has a rather banal definition.  As feeling is the negation 
of reason, feeling is merely all of those instances of the cognizance of perceptions that are 
not rational.  This definition is so ―broad,‖ ―heterogeneous,‖ and ―diverse‖ that it seems 
almost philosophically useless.
59
 
 Basically reason has only one function: the creation of the ―concept-formation.‖60  
Much more limited than the understanding, which is tasked with intuitive cognizance of 
                                                             
56 Ibid. 41. 
57 Ibid. 47. 
58 Ibid. 8. 
59 Ibid. 61. 
60 Ibid. 46. 
36 
 
the perceptible world and causality, concepts ―exist only in the human mind.‖61  Unlike 
intuitive cognizance, abstract concepts are always second order.  Schopenhauer compares 
reason‘s relationship with perception to the moon which only reflects the light of the sun 
and presents it as its own via ―borrowed reflection.‖62  Moreover, in his distinctly 
misogynistic style, Schopenhauer demeans reason as being feminine, saying ―reason is of 
a female nature: it can only give after it has received.‖63  This is because reason, for 
Schopenhauer, has content ―only by way of, and with reference to, cognizance of the 
perceptual sort.‖64  Unlike most prior philosophers who celebrated reason as a way of 
understanding the world superior to perception, Schopenhauer believes that reason is 
second-hand and that all that it knows, it knows through perception.
65
  He believes that 
perceptions should be called ―primary perceptions,‖ while Schopenhauer goes as far as to 
say the following regarding the difference between the two types of ―cognizance.‖ 
 
 
Perception is not only the source of all cognizance, but is itself cognizance par 
excellence; it alone is unconditionally true, genuine cognizance fully worthy of its 
name; for it alone imparts real insight, it alone is assimilated by a person, passes 
into his essence, and can with complete grounding be called his, whereas concepts 
merely adhere to him.
66
   
 
Schopenhauer then explains that both wisdom and virtue are the domain of perception, 
not reason, since both focus on how one interacts with the perceptual world, not the 
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abstract world.
67
 All rational thinking is second-order.  Moreover, ―cognizance of the 
relation of cause and effect on the part of the understanding is to be sure in itself much 
more complete, deeper, and more exhaustive than that which can be thought of about it in 
abstracto.‖68  In fact Schopenhauer says, in a rather vivid analogy, that abstract 
knowledge in the sciences compared to intuitive knowledge will always resemble a 
mosaic compared to a realistic painting.  ―However delicate the mosaic may be,‖ he 
writes, ―the boundaries of the stones are a constant factor, and therefore no continuous 
passage from one color to another is possible.‖69   
Moreover, ―perception is self-sufficient‖ and as long as one‘s reason resembles 
his perceptions, then he is immune to error, though not to illusion, which is the 
malfunction of perception.
70
  This distortion is due to the presentation being incorrectly 
copied and filtered through concepts.  Schopenhauer claims that ―every error is an 
inference from a consequence to a ground.‖71  This is typically the result of either 
supposing a ground for a consequence that it could not have, or assuming that a 
consequence can only have come from a particular ground.
72
  In his typically pessimistic 
and ascetic style, Schopenhauer believes that error is more likely to occur when one is 
experiencing pleasure
73
 or strong emotions such as love and hate.
74
  The relevant quality 
of error here though is that it is always the product of reason and is far more pernicious 
and lasting than mere illusion.
75
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What use then does reason have?  The vast majority of Western philosophers have 
championed reason over perception making it necessary for Nietzsche to highlight 
Heraclitus as being the philosopher of the intuitive.
76
  Why would anyone grant privilege 
to a faculty that, if we are to believe Schopenhauer, is derivative and error-prone?  He 
reminds us that ―knowledge, abstract cognizance, has its greatest value in its 
communicability and in the possibility of being preserved in a fixed form; only thereby 
does it become so inestimably important for practical matters.‖77  Without reason, man 
would be caught in an eternal present in the same way that the animals are.  With the help 
of reason, we are able to communicate that which is not immediately present.
78
  The truth 
and wisdom of perception ―can unfortunately be neither held firm nor communicated, at 
most purified and elucidated.‖79  Even this is ultimately unsatisfactory to Schopenhauer, 
however, and he laments the poor quality of communication.  
 
 
Unconditionally communicable is only the poorest sort of cognizance, that which 
is abstract, secondary, the concept, the mere shadow of proper cognizance.  If 
perceptions were communicable, there would then be a communication worth the 
trouble; but under the circumstances, everyone has to remain in the end within his 
own skin and within his own skull, and no one can help another.  To enrich 
concepts through perception is the unceasing endeavor of poetry and 
philosophy.
80
 
 
The information that is transmitted through second-hand means, such as books, will 
always be inferior to experience, since concepts are always general and thus ―not able to 
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descend to the individual.‖81  True wisdom and genius are rooted in the perceptual 
faculties.  They are both rooted in ―the entire manner in which the world displays itself,‖ 
the former being the product of experience and the latter inherent.
82
  Neither can be 
taught, nor communicated.  Since neither can be taught, understandably ―pseudo-
philosophers‖83 prefer abstract reasoning, which is communicable and easily manipulated 
to make ―broad and empty abstractions‖ to mystify their audiences.84    
We can now see why rational thinking, as described by Schopenhauer, is 
antithetical to Nietzsche‘s Heraclitus.  Besides sacrificing accuracy so as to be 
understandable to others (hardly an action that ―The Obscure‖ should take), it also fixes 
things in place.
85
  Nietzsche expresses a similar sentiment in Twilight of the Idols, when 
he bemoans the tendency of philosophers to kill and mummify living, changing things to 
hold them in place.
86
  Schopenhauer warns of the perils of the overuse of rational 
thinking albeit in a much less dramatic fashion than Nietzsche:  
 
 
Given the elevated press of life with its call for quick decisions, bold action, 
prompt and firm engagement, there is indeed need for reason, but when it wins the 
upper hand and hinders and confuses intuitive, immediate discovery and 
simultaneous adoption of the right course of action, purely in terms of 
understanding, and generates indecisiveness, it easily ruins everything.
87
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Moreover, error is possible only because of reason.
88
  In fact, madness is also a result of 
reason; Schopenhauer notes that with rare exceptions, ―animals do not go mad.‖89 While 
his championing of intuitive thought over rational thought never reaches the near fever 
pitch that is found in Nietzsche‘s description of Heraclitus, some common ground still 
remains.  
  
2.2.4 Heraclitus and Schopenhauer on Time and Becoming 
 
Even more direct links between the intuitive thought of Heraclitus and the writings of 
Schopenhauer are elucidated by Nietzsche when he describes Heraclitus‘s conception of 
time, showing how enmeshed in the Schopenhauerian framework Nietzsche still is.  ―As 
Heraclitus sees time,‖ he writes, ―so does Schopenhauer.‖90  According to Nietzsche, 
Heraclitus can perceive time and space ―intuitively, even without a definite content, 
independent of all experience, purely in themselves.‖91  This is confirmed by 
Schopenhauer who says of time and space that they ―can be perceptually presented on 
their own and apart from matter.‖92 Regarding the similarity between Heraclitus and 
Schopenhauer‘s conception of time, Nietzsche said,  
 
 
[Schopenhauer] repeatedly said of it that every moment in it exists only insofar as 
it has just consumed the preceding one, its father, and is then consumed likewise.  
And that past and future are as perishable as any dream, but that the present is but 
the dimensionless and durationless borderline between the two.
93
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Nietzsche is indeed correct in saying this.  In fact, this passage appears nearly verbatim in 
World as Will and Presentation, though Nietzsche does not cite it directly.
94
 Nietzsche 
continues the text with a passage regarding space and time having only a ―relative 
existence‖ is likewise acquired from the same paragraph of Schopenhauer.95  Continuing 
this line of thought, Nietzsche claims the following: 
 
 
This is a truth of the greatest immediate self-evidence for everyone and one for 
which this very reason is extremely difficult to reach by way of concept or reason.  
But whoever finds himself directly looking at it must move on at once to the 
Heraclitean conclusion and say that the whole nature of reality lies simply in its 
acts and that for it there exists no other sort of being.
96
 
 
Schopenhauer, lays out the exact same thought and acknowledges that ―this view is old‖ 
and that ―in it, Heraclitus bemoaned the eternal flow of things.‖97  Thereafter, 
Schopenhauer sharply disagrees with Nietzsche‘s view that one must necessarily move 
on to the Heraclitean conclusion, presenting several alternatives: 
 
 
Plato denigrated its object as that which is perennially becoming, but never is; 
Spinoza called it mere accidents of the one single substance that is and endures; 
Kant opposed that which is cognized in this way with the thing in itself.  Finally 
the ancient wisdom of the Indians speaks ―It is Mâyâ, the veil of deception, that 
envelops the eyes of mortals and lets them see a world of which one can say 
neither that it is nor that it is not…‖98 
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Nietzsche is exaggerating when he claims that when faced with Becoming and the 
impermanence of things, one‘s only option is to recognize the Heraclitean conclusion, 
though one can see that even Schopenhauer has to acknowledge that this is a ―terrible, 
paralyzing thought‖ and that all thinkers after Heraclitus have had to cope with it.99 
 This exceedingly Schopenhauerian discussion of time is followed by a long 
quotation from World as Will and Presentation (this time cited) where Schopenhauer 
admits the Heraclitean principle that ―only by acts does reality fill space and time.‖100  
This seems to me to be a bad case of editing on Nietzsche‘s part as the sentences that 
immediately precede his quotation in Schopenhauer‘s original text resemble the 
Nietzschean interpretation of Heraclitus even more than those included in PTAG.  
Schopenhauer states that matter ―is through and through nothing but causality, as 
everyone immediately sees as soon as he reflects on it... its being, namely, is its 
effectuality, no other being is so much as thinkable for it.‖101  This reads much like 
Deleuze‘s reading of Heraclitus in Nietzsche and Philosophy, ―being is the being of 
becoming as such.‖102   
To fully grasp this, it may be helpful to look at Schopenhauer‘s definition of 
causality.  In his doctoral thesis, On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, he explains that it is not objects that are causes, but rather states.
103
  That is to 
say, Schopenhauer‘s account of causality is not object-based, but rather event-based.  
While an object-based causality would look for the object that led to a change in another 
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object, Schopenhauer insists that we take a wider view.  He acknowledges that the object 
in a state that is the differing factor that causes another state to transpire should be 
isolated perhaps as a ―causal moment,‖ ―element,‖ or even ―condition,‖ but explicitly 
states that ―the entire state is the cause of the one that follows.‖104  It is the states of the 
entire world that lead to each other according to the principle of sufficient reason, rather 
than simply one object causing another object or state.
105
   Schopenhauer lays this out in 
On the Fourfold Root.   
 
 
There is absolutely no sense in saying that one object is the cause of another, first 
because objects contain not merely form and quality, but also matter which does 
not arise or pass away; and then because the law of causality refers exclusively to 
changes, in other words, to the appearance and disappearance of states in time.  
Here it regulates that relation in reference whereof the earlier state is called the 
cause, the later the effect, and their necessary connection the resulting or ensuing 
of one from another.
106
   
 
It is important here to remember that matter for Schopenhauer is the perceivability, or 
presentation of the union of space and time.
107
  While matter represents the realm of 
presentation, the thing-in-itself, the will, is even less stable.  Schopenhauer refers to the 
Will as ―constant striving,‖ a topic that Nietzsche explores later in this section.108  What 
this constant striving means though is that ―eternal being, endless flux, belongs to 
revelation of the essence of will.‖ 109   
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In other words, Schopenhauer has not explicitly denied Being per se, but rather 
has reduced it entirely into acting, or Becoming.  While I would not go far as those who 
claim that Nietzsche‘s entire reading of Heraclitus is Schopenhauerian, the similarities 
are fairly glaring.
110
  Yet I think it is important to note that the passages that Nietzsche 
quotes in regards to time are from the first book of the first volume of World as Will and 
Presentation, the book on Presentation, or how the world presents itself to us.  It would 
not be inconsistent for one to accept certain aspects of this part of Schopenhauer‘s 
philosophy without ever agreeing to the dual world of Will and Presentation that is at the 
heart of Schopenhauer‘s work.  In this manner, Nietzsche has committed to the veneer of 
Presentation without accepting the Will.  Of the Schopenhauerian passages I have quoted 
in the last few paragraphs, the only one that I believe Nietzsche would truly find 
troubling is Schopenhauer saying that Heraclitus ―laments‖ the eternal flux.  Later in this 
chapter, I will show how this will be the true breaking point between Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche.  
 
2.2.5 The Second Negation 
 
Heraclitus‘s ―far bolder‖ of his two negations is his complete and utter denial of Being.111  
Nietzsche has him proclaim this ―louder than Anaximander,‖ shouting while his 
predecessor had spoken in hushed tones. Becoming is all that he can see; there is no 
Being, merely Becoming.
112
  It is the hallucination of philosophers that allows them to 
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―see land somewhere in the ocean of coming-to-be and passing away.‖113 This evocative 
language appears to be meant to invoke a metaphor from Kant‘s First Critique.114  
 
 
We have now not only traveled through the land of pure understanding, and 
carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed it, and determined 
the place for each thing in it.  This land however is an island, and enclosed in 
unalterable boundaries by nature itself.  It is the land of truth (a charming name), 
surrounded by a broad and stormy ocean, the true seat of illusion, where many a 
fog bank and rapidly melting iceberg pretend to be new lands and, ceaselessly 
deceiving with empty hopes the voyager looking around for new discoveries, 
entwine him in adventures from which he can never escape and yet also never 
bring to an end.
115
 
 
Kant accurately describes the swirling uncertainties that await the metaphysical sailor on 
the open seas of Becoming.  The world of flux is indeed ―stormy‖ and those brief 
moments of the certainty that only Being could provide are ―rapidly melting.‖  Yet 
Nietzsche takes the entire analogy a step further, depriving our sailor of ―the land of 
truth.‖  Every piece of dry land is illusory in the ocean of Becoming.  
 In Nietzsche‘s reading, as we have seen, Heraclitus comes to these truths 
intuitively, which would seem to suggest that he knows them empirically.  Yet fifteen 
years later, in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche takes Heraclitus to task for not admiring 
the sensory organs highly enough: 
 
 
When all the other philosophical folk threw out the testimony of the senses 
because it showed multiplicity and change, Heraclitus threw it out because it 
made things look permanent and unified.  Heraclitus did not do justice to the 
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senses either.  The senses do not lie the way the Eleatics thought they did, or the 
way Heraclitus thought they did, -- they do not lie at all.  What we do with the 
testimony of the senses, that is where the lies begin, like the lie of unity, the lie of 
objectification, of substance, of permanence… ‗Reason‘ makes us falsify the 
testimony of the senses.  The senses are not lying when they show becoming, 
passing away, change…116  
 
I would like to first note that as late as 1888, the influence of Schopenhauer can still be 
felt.   Schopenhauer‘s belief is that only through processing the intuition through the 
concepts do we fall into reason, or even madness.
117
  But what I shall focus on primarily 
is Nietzsche‘s seeming condemnation of Heraclitus. Why would he condemn the 
philosopher whom he frequently lauds in much of his earlier work?   
 Nietzsche seems to have in mind the following Heraclitean aphorism: ―Eyes and 
ears are poor witnesses for men if their souls do not understand the language.‖118  The 
first clause of the sentence does seem to imply that Heraclitus finds the testimony of the 
senses to be unreliable.  Moreover, the source of the passage is Sextus Empiricus, the 
Pyrrhonian Skeptic, so a skeptical interpretation of the aphorism is understandable.  Yet 
notice the second half of the sentence; the senses‘ inability to serve as good witnesses is 
contingent on the soul not understanding the language, literally having a ―barbarous‖ soul 
in the original Greek.  What this refers to is one‘s inability to interpret sensory data if one 
does not have knowledge of the logos.
119
  A proper examination of what the word, logos, 
means for Heraclitus is beyond the scope of this work, but for our purposes, let us 
identify it with rationality, or literally an ―account‖ of the world.120  In other words, the 
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senses do not transmit correctly if one‘s ability to interpret them is wanting.121  This 
seems to be roughly what Nietzsche is saying in Twilight of the Idols.  The senses are not 
deceitful in themselves, but only in the misappropriation of them.  Moreover, Heraclitus 
gives a strong endorsement of the senses, saying ―Whatever comes from sight, hearing, 
learning from experience, this I prefer.‖122  Even another seeming condemnation of one 
sense, ―eyes are surer witness than ears,‖123 represents not a denigration of hearing, but 
rather a preference of firsthand experience over hearsay.
124
  Thus, Nietzsche‘s late 
scolding of Heraclitus seems not only inconsistent with his earlier works, but misguided 
in its interpretation of the relevant aphorisms.  
 
2.2.6 Heraclitus and Perception 
  
Perhaps, though, Nietzsche was referring to Heraclitus‘s aphorisms about the confusing 
testimonies that the senses do give.  Heraclitus was, despite the passages quoted above, 
hardly an empiricist.  In fact, many of Heraclitus‘s fragments address how different 
observers can give different accounts of the same ―object.‖125  In The Art and Thought of 
Heraclitus, Charles Kahn groups a set of these fragments together: 
 
 
The sea is the purest and foulest water: for fishes drinkable and life-sustaining; for 
men undrinkable and deadly.
126
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Asses prefer garbage to gold.
127
 
 
Swine delight in mire rather than clean water; chickens bathe in dust.
128
 
 
These fragments show the differences between the needs and desires of human beings 
and those of animals.  Kahn, in a fashion of which Nietzsche would approve, warns us 
against seeing these fragments as being an attempt to moralize and judge the actions of 
men by calling them bestial.
129
  He also brings up the ancient tradition of ―interspecies 
relativism‖ using Plato‘s depiction of Protagoras utilizing this technique in his 
eponymous dialogue.
130
  This technique was popular enough in the Roman world that 
Sextus Empiricus lists it as the first of the ―Ten Modes through which we are thought to 
conclude to the suspension of judgment.‖131  Sextus refers to the mode as ―the argument 
according to which animals, depending on the difference among them, do not receive the 
same appearances from the same things.‖132  By showing that the same thing is 
experienced differently by different animals, Sextus attempts to demonstrate that we are 
not sure if true knowledge of any particular thing can be apprehended.
133
  
 In his lectures on Heraclitus, Nietzsche attempts to use the mode with mid-
nineteenth century scientific theories to prove a slightly different point.  Rather than 
attempting to advance a skeptical position, Nietzsche wishes to show that ―whenever a 
human being believes he recognizes any sort of persistence in living nature, it is due to 
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our small standards.‖134  He cites a thought experiment given by ―a researcher in the 
natural sciences at the Petersburg Academy‖ in 1860.  The researcher posed the 
possibility that the inner lives of animals are experienced at a ratio proportional to their 
pulse rate.  In other words, rabbits have a pulse four times that of cows, so rabbits would 
experience the world as moving at one fourth the speed as cows do.
135
  Nietzsche asks us 
to imagine if this sort of thing were magnified to extremes in human beings.  If a human 
being‘s pulse were fast enough, a bullet in flight would appear to be moving at a 
standstill and the growth of grass would be as slow as the growth of mountains is to us 
now.
136
 What if we were to imagine the opposite, which is to say that the world appears 
to be moving a thousand times faster than how it appears to man?  Time would have the 
opposite effect.  A year would seem to be eight hours long; day and night would 
―alternate like light and shadow in but a moment‖; the sun ―would race along the arch of 
the heavens.‖137 If it should be a thousand times faster, day and night would disappear 
and ―the solar ecliptic‖ would appear as ―a circle of fire.‖138   
 What Nietzsche is saying with such vivid imagery is that what we see as 
permanence is merely the effect of our perceptions.  Things that appear in motion to us 
would appear as eternal to beings whose lives we could measure in seconds, while those 
who would measure our lives in seconds see our eternals as transitory.  It is only our all-
too-human perception of time that makes the world seem stable.  If we had the vision of a 
god, ―every shape appearing to use as persistent would vanish in the superhaste of events 
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and would be devoured by the wild storm of Becoming.‖139  If we could think even faster 
than we already do then we would have ―an even greater illusion of persistence,‖ and at 
some ultimate speed, ―all motion would cease, and everything would be eternally 
fixed.‖140  Nietzsche even seems to have some rudimentary understanding of modern 
atomic theory, saying that ―Becoming never ceases at the indefinitely small,‖ anticipating 
the constantly moving electrons that exist in every atom of every seemingly stationary 
object.
141
 
 In Gay Science, Nietzsche says that man ―placed himself in a false rank order in 
relation to animals and nature.‖142  This is similar to the Heraclitean fragments mentioned 
above regarding the difference of opinions between man and animal, in addition to the 
hypothetical creatures of Nietzsche that live lives magnitudes faster and slower than ours.  
This should not be read as Pyrrhonian Skepticism; neither Nietzsche nor Heraclitus is 
trying to show that the senses are completely unreliable.   Rather, ―every description is 
relative to an interpretation.‖143  Neither the ass, nor the man has the entire truth, though 
both of them hold part of it.  I do think that Nietzsche moves a bit away from his 
perspectivist outlook though, giving Heraclitus‘s ―intuitive perception‖ a privileged 
position.  He says of this perception, ―there is no thing of which we may say, ‗it is.‘ He 
rejects Being.  He knows only Becoming, the flowing.  He considers belief in something 
persistent as error and foolishness.‖144  I believe this strongly suggests that this is not 
merely an aesthetic truth, of the sort that shall be discussed below, but that Nietzsche 
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believes that Heraclitus has a privileged epistemological position.  His use of 
contemporary science and empirical evidence to bolster his claims regarding Becoming 
lend credence to this interpretation.  In fact, in his notes, Nietzsche attributes the 
quotation, ―humans in all their activities and in any of their arts only emulate the natural 
law and nevertheless do not recognize this,‖ to Heraclitus.145  This is not an exact 
translation of any of Heraclitus‘s aphorisms, but does show that Nietzsche‘s Heraclitus 
believes that the truth of nature predates man‘s interpretation. 146    
  
2.2.7 The One, Qualities, and Strife  
 
Having established that Heraclitus differs from Anaximander by having no duality of 
worlds, nor any concept of Being, Nietzsche establishes one final difference in the 
metaphysics of the two.  Heraclitus does not totally eschew the idea of the One, though 
his acceptance of it is very different from the doctrines of Anaximander or Parmenides.
147
  
He even goes as far as to say that if one listens to the logos one will ―agree that all things 
are one.‖148  Yet Nietzsche reads the Heraclitean notion of the One as very different from 
Anaximander‘s.   For Nietzsche‘s Anaximander, the apeiron is a One unified by its 
complete lack of qualities.  In other words, the apeiron is defined by its lack of definition; 
a definite quality would risk passing away or coming to be and thus must not be attached 
to the apeiron.
149
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 For Nietzsche‘s Heraclitus, though, it is the presence of qualities that defines the 
One.  In his lectures on Heraclitus, he affirms that Heraclitus sees the existence of the 
One, but in a manner that is directly opposed to that of Anaximander or Parmenides.  For 
those latter two thinkers, the presence of multiplicity is a hallmark of illusion.  Yet for 
Heraclitus, it is only through multiplicity that we may see the One. 
 
 
Heraclitus thus sees only the One, but in the sense opposite to Parmenides‘.  All 
qualities of things, all laws, all generation and destruction, are the continual 
revelation of the existence of the One: multiplicity, which is a deception of the 
senses according to Parmenides, is for Heraclitus the cloth, the form of 
appearance of the One, in no way a deception: otherwise the One does not appear 
at all.
150
      
 
Nietzsche ties this back to Anaximander, reminding the reader of the ―qualityless Being‖ 
of the apeiron, but asks how ―can that which is encumbered by qualities, Becoming, arise 
from the qualityless.‖151  Thus the One must have ―all predicates, all qualities.‖152  
Nietzsche states that the multiplicity that Parmenides denounces as the root of all 
deception is for Heraclitus ―the cloth, the form of appearance, of the One.‖153  The One 
imagined by Nietzsche in his reading of Heraclitus is the plurality of all qualities.  The 
world does not emerge from a qualityless apeiron and then develop qualities.  Rather, the 
One already contains all of the qualities of existence, since it is the totality of qualities 
that forms the One.     
Gilles Deleuze, a philosopher enamored with multiplicity, describes Heraclitus‘s 
multiplicity in Nietzsche‘s work in a way that ties it back to the first two negations.  
                                                             
150 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 63. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
53 
 
 
 
For there is no being beyond becoming, nothing beyond multiplicity; neither 
multiplicity nor becoming are appearances or illusions. But neither are there 
multiple or eternal realities which would be, in turn, like essences beyond 
appearance.  Multiplicity is the inseparable manifestation, essential 
transformation, and constant symptom of unity.
154
 
 
 Deleuze captures the danger of the incoherence of multiplicity either being a veil of 
illusion cast over qualities, or a transcendent essence.  If Anaximander or Parmenides 
were right and the world‘s primary character were that of perfect unity without 
multiplicity, then whence comes the apparent multiplicity of the world?  Even the 
existence of two worlds, one ―real‖ and one merely apparent, suggests multiplicity by the 
very nature of dualism.
155
  A worldview that accounts for multiplicity, such as that of 
Heraclitus, is the only coherent option.  Nietzsche describes this as ―not a world of unity 
as Anaximander sought beyond the fluttering veils of the many, but a world of eternal 
substantive multiplicities.‖156  Nietzsche does not want these qualities to be phantasms, as 
Parmenides would describe them, nor ―eternal substances‖ as they would be for 
Anaxagoras.
157
  Instead, these qualities are in constant struggle against one another, going 
in and out of existence.  ―Everlastingly,‖ he writes, ―a given quality contends against 
itself and separates into opposites; everlastingly these opposites seek to reunite.‖158  
Whatever appears to have any sort of permanence is merely a tension of these 
qualities.
159
  This brings Nietzsche to another quotation by Schopenhauer and also to the 
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real place where the chasm between the two begins to emerge.
160
  The passage from 
Schopenhauer is as follows.
161
  
 
 
Thus everywhere in nature we see conflict, battle, and the exchange of victory, 
and will later more distinctly recognize precisely in this fact the internal division 
that is essential to will.  Every level of the objectification of will makes matter, 
space, time contestable for others.  Persisting matter must constantly vary its form 
while, according to the directing principle of causality, mechanical, physical, 
chemical, organic phenomena, greedily pressing to come to the fore, tear that 
matter away from one another; for each would reveal its Idea.  Though the whole 
of nature one may pursue this conflict, indeed it exists only precisely through it.
162
 
 
Nietzsche says that the ―pages that follow this passage give some notable illustrations of 
such struggle.‖163  ―Notable‖ may be a slight understatement as Schopenhauer uses these 
vivid examples: the ichneumon wasp laying its eggs in the living bodies of other insects; 
the bulldog ant after having been cut in two proceeding to have a mortal battle between 
the severed head and tail.
164
  Also, notable is the glaring omission that Nietzsche makes 
in his editing.  After the point where Nietzsche cuts off the sentence, Schopenhauer‘s 
original text continues with a quotation by Empedocles (in the original Greek) which 
translates to the following: ―If strife had not been present in things, then all would have 
been one.‖165  While Nietzsche wishes to show the similarities and differences between 
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Schopenhauer and Heraclitus, Schopenhauer himself wishes to show that his doctrine is 
similar to that of Empedocles.
166
 
 Nietzsche points out that there is a large difference between how Heraclitus and 
Schopenhauer describe strife, saying of Schopenhauer‘s notable examples: ―the basic 
tone of their description is quite different from that which Heraclitus offers, because strife 
for Schopenhauer is a proof of the internal self-dissociation of the Will-to-Live.‖167  Not 
unlike the injustice of Anaximander before him, Schopenhauer‘s notion of the Will is ―a 
self-consuming, menacing and gloomy drive, a thoroughly frightful and by no means 
blessed phenomenon.‖168  Herein lies the real split between Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.  
He may agree with him on metaphysical issues, at least at this point in his career, but he 
is no longer willing to take up the life-denying philosophy of pessimism Schopenhauer 
associates with it.  While Heraclitus may have been portrayed as the Weeping 
Philosopher, Nietzsche finds in him a philosophy of affirmation.  Heraclitus answers the 
real concern of Anaximander, the injustice of Becoming, through the Heraclitean images 
of justice seen as the contest, as fire, and as the child at play. In doing so, he places 
himself apart from the gloomy and pessimistic philosophy of his predecessor.  Thus the 
justification of Becoming can be understood only if Heraclitus‘s unique views of justice 
are first grasped.  
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2.3 Justice 
 
2.3.1 The Earthquake and Pessimism  
 
Nietzsche fully acknowledges that the transition from a metaphysics of Being to a 
metaphysics of Becoming is a harrowing one.  Heraclitus‘s thought is ―terrible‖ and 
―paralyzing.‖169  Nietzsche uses a powerful metaphor to describe it: 
 
 
Its impact on men can most nearly be likened to the sensation during an 
earthquake when one loses one‘s familiar confidence in a firmly grounded earth.  
It takes astonishing strength to transform this reaction into its opposite, into 
sublimity and the feeling of blessed astonishment.
170
 
 
Nietzsche is fond enough of the metaphor to use it also in his lecture notes, where he 
places the observer in the middle of the earthquake so he ―observes all things in 
motion.‖171  The world of the metaphysician has been destroyed and everything that at 
one point seemed stable has come crashing down.  Yet why does this particular metaphor 
appear twice?  When it appears in the lecture notes it is accompanied with an allusion to 
the sea, but it appears alone in the manuscript of PTAG.  Why would Nietzsche select a 
metaphor of earth—rather than perhaps a conflagration, which would seem more apropos 
to Heraclitus—to represent cosmic strife?  The earthquake conveys well the sense of 
having the ground fall from beneath one‘s feet, to be sure, but I believe Nietzsche has 
something else in mind as well. 
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 Because this passage is indeed about finding ―sublimity‖172 in the midst of a 
natural disaster, namely an earthquake, perhaps Nietzsche is alluding to the Lisbon 
Earthquake.  This disaster, which struck on November 1, 1755, was one of the deadliest 
in modern European history, killing nearly a quarter of the city‘s 250,000 inhabitants and 
destroying not only the capital of a great empire, but also cities farther abroad in 
Andalusia, France, and Morocco.
173
   It could be felt throughout Europe for weeks and 
triggered tidal surges as far away as Finland and the Dutch East Indies.
174
  Yet the 
shockwaves it sent throughout European culture resonated even longer.  While Voltaire 
had once been a believer in the theodicy of Leibniz, that this was the best of all possible 
worlds, as Adorno states, ―the earthquake of Lisbon sufficed to cure Voltaire of the 
theodicy of Leibniz.‖175  In fact, one Voltaire scholar has gone so far as to say that the 
earthquake marked ―the death of optimism,‖ and it was this event that inspired Voltaire‘s 
1759 satire of Leibniz, Candide (not to mention its biting subtitle, Optimism).
176
  
More nuanced reactions to this devastation were born in Konigsberg, where a 
young Immanuel Kant stayed abreast of the debates, philosophical or scientific, that 
followed the earthquake.
177
  Eagerly collecting every report he could find, Kant 
proceeded to compile what Walter Benjamin refers to as ―certainly the beginnings of 
seismology.‖178  Kant‘s essays explained earthquakes as ―purely geological phenomena 
which were in no wise incompatible with the goodness and power of God.‖179  In fact, 
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Kant went as far as to argue that doubts about the compatibility of a perfect creation and 
natural disasters are rooted in ―ignorance, egocentricity, and presumptuousness.‖180 
 Kant took another tack on this matter several decades later in his Critique of the 
Power of Judgment.  Although explicit references to the Lisbon Earthquake are absent 
(just as mentions of earthquakes in general are conspicuously rare), Kant introduces his 
concept of the dynamic sublime, which attempts to account for the feeling one has when 
confronted with frightening natural phenomena.
181
  The sublime itself is, for Kant, the 
combination on the one hand of displeasure someone has when the bounds of his 
imagination have been overcome and on the other of the pleasure that he feels when he 
judges the inadequacy of imagination against the power of his reason.
182
   Describing 
nearly every major natural disaster except earthquakes, Kant says that they have the 
ability to ―make our capacity to resist an insignificant trifle in comparison with their 
power,‖ yet the more fearful they are, the more attractive they are. Thus they are sublime 
when we find ourselves in relation to them, but only in relative safety, in that they 
―elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within 
ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to 
measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature.‖183 In other words, the 
more horrific the event is the more that the dignity of man is allowed to shine through.  
An event as horrific as the Lisbon Earthquake could not help but be felt as sublime to 
Kant.  
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 The aftershock of the earthquake was continued to be felt in philosophical texts as 
late as 1844, since Schopenhauer references, albeit in passing, in the second volume of 
The World as Will and Presentation.  In his own attack on Leibniz‘s optimism, 
Schopenhauer proposes the complete antithesis of the theodicy: that this is actually the 
worst of all possible worlds.
184
  For any world that were any worse than this world would 
not be able to exist; our world always exists on the cusp of destruction.  He says ―This 
world, then, is arranged as it had just barely to be in order to persist: if it were a little bit 
worse, it could no longer persist.  Consequently one worse than it, since it could not 
persist, is not possible at all, it itself therefore the worst of all possible.‖185  Following 
this, he presents a number of things that could go wrong on an astronomical scale, before 
presenting his own view of seismology: one in which the Earth is constantly on the verge 
of destroying its surface. 
 
 
Under the firm crust of planets, in turn, powerful forces of nature reside, which as 
soon as some chance occurrence gives them leeway, must necessarily destroy it 
with everything living on it: as has already occurred at least three times on our 
planet, and will probably occur still more often.  An earthquake in Lisbon, in 
Haiti, the burying of Pompeii are but minor, mischievous hints as to what is 
possible.
186
 
 
Following this, Schopenhauer goes on to show the various atmospheric and ecological 
changes that also could spell total doom for life on Earth.  This is followed by a brief 
discussion of fossils of extinct animals, demonstrating that life on Earth actually has been 
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extinguished at different points in history.
187
  The Lisbon earthquake, which was a world-
shattering event for prior European philosophers, is a mere hiccup in Schopenhauer‘s 
cosmology.  Schopenhauer starts from a point of pessimism, wherein depict ing life ―as a 
desirable state and human happiness as its purpose‖ is a ―pernicious doctrine,‖ thus to 
him the upset of an earthquake is hardly an evil.
188
 
 Thus by using the imagery of the earthquake, Nietzsche is invoking two distinct 
feelings that the philosophy of Heraclitus should awaken in the reader.   First, as 
Nietzsche explicitly states, there is a feeling of sublimity that arises from this loss of 
one‘s footing.  While Nietzsche may not be as concerned with the dignity of man as Kant 
is, he is trying to evoke the aesthetic experience that the enormity of the Heraclitean 
earthquake inspires. Second, Nietzsche is once again joining the battle between optimism 
and pessimism that occurs in philosophy.  The strong opposition to optimism, 
championed by Voltaire in 1755, has already made itself known in PTAG in a perhaps 
exaggerated sense through the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Anaximander.  
Schopenhauer, incidentally, praised Voltaire for his ―war on optimism in Candide,‖ 
showing that he saw his French predecessor as a fellow champion of pessimism.
189
 
But what of theodicies and optimism?  Should we expect Heraclitus and 
Nietzsche to take the Panglossian side of Leibniz and Kant?  Five years after writing 
PTAG, in Human, All-Too Human, Nietzsche made explicit his opinion of theodicies and 
the debate between optimism and pessimism.
190
  First, he wishes to dispense with the 
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terms ―optimism‖ and ―pessimism,‖ because he equates optimism with the need to defend 
a God and pessimism as an attempt to attack belief in God.
191
  For his part, Nietzsche 
feels that we have moved past theological debates, asking ―what thinker still has need of 
the hypothesis of a God?‖ and ―who still bothers about theologians – except other 
theologians?‖192  Thus Nietzsche sees the question about the inherent goodness or 
badness of the world as irrelevant, at least at this point in his career: 
 
 
Disregarding theology and opposition to theology, it is quite obvious that the 
world is neither good nor evil, let alone the best of all or the worst of all 
worlds,
193
 and that these concepts ‗good‘ and ‗evil‘ possess meaning only when 
applied to men and perhaps even here are, as they are usually employed, 
unjustified: in any event, we must cast off both that conception of the world that 
inveighs against it and that which glorifies it.
194
 
 
This sentiment of 1878 is perhaps a bit cooler than some of his later works, but I believe 
that it is one that first makes itself truly known in PTAG.  Nietzsche says that unlike 
Leibniz, Heraclitus has no need to prove that this is the ―best of all possible worlds.‖195  
At the same time, Heraclitus does not answer to those who would find him ―gloomy, 
melancholy, tearful, sinister, bilious, pessimistic, generally hateful‖ for they are like the 
ones who need to refute the theologians, hoping to grind their axes.
196
   
Heraclitus, by contrast, wishes to make ―existence an aesthetic phenomenon 
rather than a moral or religious one.‖197  To understand this form of existence, Nietzsche 
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examines Heraclitus‘s world first as the agon, a contest between qualities.  Then he 
examines the doctrine of the conflagration or ecpyrosis, wherein the primal fire of 
existence justly consumes the hubristic world.  Finally, Nietzsche gives us perhaps the 
clearest, aesthetic worldview through Heraclitus‘s example of the ―child at play, moving 
pieces in a game.‖198  I shall now examine each of these permutations of Heraclitean 
justice. 
 
2.3.2 Agon: Justice as Competition 
 
As has been stated above, for Heraclitus, the world is filled with a constant struggle 
between qualities.  If we ever perceive permanence in a thing, it is merely because the 
thing is ―at variance with itself,‖ being drawn tight like a bow or a lyre.199 Nietzsche 
conceives of this tension between qualities as ―the diverging of a force into two 
qualitatively different opposed activities that seek to reunite‖; or perhaps the qualities are 
like two wrestlers, who in the course of the match exchange positions, the inferior 
becoming superior, and vice versa.
200
  Our limited view of this struggle might cause us to 
believe that the superior position is permanent and thus that quality is eternal, but this too 
is subject to change.  Imagine the modern sports fan that has seen his favorite team 
consistently have losing seasons for as long as he has lived in his town.  While he may 
gnash his teeth and assume that it is simply that his team is an eternally losing franchise, 
it probably has not always been this way, nor shall it be forever.   The opposite qualities 
inherent in all things can be seen in a similar way.  Although one may have dominance 
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for long enough that mortals perceive it as the truly permanent quality of the thing, it is 
but the ―momentary ascendency of one partner.‖  Nietzsche reminds us that ―this by no 
means signifies the end of the war; the contest endures in all eternity.‖201 
There is still the danger of viewing this contest in an Anaximandrian, or 
Schopenhauerian, sense.  It is easy for the observer to judge that the contest is proof of 
the injustice of existence.  As stated above, Nietzsche highlights this with a description of 
the struggle from World as Will and Presentation, asserting that the passage has a tone 
that ―is quite different from that which Heraclitus offers.‖202  Once again, this is 
Schopenhauer‘s view of the will that Nietzsche finds ―self-consuming, menacing, and 
gloomy…thoroughly frightful and by no means blessed.‖  Schopenhauer follows this 
characterization with several pages of grotesque descriptions of the most horrific 
manifestations of the will in the natural world.
203
 
In Hesiod‘s Works and Days, there is mention of a ―good Eris‖ along with the 
more traditional Eris who brings war.  The ―good Eris,‖ however, is the strife that 
continually causes humans to move forward, fostering healthy competition.
204
  While 
Heraclitus was no admirer of Hesiod,
205
 this sort of imagery provides Nietzsche with 
what he sees as the proper Hellenic and Heraclitean way of looking at the world.
206
  In 
―Homer‘s Contest,‖ an essay written one or two years before PTAG, Nietzsche stresses 
that this ―Good Eris‖ is a distinctly Greek manner of looking at the world.  The ―Good 
Eris‖ causes men to be envious of another, yet this is an admirable state.  It is only 
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through this envy that competition can arise so that men achieve greatness.
207
  In this 
essay, Nietzsche again praises those whom Heraclitus himself condemns, in this case the 
Ephesians who, according to Heraclitus, ―drove out their best man, Hermodorus, saying 
‗Let no one be the best among us; if he is, let him be so elsewhere and among others.‘‖208  
However, rather than prescribing that all the men of Ephesus should be hanged, as 
Heraclitus does, Nietzsche hypothesizes how the practice of ostracism originally arose 
among the Greeks.  If anyone ever did become the best, unchallengeable, then the whole 
idea of the contest would become untenable.  According to Nietzsche, the early Greeks 
loved contests so much that they forbade anyone who truly dominated a competition from 
continuing to compete.  As long as there was no clear preordained winner in a 
competition, then each competitor would improve himself in an attempt to win.  The 
Hellenic culture ―loathes a monopoly of predominance and fears the danger of this,‖ that 
is to say, an end to the competition and a state of stasis.
209
  Ironically, it seems as if in this 
one instance, the Ephesians understood Heraclitus‘s principle of Eris better than 
Heraclitus himself did. 
The same thing can be said of the contest that occurs between qualities in the 
things of the world.  In PTAG, Nietzsche says that the ―Good Eris‖ is at play here too.  
She has now been ―transformed into a cosmic principle‖ and the Greek spirit of 
competition has been ―transformed into universal application so that now the wheels of 
the cosmos turn on it.‖210  The principle that spurred on the Greeks to excel in athletics 
and drama has been used by Heraclitus to explain why it is that the world is in a constant 
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state of flux.  This constant striving and competition justifies the world.  The purpose of 
the world is the conflict itself, so strife justifies itself. Only by this strife can eternal 
justice be revealed.
211
 
Moreover, the judges of existence are not like the umpires and referees of an 
athletic competition who must sit on the sidelines as impartial observers.  The ―blissful 
spectator‖ and ―stern judges‖ are actually the competitors themselves.  Heraclitus ―could 
no longer see the contesting pairs and their referees as separate: the judges themselves 
seemed to be striving in the contest and the contestants seemed to be judging them.‖212  
This unification of contestant and judge seems both to solve and return to the problem of 
the one and the many.  On one hand, there are no cosmic outsiders who judge existence.  
The gods themselves, in Nietzsche‘s reading of Heraclitus, are purely immanent.213  On 
the other hand, Nietzsche acknowledges that this reading does seem to suggest that 
beneath the world of men, there is a deeper world, perhaps opening a back door for 
Parmenides‘ assertion that the senses deceive us, or Anaxagoras‘s belief that eternal 
qualities come from eternal substances.
214
  Nietzsche, however, believes that Heraclitus 
has a third way of solving this problem that ―cannot be guessed by dialectic detective 
work nor figured out with the help of calculations.‖215  
 
2.3.3 Fire as Justice and First Substance 
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 Nietzsche thus introduces the other two metaphors for cosmic justice: the fire, 
representing both the one and the many, and the world as the ―game Zeus plays.‖216  Fire 
shall be conceived in Nietzsche‘s reading of Heraclitus in two ways.  First, it acts as a 
unifying principle that is itself one, but out of which all other things come.  Second, it is 
the agent of the cosmic cycle of conflagration through which all things are destroyed and 
then reconstituted.  The conflagration will ultimately be seen to be the play of Zeus.  
The imagery of fire in Heraclitus has been subject to numerous interpretations.  
On the one extreme, we have the materialistic monist view of Aristotle, for whom 
Heraclitus‘s fire is analogous to Anaximenes‘s ―air‖ or Thales‘s ―water‖ as ―the most 
primary of the simple bodies.‖217  This tradition of reading Heraclitus as a physical 
philosopher would also include the Stoics, who as mentioned before, see Heraclitus‘s 
philosophy as containing a physical doctrine.
218
  The fire described by the Stoics is a 
literal fire.
219
   At the other extreme, we have a view held by the Stoics, which is 
interpreted by the Ante-Nicene Church Father, Clement of Alexandria, so that there 
would be a cosmic conflagration that would be the ―purification by fire of those who 
have led bad lives.‖220  It should come as no great surprise to anyone familiar with 
Nietzsche‘s philosophy that this latter, Christian, view is seen by him as ―a crude 
misunderstanding.‖221  Yet the conflagration, and fire itself, have more than a grossly 
materialist meaning.
222
  Nietzsche, as we shall soon see, does acknowledge that much of 
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the Heraclitean view of fire is taken from Anaximander, who in turn borrows much of his 
own position from Thales.
223
  Anaximander‘s influence on Heraclitus is also felt in the 
very notion of conflagration, which Heraclitus uses to develop his own idea of the justice 
of the world.
224
 
Nietzsche introduces the concept of fire in PTAG by reminding the reader of how 
Anaximander made warm and cold the primary qualities in nature.  When the 
―aboriginal‖ qualities of warm and cold combined, they formed the moist, ―the birth 
canal for all things.‖225  This provides both an origin for Thales‘s primal water and also 
helps explain the beginning of Becoming for Anaximander.
226
 Heraclitus‘s 
reinterpretation debuts when he makes ―warm breath, dry vapor, in other words…fire‖ 
the primal object rather than adopting the moisture of Thales and Anaximander.
227
  Like 
the two earlier philosophers, Heraclitus has all things born out of this fire as it takes 
different forms.
228
  As Clement had reported Heraclitus saying, ―The reversals of fire: 
first sea; but of sea half is earth, half lightning storm… Sea pours out <from earth>, and it 
measures up to the same amount it was before becoming earth.‖229  Nietzsche quotes this 
fragment, identifying it as ―the worldview of Anaximander,‖ whom, according to 
Nietzsche, Heraclitus considers to be ―an authority in the natural sciences.‖230  He also 
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cites Heraclitus‘s assertion that ―the way up and the way down is one and the same‖231 as 
proof that the cycle is complete and works both ways.
232
 
According to Nietzsche there is one major difference between the worldviews of 
Anaximander and Heraclitus: the absence of an absolute principle of cold in Heraclitus: 
 
 
While Heraclitus is Anaximander‘s disciple as to the main ideas, such as fire 
being fed by vapors, or water separating into earth and fire, he is independent of 
Anaximander and in opposition to him in that he excludes cold from the physical 
process.  Anaximander had juxtaposed cold and warm as equal terms in order to 
produce moisture from both.  Heraclitus of necessity could not allow this, for if 
everything is fire, then in spite of all its transformations there can be no such thing 
as an absolute opposite.  Hence he probably interpreted what is called ‗cold‘ as 
but a degree of warmth.
233
 
 
This rather idiosyncratic view appears both in the PTAG passage quoted above and also, 
nearly identically, in his lecture notes.
234
  In those notes, Nietzsche does not quote any 
actual sources when making this assertion and says only that ―we must probably 
attribute‖ the lack of absolute cold to Heraclitus.235  Heraclitus‘s view, at least as it can be 
reconstructed from the extant aphorisms, seems to contradict Nietzsche‘s reading.  In one 
aphorism, for example, Heraclitus states, ―cold warms up, warm cools off, moist parches, 
dry dampens.‖236   This aphorism seems to imply that Heraclitus is continuing 
Anaximander‘s changing of opposites into one another, without any substantial break in 
tradition.
237
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 So why would Nietzsche attribute the disbelief in cold as a property to Heraclitus, 
despite a fragment that seems explicitly to negate such a reading?  I believe that here 
Nietzsche is attempting to attribute one of his own metaphysical presuppositions to 
Heraclitus.  As Christoph Cox says in his Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation, the 
―critique of opposites and dissolution of differences-in-kind into differences-of-degree is 
a central feature of Nietzsche‘s philosophy.‖238  Cox gives several noteworthy examples 
of this feature, including the following from Nietzsche‘s works. 
 
 
Between good and evil actions there is no difference in kind, but at the most one 
of degree.
239
  
 
Let us beware of saying that death is opposed to life.  The living is only a form of 
what is dead, and a very rare form.
240
  
 
Actually, why do we even assume that ‗true‘ and ‗false‘ are intrinsically opposed?  
Isn‘t it enough to assume that there are levels of appearance and, as it were, 
lighter and darker shades and tones of appearances…?241 
 
Even when language, here as elsewhere, cannot get over its crassness and keeps 
talking about opposites where there are only degrees and multiple, subtle shades 
of gradation…242 
 
Cox could easily have included Nietzsche‘s view of Heraclitus‘s absent cold in his list.  If 
Nietzsche allows cold to exist in the Heraclitean worldview as a rival principle to fire, 
then he ushers in both an eternal absolute and a total lack of Becoming.  An absolute cold 
would have no ability to move both up and down in the eternal competition, becoming 
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warmer as it did so, for cold cannot be warm.  The absolute cold, if it were to exist, 
would be like the dominant contestant mentioned in ―Homer‘s Contest,‖ an eternal victor 
in the game of Becoming, for if it is truly untouched by fire then there is no way that it 
can be unseated in the fiery conflict.
243
  An absolute cold would be as dominant in the 
competition as a fire of which no greater fire can be imagined.  Thus it too must be 
banished from the competition.  What of the other Heraclitean principles?  Why not 
extend this to dryness or wetness?  This may simply be an oversight in Nietzsche‘s 
reading of Heraclitus.  It may also be an attempt to stay focused on the primacy of fire, 
which will make itself known in the sections on the conflagration.  Therefore, he speaks 
of the impossibility only of an absolute cold. 
 
2.3.4 Fire as the Cosmic Cycle of Conflagration  
 
But what are we to make of the other extreme?  What of the fire of which none could be 
greater?  This Nietzsche examines in the second aspect of fire, conflagration.  Briefly put, 
conflagration (also known as ecpyrosis) is the process by which the world is engulfed by 
an all-consuming fire.
244
  Nietzsche views the conflagration of Heraclitus as being 
another element that remains consistent from the doctrines of Anaximander.  Nietzsche 
says that Heraclitus ―believes, like Anaximander, in a periodically repeated end of the 
world, and in the ever renewed rise of another world out of the all-destroying cosmic 
fire.‖245  In PTAG Nietzsche speaks only of a much more general coming-to-be and 
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passing-away for all things in the philosophy of Anaximander; he thus never mentions all 
of creation coming-to-be or passing-away at the same time, except to ponder why this 
had not happened yet.
246
  In his lecture notes, however, Nietzsche denies prior 
interpretations of Anaximander (such as those of Eduard Zeller) which assume ―a 
coexistence of the countless worlds.‖247  Nietzsche instead posits this as Anaximander‘s 
theory of the existence of countless worlds. 
 
 
Correct are those propositions that guarantee that the world is destroyed, that the 
sea gradually wanes and dries out and that the earth is gradually destroyed by fire.  
Hence this world perishes, yet Becoming does not cease; the next world coming 
to be must perish.  And so forth.  Thus, countless worlds exist.
248
 
 
With this reading of Anaximander, Nietzsche lays the groundwork for a philosophy that 
must accept the consequences of such thinking about Becoming, namely ―the future 
annihilation of the world, infinite worlds one after another.‖249 He also notes that there is 
an evolution of the doctrine from Anaximander to Heraclitus.  According to his 
interpretation, Anaximander posited ―the gradual drying out of the sea, thus a gradual 
domination of fire.‖250  Having followed Anaximander this far, however, Heraclitus 
found that ―the influence of the forerunner was even great enough to draw him to a less 
than logical conclusion.‖251  Therefore, we shall examine what Nietzsche believes this 
―less than logical conclusion‖ is, and how it should be interpreted.  
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 Heraclitus, at least as is evidenced by the accounts of Theophrastus and the 
Stoics, continued Anaximander‘s view of a world that is repeatedly, regularly, consumed 
by a cosmic flame.  And like his Milesian predecessor, Heraclitus presumes that through 
the same process, the world re-emerges.  Diogenes Laertius, the Roman-era doxographer, 
recounted a summary of Heraclitus‘s doctrines that had been compiled by Aristotle‘s 
successor at the Lyceum, Theophrastus.
252
  What follows is the portion of that account 
that gives the most general, and perhaps thorough, view of the conflagration. 
 
 
Fire is the element, all things are exchange for fire and come into being by 
rarefaction and condensation; but of this he gives no clear explanation.  All things 
come into being by conflict of opposites, and the sum of things flows like a 
stream.  Further, all this is is limited and forms one world.  And it is alternately 
born from fire and again resolved into fire in fixed cycles to all eternity, and this 
is determined by destiny.  Of the opposites that which tends to birth or creation is 
called war and strife, and that which tends to destruction by fire is called concord 
and peace.
253
    
 
From this paragraph, we see the important elements of the conflagration.  Fire is the 
primal element of the universe, creating and consuming all things.  Moreover, there is a 
fixed cycle of ignition and extinguishing of the cosmic fire.  Also, the entire cycle is 
caused by the interplay of opposite forces, in this case ―war and strife‖ versus ―concord 
and peace.‖254 
                                                             
252 Diogenes Laertius, V, 36. 
253 Ibid. IX, 8.  
254 This view seems to privilege war as the superior force, though we might be able to imagine the 
dominance of peace as being completely outside of the force of war when it is in ascent.  Still, the fact that 
peace has to struggle with war makes it seem that war should probably be seen as the superior force.  
73 
 
Diogenes then goes on to describe the specific exchanges of heat and moisture 
that result in the transmutation of the elements.
255
  Charles Kahn in The Art and Thought 
of Heraclitus calls into question the account that Theophrastus gives of the Heraclitean 
corpus, particularly the sections that attempt to make Heraclitus‘s philosophy into a 
simplified, physical philosophy.
256
  Thus he sees the specific details mentioned after the 
passage mentioned above as being apocryphal and ―a childish view.‖257  The portion 
above, however, seems to differ from those later sections and Kahn believes it is quite 
possibly derived from Heraclitus‘s own book.258     
Kahn also cites two other doxographical records that give us accounts of the 
conflagration, one indirectly, the other explicitly.  The first is from Simplicius, who 
claims that for Heraclitus ―there is a certain order and fixed time for the change of the 
cosmos in accordance with some fated necessity.‖259  This seems consistent with the less 
suspect paragraph from Diogenes Laertius and is ―free of Stoic contamination,‖ so Kahn 
believes that it may very well be accurate.
260
  The second, like the rest of Diogenes 
Laertius‘s quotation from Theophrastus, presents us with a very detailed, but also 
suspicious view of the conflagration.
261
  It is quoted, probably from a Stoic source,
262
 by 
Censorinus, the Roman grammarian. 
 
 
There is a <Great> Year… whose winter is a great flood and whose summer is an 
ecpyrosis, that is, a world conflagration.  For it is thought that in these alternating 
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periods the world is now going up in flames, now turning to water.  Heraclitus 
and Linus <believed this cycle to consist of> 10,800 years.
263
  
 
Like the Theophrastus accounts from outside of the eighth paragraph of book nine of 
Diogenes Laertius, it seems to contradict the claim that little is known of the details of the 
conflagration.
264
  Moreover, giving an exact number is a practice that is virtually 
unknown in the writings of Heraclitus.
265
  Like the section from Diogenes Laertius and 
Theophrastus, this fragment seems to be based on a later reading of Heraclitus instead of 
his original writings. 
I quoted the section from the doxographical writings for two reasons.  First, it 
gives a clear account of the conflagration, uniting the elements of it that are found in 
more scattered, but also more authentic fragments.  Although a somewhat literal reading 
of the conflagration has fallen out of favor with some scholars in recent years, it has been 
the view of the Stoics, along with Kahn, Zeller, and, most importantly, Nietzsche.
266
  In 
fact, the doctrine had been questioned in Nietzsche‘s time.  Zeller states in his 1883 
Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy that attempts had been made to deny that 
Heraclitus held the view of a cyclical, cosmic conflagration. He argues that such denials 
were ―contradicted not only by the unanimous testimony of the ancients since Aristotle, 
but by Heraclitus‘ own words.‖267  Likewise, Nietzsche himself mentions that 
Schleiermacher and Lasalle opposed the conflagration, but that ―Hippolytus‘s book  
seems to remove any doubt that Heraclitus conceived of world epochs.‖268  Second, I 
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want to contrast the crude materialist reading that Theophrastus gives in the rest of his 
epitome with the more nuanced reading of the conflagration that Nietzsche gives.  
Nietzsche does not jettison the conflagration, but says that ―the Stoics reinterpreted him 
on a shallow level, dragging down his basically esthetic perception of cosmic play to 
signify a vulgar consideration of the world‘s useful ends.‖269  Before we can get to 
―cosmic play‖ though, we must unpack the notion of the conflagration itself. 
 Although a thorough analysis of whether the conflagration is authentically 
Heraclitean is outside the scope of this study, I do want at least to present textual 
evidence that the account found in Diogenes Laertius IX, 8 is a legitimate reading based 
on what survives from Heraclitus‘s own writing. The main reason for this is that 
Nietzsche, as shown above, appears to take the conflagration as a major doctrine of 
Heraclitus.   
The aphorisms of Heraclitus, found outside of doxographical writings, that 
mention the conflagration are not as cohesive as the previously quoted account, but still 
prove conflagration to be an authentic Heraclitean principle.  Clement has Heraclitus 
saying that ―the ordering, the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and 
is and will be: fire everliving, kindled in measures and in measures going out.‖270  This 
confirms the idea of an eternal, cyclical fire that in a measured fashion ignites and is 
snuffed.  Clement also has Heraclitus saying, ―The reversals of fire: first sea; but of sea 
half is earth, half lightning storm.  Sea pours out <from earth>, and it measures up to the 
same amount it was before becoming earth.‖271  While this is nowhere near as complete 
an account as Theophrastus gives (and Kahn suggests that it is probably as complete as 
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Heraclitus ever gave), it does suggest a cosmic cycle wherein the elements of the world 
are in a perpetual cycle of transmutation.
272
  Moreover, all of these transmutations are 
―reversals of fire.‖  That all things shall come out of fire and return to it is also suggested 
by a passage in Plutarch.  ―All things are requital for fire, and fire for all things,‖ writes 
Heraclitus, ―as goods for gold and gold for goods.‖273  A cycle of fire that produces, 
transforms, and consumes all things seems to be posited by Heraclitus. 
 Moreover, there are the passages from the book of Hippolytus that seem, 
according to Nietzsche. 
 
 
To remove any doubt that Heraclitus conceived of world epochs in which the 
plurality of things strives for the unity of the primal fire and a condition of 
miserable ―craving‖ (chresmosyne), in contrast to those world epochs of satiety 
(kyros), which have entered into primal fire.
274
 
 
What exactly does Hippolytus say that is so definitive?  In the fifth chapter of the ninth 
book of Refutation of All Heresies, while comparing Heraclitus‘s philosophy to the 
heresy of Noetus, he states the following.  
 
 
<Heraclitus> says ―the thunderbolt pilots all things.‖  By ―thunderbolt‖ he means 
the eternal fire.  And he says this fire is intelligent and cause of the organization 
of the universe.  He calls it ―need and satiety.‖  According to him, ―need‖ is the 
construction of the world order; ―satiety‖ is the conflagration.  For he says ―fire 
coming on will discern and catch up with all things.‖275 
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Once again Heraclitus is quoted as presenting an ―eternal fire‖ that is the ―cause of the 
organization of the universe.‖  Hippolytus also explicitly mentions the conflagration, 
though he never uses that word in an actual quotation of Heraclitus, and thus is possibly 
using the vocabulary of contemporary Stoics.  But the portions of Hippolytus‘s account 
that are quotations seem to support the conflagration interpretation.   
The fact that ―fire…will discern‖ or judge ―and catch up with all things,‖ 
moreover, introduces the idea of justice to the conflagration.
276
  This is supported by the 
aphorism where Heraclitus claims that if the sun steps out of line, the ―Furies, ministers 
of Justice, will find him out.‖277  Fire acts as the agent or personification of Justice, 
catching up to all things to bring them to judgment, in the same way as the mythical 
Furies did to matricides and oath-breakers (particularly if we think of all things as acting 
out of injustice as Anaximander did).  Moreover, fire has been identified by Diogenes 
Laertius above as identical to strife and warfare.
278
 If that is the case, and we take into 
account the famous aphorism in which Heraclitus proclaims that conflict or strife is 
identical with justice, then transitively it makes sense to say that fire itself is justice.
279
  
Fire also has been identified in Hippolytus, Plutarch, and Clement‘s earlier quotations as 
the principle of the universe.
280
  Thus it seems that the universe, having fire as its guiding 
principle, has an inherent justice.
281
  
This principle of justice through strife, destruction, and repetition is what 
Nietzsche finds so attractive in the theory of conflagration.  Even if we do not accept it as 
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a physical truth that the world is literally immolated and reconstituted every few 
millennia, there is still a deep meaning in the account for Nietzsche.  As I have already 
shown, Nietzsche believes that Heraclitus‘s philosophy is an antidote to the pessimism of 
Anaximander and Schopenhauer, largely through by supplying the world with immanent 
justice. 
 
2.3.5 Fire as Want and Satiety 
 
Central to Nietzsche‘s reading of Heraclitus is the interplay between want and satiety, as 
was quoted above in the passage by Hippolytus.
282
  In PTAG, he notices how Heraclitus 
characterized the conflagration ―with notable emphasis, as a desire, want, or lack; the full 
consumption in fire he calls satiety.‖283  From this, Nietzsche says that it ―remains for us‖ 
to determine how exactly Heraclitus interpreted the interplay between want and satiety, 
and the ―newly awakening impulse toward cosmic formation, the new outpouring into the 
forms of plurality.‖284  He, however, finds a possible solution in a Greek proverb that 
states, ―Satiety gives birth to hubris.‖285  Thus Heraclitus may ―perhaps derive the return 
to the many from hubris.‖286  In his lecture notes, Nietzsche puts it more clearly, stating 
that ―a satiated fire breaks out into a desire for multiplicity.‖287  The reason for this is that 
Nietzsche believes that Heraclitus possesses the idea that ―plurality is associated with 
impulsiveness‖ as a holdover from the philosophy of Anaximander.288  
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  Let us step back and examine the aphorism regarding ―need and satiety.‖  A fire is 
impossible unless it possesses both need and satiety.  A fire that is completely needful, 
but not at all satiated will die because it lacks fuel to keep itself lit.  A fire that has 
completely satiated, and not at all needful, on the other hand, is in the same position.  In 
its utter satiety it will not seek any more fuel and will burn itself out.  Thus to continue to 
exist, the fire must at the same time be satiated and hungry.  This fragment could exist 
within itself as a Heraclitean paradox, denying the Principle of Non-Contradiction by 
having fire be two contradictory things at the same time, in the same way.
 289
   Yet if we 
look at the context that Hippolytus puts it in, the fire looms larger, being the principle of 
the entire cosmos.  It should be mentioned that this could very well be the product of a 
Stoic contamination of the text.
290
  If the conflagration is taken as an authentically 
Heraclitean doctrine, then the description of fire as need and satiety is extremely 
important. 
Going back to the Nietzschean interpretation, the satiety that occurs upon ―full 
consumption‖ is ultimately transformed into hubris.291  One can imagine the self-satisfied 
flame that has engulfed all that there is to engulf.
292
  In its haughtiness and its lack of 
concern for those that it has immolated, it no longer remains fire in the proper sense.  If it 
lacks material for consumption, it cannot burn any longer.  It must cease being complete 
fire and therefore must allow a new world to spring from its ashes.  Nietzsche says that 
Heraclitus ―probably considered fire to be eternal, whereas the world had developed.‖293  
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Fire always exists as fire, yet the world has to come in and out of existence.  Although it 
may win the conflict regularly, fire must always show its hubris and lose some of its grip 
on the world if it wishes the conflict to continue. Fire is seen by Heraclitus as being the 
force of conflict,
294
 so it would lose its status as eternal competitor if it consumed all that 
there is to consume without recreating the world. It would thereby cease being fire.   
 
2.3.6 Fire as Punishment for Hubris 
 
 As I mentioned above, Nietzsche does not believe this to be the most logical proposition, 
but this worldview does present new options for answering the problems put forth by 
Anaximander, Schopenhauer, and other such pessimists.
295
  Nietzsche does use the 
conflagration in PTAG as his opportunity to introduce Heraclitus‘s countenance as the 
―weeping philosopher,‖ but in his lecture notes he provides an interesting solution to 
Anaximander‘s guilt.296   
 
 
We discover in this notion of hubris, in the notion of the development of the 
world, and in the notion of judgment by fire a facet of Anaximander‘s ideas that 
was not completely overcome: plurality is associated with impulsiveness for 
Heraclitus also; the transition from pure to impure cannot be explained without 
recourse to guilt.  The entire process of the transformation carries out the laws of 
justice: the particular individual is thus free from injustice.  Fire itself, however, is 
punished for its own inborn hubris by this craving and want.  Injustice is mislaid 
at the core of things; individuals are exonerated of it.  The world process is a huge 
act of punishment, the workings of justice and the consequent purification, or 
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catharsis, of fire.  We should keep clearly in mind the oneness of fire and justice; 
it is its own judge.
297
 
 
In other words, fire is ultimately self-regulating.  There is no need for an outside force 
coming in to pronounce or impose justice upon the world.  At first, one may draw the 
comparison between this reading of Heraclitus and Schopenhauer‘s world of self-
correcting justice.  As mentioned in my earlier treatment of Anaximander, Schopenhauer 
believes that the suffering of the world is just because it is merely the world punishing 
itself for the suffering it has inflicted upon itself.
298
  Nietzsche‘s reading is somewhat less 
harsh.  Suffering has not been meted out to the individuals of the world.  Instead, they are 
exonerated of any injustice; injustice is found only in the whole, not the part.
299
  This 
shows a fundamental difference between Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: both find the 
world to be unjust, but this brings the former to charges of immorality and the latter to a 
new amorality.   Schopenhauer sees the world as unjust and thus requiring punishment.  
Nietzsche sees the unjust world punishing itself and sees this as just, making the world an 
―unjust justice.‖300 
 
2.3.7 Hubris and Justice 
 
The language of punishment, however, becomes problematic for Nietzsche.  The degree 
of this varies between PTAG and the lecture notes. When facing hubris in the former, 
Nietzsche calls it ―that dangerous word‖ that ―is indeed the touchstone for every 
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Heraclitean.‖301  It is when confronting the idea of hubris that the Heraclitean must 
inquire into the guilt of the world of which Anaximander was the harbinger.  Oddly, in 
his lecture notes Nietzsche finds hubris a less compelling notion.  Dale Wilkerson in 
Nietzsche and the Greeks sums the contrast up in this way.  
 
 
In 1873‘s essay, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, he seems to accept, 
with some qualification, but absent commentary, the view that ―hubris‖ serves the 
Heraclitean worldview as a fundamental principle, through which the moral states 
of individuals, communities, and the whole of existence are determined.  In 
Nietzsche‘s lectures on Heraclitus, however, almost certainly revised in the 
1870s, Nietzsche‘s consideration of this point is at least clearer: to attribute to 
Heraclitus the proposition that hubris best describes the moral state of all beings is 
to completely misunderstand Heraclitus‘s view of the world.  In a Heraclitean 
system, moral judgments are merely expressions of human perspectives. 
302
   
 
I think that Wilkerson provides a viable explanation for the discrepancy, but I would also 
like to propose an alternative.   
I suspect that Nietzsche was more careful with structure in PTAG than he was in 
his lecture notes.  Remember that PTAG was intended to be published eventually and 
was even presented to Cosima and Richard Wagner.  Nietzsche‘s notes, on the other 
hand, were intended to be seen only by him (and perhaps heard by the young students in 
his under-attended courses).  Rather than a naïve idea in need of revision, I believe that 
Nietzsche is presenting a stage in the progression of Heraclitus‘s thought.  Wilkerson‘s 
presentation implies that it was a post-1873 innovation for Nietzsche to proclaim that 
Heraclitus has a non-moral view of the world, despite his saying in PTAG that Heraclitus 
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implores us not to ―make morality of‖ his system.303  For Nietzsche, the examination of 
hubris is a step in Heraclitus‘s thought.  By isolating the idea of hubris, Heraclitus 
receives the question of whether ―guilt, injustice, contradiction and suffering exist in the 
world.‖304  Before he can make the leap to cosmic play, he must confront this grimmest 
of all questions.   
With this progression, we can see a forecast of one of Nietzsche‘s most striking 
images of his later work.  In ―On the Three Metamorphoses‖ from Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, the pinnacle of the transformation is the creative child at play. Before one 
can take that step, however, one must experience the previous form of the grimmest of 
beasts, the lion.
305
  While I do not want to get too far ahead of myself, I simply wish to 
present the idea that Nietzsche intentionally has his reader trek through the wilderness of 
the moral interpretation of the cosmic cycle.  Gilles Deleuze provides a similar reading, 
saying that ―we must understand the secret of Heraclitus interpretation; he opposes the 
instinct of the game to hubris.‖306  I also suspect that Nietzsche is intentionally having 
Heraclitus wrestle with Anaximander to highlight his own struggle against Schopenhauer.  
So what is the Heraclitean answer to Anaximander‘s question about the existence 
of this cosmic guilt, in addition to the existence of ―injustice, contradiction, and 
suffering?‖  ―They do exist,‖ says Nietzsche‘s Heraclitus, ―but only for the limited 
human mind which sees things apart but not connected.‖307  The godlike eye for 
Heraclitus is one that sees things—all things—as good.  Nietzsche states that ―before his 
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fire-gaze not a drop of injustice remains in the world poured all around him.‖308  This 
echoes Heraclitus‘s own view that ―for god all things are fair and good and just, but men 
have taken some things as unjust, others as just.‖309  This is also the view that Nietzsche 
states in his notes, a view that is nonetheless absent from PTAG.
310
 But in his lecture 
notes, Nietzsche paraphrases the fragment mentioned above, saying ―to God all things 
appear as good while to mankind much appears as bad.‖311  The god that Nietzsche‘s 
Heraclitus presents is blind to our human labeling of things as good and evil. 
Now, obviously the god in question is not the Abrahamic one for whom Nietzsche 
would later provide an infamous obituary.  He (or it) is neither the grim lawgiver of Near 
Eastern faiths, nor the karmic balance of Schopenhauer.  Deleuze gives this god two 
names and several epithets: ―the player-artist-child, Zeus-child; Dionysus, who the myth 
presents to us surrounded by his divine toys.‖312  This figure is described by Heraclitus in 
another aphorism preserved in Hippolytus‘s Refutations.  Heraclitus proclaims ―Lifetime 
is a child at play, moving pieces in a game.  Kingship belongs to the child.‖313  Of all of 
the extant fragments of Heraclitus, this is the one that appears to have most thoroughly 
captured Nietzsche‘s imagination. 
 
2.3.8 Justice as a Child 
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In 1872‘s Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche is already inspired by the image of the cosmic 
child.  He describes the Dionysiac phenomenon as follows. 
 
 
That striving towards infinity, that wing-beat of longing even as we feel supreme 
delight in a clearly perceived reality, these things indicate that in both these states 
of mind we are to recognize a Dionysiac phenomenon, one which reveals to us the 
playful construction and demolition of the world of individuality as an outpouring 
of primal pleasure and delight, a process quite similar to Heraclitus the Obscure‘s 
comparison of the force that shapes the world to a playing child who sets down 
stones here, there, and the next place, and who builds up piles of sand only to 
knock them down again.
314
 
 
Here Nietzsche is describing the mindset that tragedy creates.  The breakdown of the 
principle of individuation is occurring, yet the destruction is playful.  While we may feel 
―supreme delight in a clearly perceived reality,‖ a reality that makes sense, we always 
have a desire to unearth this other, chaotic phenomenon, and thus to return to the state of 
the child playing.
315
  A second innocence is brought to what may otherwise have been 
considered frightening and destructive.  
 One year after publishing Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche returns to the image of the 
Heraclitean child in PTAG, not as a way of elucidating the tragic destructive power of the 
Dionysian, but now as the answer to the problem of guilt brought forward by 
Anaximander.  As stated above, Nietzsche has Heraclitus no longer seeing injustice.
316
  In 
order to find a language describing the post-injustice world view, he uses ―play.‖  The 
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world is now seen as the play of a child, or perhaps an artist thanks to Heraclitus‘s 
―sublime metaphor.‖317  The account given in PTAG is as follows:  
 
 
In this world only play, play as artists and children engage in it, exhibits coming-
to-be and passing away, structuring and destroying, without any moral additive, in 
forever equal innocence.  And as children and artists play, so plays the ever-living 
fire.  It constructs and destroys, all in innocence.  Such is the game that the aeon 
plays with itself.  Transforming itself into water and earth, it builds towers of sand 
like a child at the seashore, piles them up and tramples them down.
318
 
 
Nietzsche has equated the cosmic cycle of conflagration, both its destruction and its 
creation, with the play of a child.  Fire, the eternal actor, is represented as the child.  It is 
a constant in the world, not necessarily unchanging, but never either created or 
destroyed.
319
   
This is not to say that the world suffers no vicissitudes of generation and 
corruption thanks to the cosmic child.
320
  But Nietzsche is quick to separate this from a 
vengeful or hubristic deity, continuing his metaphor: 
 
 
From time to time it starts the game anew.  An instant of satiety – and again it is 
seized by its need, as the artist is seized by his need to create.  Not hubris but the 
ever self-renewing impulse to play calls new worlds into being.  The child throws 
its toys away from time to time – and starts again, in innocent caprice.321   
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Notice that once again we have the interplay between need and satiety.  The child on the 
beach can build its sandcastle as tall as it wishes, but its satisfaction (or satiety) is short-
lived. Eventually there will come a point when the child is bored and knocks its creation 
down.  Notice that there is absolutely no malice in this destruction.  Nor is there any sort 
of judgment.  The sandcastle has done nothing wrong and has not been found wanting; 
even the perfect sandcastle must suffer this fate.  Such is the case with the world.  The 
world should not feel guilt for being destroyed, but merely understand that it is at the 
mercy of the caprice of the child.  The child on the other hand, as Nietzsche says, is not 
acting out of hubris, for that would imply that it wishes to harm the object of its play.
322
  
But once again, the child acts innocently and amorally.  
 A less poetic, but perhaps more explicit description of the metaphor of the child 
appears in Nietzsche‘s lecture notes.  There are similarities between his accounts, but it is 
nonetheless worth noticing his emphasis on the moralistic and teleological consequences 
of this view: 
 
 
Heraclitus possessed a sublime metaphor… only in the play of the child (or that of 
the artist) does there exist a Becoming and Passing Away without any moralistic 
calculations.  He conceives of the play of children as that of spontaneous human 
beings: here is innocence and yet coming into being and destruction: not one 
droplet of injustice should remain in the world.  The eternally living fire, Aeon, 
plays, builds, and knocks down: strife, this opposition of different characteristics, 
directed by justice…We must exclude even more any moralistic tendencies to 
think teleologically here, for the cosmic child behaves with no regard to purposes 
but rather only according to an immanent justice: it can act only willfully and 
lawfully, but it does not will these ways.
323
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Here we have an explicit account of the actions of the child, completely innocent, without 
a hint of injustice.  Moreover, Nietzsche explicitly links the motions of strife and fire 
with those of the Aeon child.   
 
2.3.9 Justice as Play 
 
These motions of the Aeon child should not be conceived of teleologically.  Note that 
Nietzsche says that the child acts ―willfully and lawfully,‖ but does not itself will.324  
First, let us note the term, ―lawfully.‖  In PTAG, Nietzsche states that ―when [the child] 
does build, it combines and joins its structures regularly, conforming to inner laws.‖325  
Thus, while the child moves capriciously, there is some sort of lawfulness to its motions.  
Like a child playing a game, the cosmic child sets up rules for itself.  In his interpretation 
of the fragment, Kahn stresses that the child follows a set of specific rules, noting ―the 
fundamental thought is not the childlike and random movements of the game (as some 
interpreters have supposed) but the fact that these moves follow a definite rule.‖326  
Though I believe that he is one of the interpreters mentioned in Kahn‘s parenthetical 
criticism, Nietzsche still does seem to respect the necessity of some sort of rule.  Note 
here that Nietzsche has changed the metaphor of the aphorism from the playing of a 
board game, as is found in the original fragment,
327
 to the building of castles in the 
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sand.
328
  While one may be tempted to say that Nietzsche is attempting to choose a 
manner of play that is more chaotic than the one found in interpretations such as Kahn‘s, 
I imagine that the main reason for this change is that he is introducing a creative element 
to relate the child‘s play to the artistic endeavors of the aesthetic man.  Note that while 
sandcastle building does not have the rigid structures of a board game, it does have a set 
of inner rules that separate it from truly random play.  
The other notable aspect of the Aeon-child is that while it expresses itself 
―willfully,‖ it itself ―does not will these ways.‖329  In a footnote, Nietzsche explains this 
to be in contrast to the ―superficial‖ readings that the Stoics gave Heraclitus.  While 
Heraclitus ―embraced the highest lawfulness of the world,‖ he did so ―without Stoic 
optimism.‖330 What Nietzsche is equating with this optimism is their clinging to the 
doctrine of ―freedom of the will.‖331  He reads Heraclitus as being an opponent of any 
such doctrine of free will.  PTAG contains the following attack on the notion of free will: 
 
 
Man is necessity down to his last fibre, and totally ―unfree,‖ that is if by freedom 
one means the foolish demand to be able to change one‘s essentia arbitrarily, like 
a garment – a demand which every serious philosophy has rejected with the 
proper scorn.
332
 
 
If Nietzsche is alluding to a specific saying of Heraclitus, it is probably ―man‘s character 
is his fate.‖333  In other words, someone cannot change his character ―like a garment,‖ 
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which would be a prerequisite for any theory of robust free will.
334
  Nietzsche here is 
perhaps channeling Schopenhauer again.  Of character, Schopenhauer said that ―no one 
can be talked out of egoism or malice any more than a cat can be of its inclination to 
mousing‖ and that good character is equally immutable.335  Moreover, Nietzsche is 
adamant in asserting that ―every serious philosophy‖ rejects the notion of free will ―with 
proper scorn.‖336  Schopenhauer similarly claims that ―the touchstone by which one can 
differentiate the profound, thinking minds from the superfluous ones‖ is by their denial of 
free will.
337
  Thus, we see another holdover from Nietzsche‘s reading of Schopenhauer, 
albeit one that will persist into his later writings, notably On the Genealogy of Morality, 
where the idea of the free man is bred in an attempt to force responsibility onto him.
338
 
 By presenting the Aeon-child (along with all others) as not possessing ―free will‖ 
and acting lawfully, but not teleologically, Nietzsche also differentiates Heraclitus from 
his successor, Anaxagoras.  Having proposed a world where intelligence
339
 is found in all 
things, Anaxagoras ―construes the order of the world as a determinant will with 
intentions.‖340  This, Nietzsche believes, is what caused successive philosophers to 
imagine that the world desires consciousness, a notion that Nietzsche believes shows 
Anaxagoras‘s intelligence to be closer to the will, that is to say ―the willing after goals‖ 
than it is to other sorts of intelligence.
341
  Both the Heraclitean child and Anaxagoras‘s 
mind are defined by their desires, not by their contemplation. 
                                                             
334 PTAG, 63. 
335 The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 255. 
336 PTAG, 63. 
337 The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 59. 
338 On the Genealogy of Morality, II, 2. 
339 Nous. 
340 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 72. 
341 Ibid.  The ―will‖ here is a translation from Der Wille. 
91 
 
 Heraclitus does not propose a world without any sort of intelligence, according to 
Nietzsche; instead, he understands intelligence in a peculiar way.  Heraclitus speaks of 
wisdom when he says, for example,  ―it is wise, listening not to me but to the [logos], to 
agree that all things are one,‖342 or ―of all those whose accounts I have heard, none has 
gone so far as this: to recognize what is wise, set apart from all.‖343 Nietzsche writes that 
Heraclitus is not speaking of ―contemplative knowing,‖ but rather knowing of a different 
sort.
344
  How would one be able to achieve such different knowing?  Nietzsche proposes 
that we embrace the thinking of the cosmic child.
345
    
 
 
The fire eternally building the world at play views the entire process similar to 
how Heraclitus himself views this entire process; consequently, he attributes 
wisdom to himself.  To become one with this intuitive intelligence, not somehow 
to do this with dynamic things, is wisdom.  We must distinguish between the 
justice in the form of the trial and this all-contemplating intuition: this immanent 
justice and intelligence prevailing over oppositions and this fiery power 
overlooking the entirety of strife.
346
 
 
For Heraclitus, then, wisdom is not something found in humans to be imposed on the 
cosmic order, but rather something that one develops by assimilating the cosmic order 
within oneself.  Once again we have mention of intuitive thinking being the strength of 
Heraclitus and now we see its value as it mirrors the cosmic child.
347
 
 The sort of man who can achieve this childlike thinking is the aesthetic man.  
Familiarity with the interplay of plurality and lawfulness, of necessity and randomness, is 
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the strength of the aesthetic man according to Nietzsche.
348
  It is up to such great men to 
recognize that the cosmic cycle is ―the beautiful innocent game of the aeon.‖349  As 
Deleuze says in his study of Nietzsche, Heraclitus ―understands existence on the basis of 
an instinct of play,‖ making ―existence an aesthetic phenomenon rather than a moral or 
religious one.‖350  Moving from the view of the world order as being motivated by hubris 
to that of the cosmic child, moreover, Deleuze says in the voice of Heraclitus, ―It is not 
guilty pride but the ceaselessly reawoken instinct of the game which calls forth new 
worlds.‖351  Nietzsche puts similar words in the mouth of Heraclitus when he is 
responding to those who ask ―why fire is not always fire‖: ―It is a game.  Don‘t take it so 
pathetically and – above all – don‘t make a morality of it!‖352  The world cannot be 
appreciated in moral terms if thought of as the game of a child.  Nietzsche instead 
imagines Heraclitus gazing with pleasure upon this game as ―an artist does when he looks 
at his work in progress.‖353  By finding satisfaction in the chaotic interplay of the world, 
the Heraclitean man is able to understand a higher form of justice.   
  
2.4 The Philosopher’s Bearing 
The satisfaction that Heraclitus felt upon contemplating the divine game brings us to the 
third aspect of Nietzsche‘s interpretation of Heraclitus: the noble bearing of the 
philosopher.  As PTAG is intended to celebrate the ―slice of personality‖ and to create 
―the recovery and the re-creation of certain ancient names,‖ this is the section that should 
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truly embody Heraclitus as philosopher.
354
  The section is largely successful, containing 
some of the most beautiful language and profound proclamations to be found in 
Nietzsche‘s early works, though, as I shall soon show, it also represents an odd echo of 
previous writing. 
  
2.4.1 Heraclitus’s Obscurity 
 
The segue between Nietzsche‘s description of Heraclitean justice and the description of 
Heraclitus‘s bearing is the refusal to take seriously those who attempt to make a morality 
out of cosmic justice.  As I have stated above, those ―gloomy, melancholy, tearful, 
sinister, bilious, pessimistic, generally hateful‖ people are found to be ―negligible‖ to 
Heraclitus.
355
  To them, he ―condescends‖ and offers advice such as ―dogs bark at those 
they do not recognize‖356 and ―asses prefer garbage to gold.‖357  Yet the relationship 
between the pessimists and Heraclitus leads to his reputation as a particularly obscure 
thinker.
358
  Heraclitus‘s aphoristic style, combined with the difficulty of his philosophical 
project, might give the reader the suggestion of an inscrutable thinker.  That initial 
impression is bolstered with the received readings of centuries of frustrated 
commentators.  From that arises this reputation of Heraclitus, the Obscure.    Nietzsche 
actually believes that the reputation of obscurity is unfounded and is primarily an 
invention of the pessimists.
359
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 An example of this reading of Heraclitus ―the Obscure‖ can be found in Hegel‘s 
History of Philosophy.  As Hegel is not typically associated with clarity of writing, it is 
somewhat amusing to hear him speak of another philosopher‘s obscurity.   Hegel says of 
Heraclitus that he ―has been considered obscure and is indeed celebrated for this.‖360  To 
attempt to explain this, Hegel first looks at the explanations of two ancient commentators.  
On one hand, Cicero ―thinks that Heraclitus purposely wrote obscurely.‖361  Hegel 
dismisses this as a ―shallow‖ idea, showing the ―shallowness of Cicero himself.‖362  
Despite Hegel‘s derision of this view, it is worth noting that according to Diogenes 
Laertius, it was not an uncommon view in antiquity.
363
  On the other hand, according to 
Hegel, Aristotle believed that ―Heraclitus‘s obscurity is the result of neglecting proper 
composition and of imperfect language.‖364  Although it does not provoke personal 
attacks, Aristotle‘s thesis is also rejected by Hegel.  Why is Heraclitus perceived as being 
obscure?  ―The obscurity of this philosophy,‖ according to Hegel, ―chiefly consists in 
there being profound speculative thought contained in it.‖365  In other words, the 
difficulty lies in the fact that the ―Notion‖ or ―Idea‖ is ―foreign to the understanding,‖ no 
doubt accounting also for the obscurity of Hegel‘s own works.366 
 While Nietzsche disagrees with Hegel‘s actual account of Heraclitus‘s obscurity, 
he does similarly tie this reputation to complaints that have been made against his own 
philosophy.  Nietzsche declares that ―hardly anyone has ever written with as lucid and 
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luminous a quality,‖ thus totally denying the accusations of obscurity.367  What makes 
Heraclitus difficult, and ultimately obscure, for some readers is that he writes ―very 
tersely‖ and thus causes difficulties for ―readers who skim and race.‖368  This appears to 
forecast Nietzsche‘s own aphoristic style that would emerge several years later.  In 
1879‘s Assorted Opinions and Maxims, a supplement to Human All-Too Human, 
Nietzsche speaks ―against the censurers of brevity‖ and laments that novice readers are 
not able to grasp the ―fruit of long thought.‖ 369 In the very next aphorism, he scolds the 
reader who assumes that ―this work must be fragmentary‖ because it has been given in 
fragments.
370
  Thus there is a similar frustration with those who complain about a work 
that is terse and does not on first glance give the reader what he desires.   Such laments 
carry into On the Genealogy of Morality, where he claims that the aphoristic form ―is not 
taken seriously enough these days.‖371  The problem is that many who read an aphorism 
declare it to have been understood upon reading it.  What Nietzsche instead proposes is 
that an aphorism must be ruminated in the same way that a cow digests its food.
372
 
Thus the speed of reading is also a problem.  In the 1886 preface to Daybreak, 
Nietzsche says that he is living in an age that emphasizes speed, so his goal is to teach his 
reader to ―read well, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and 
aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers.‖373  In other 
words, he does not want his readers to ―skim and race‖ as they did with Heraclitus.374  
Nietzsche‘s Zarathustra makes a similar request, stating ―whoever writes in blood and 
                                                             
367 PTAG, 64. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Human, All-Too Human, Volume  II, 127. 
370 Ibid. 128. 
371 On the Genealogy of Morality, Preface, 8. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Daybreak, Preface, 5.  
374 PTAG, 64. 
96 
 
proverbs does not want to be read, but to be learned by heart.‖375  Therefore it is not 
Heraclitus who is obscure, but the reader who is incompetent and rushed in his reading.  
Furthermore, Nietzsche cannot fathom why any writer would make a deliberate 
effort to be read as obscure, unless he had ―good cause for hiding certain thoughts, or else 
were rascal enough to hide his thoughtlessness behind words.‖376  At this point, Nietzsche 
agrees with Hegel‘s assertion regarding the reading of Heraclitus given by Cicero.377  But 
Nietzsche instead brings in Hegel‘s nemesis, Schopenhauer to elucidate this point.  
Nietzsche says that Schopenhauer calls on us to write clearly about ―those most difficult, 
abstruse, scarcely attainable goals of thinking that it is philosophy‘s task to express.‖378  
While Nietzsche does not explicitly reference any specific passage by Schopenhauer, 
there are numerous examples of such sentiments, usually leveling attacks against Hegel.  
A quintessential example occurs in the examination of sculpture in the third book of The 
World as Will and Presentation.  After having discussed whether it is aesthetically 
preferable to have statues be clothed or nude, Schopenhauer goes on this tangent. 
 
 
Just as beautiful corporeal form is most advantageously visible with the lightest of 
clothing or none at all – and therefore a most beautiful man, if he had taste and 
was at the same time able to follow it, would preferably walk around nearly 
naked, clothed only after the manner of the ancients – just in the same way, every 
beautiful and inspired spirit will always express itself in the most natural, least 
involved, simplest manner, endeavoring whenever possible to communicate his 
thoughts to others, so as thereby  to alleviate the loneliness that he is bound to feel 
in a world such as this.  But conversely, spiritual poverty, confusion, and 
contortedness clothe themselves in the most contrived expressions and the most 
obscure modes of speech, so as to cloak in weighty and pompous phrases, trivial, 
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minute, dull, or everyday thoughts: like someone who, because he is lacking in 
beauty‘s majesty, would compensate for the failure with clothing, and seek to hide 
the minuteness or ugliness of his person under barbaric trimmings, glitter, 
feathers, ruffles, puffs, and cloaks.  Just as embarrassed as one such as this would 
be, were he to have to go naked, many an author would be, were he compelled to 
translate his so pompous, obscure book into its trivial, clear content.
379
 
 
The philosopher of substance, according to Schopenhauer, is marked by his clarity, not 
his obscurity.   Nietzsche cites Schopenhauer and the Romantic novelist, Jean Paul, 
whom he quotes in this section, as being the champions of clarity in writing, which itself 
is to Nietzsche a trademark of Heraclitus.
380
  
 Despite his clarity, Nietzsche said that ―Heraclitus has not escaped ‗barren 
minds,‘‖ borrowing a phrase from Jean Paul.381  As I have already mentioned, Nietzsche 
singles out the Stoics as interpreting Heraclitus ―on a shallow level.‖382 The Stoics 
commit the crime of taking Heraclitus‘s notion of the Great Year, which he interprets as 
an ―aesthetic perception of cosmic play‖ and dumbing it down to ―a vulgar consideration 
for the world‘s useful ends.‖383  Here Nietzsche harks back to his chapter on Thales, 
where he quotes Aristotle‘s Nichomachean Ethics: ―What Thales and Anaxagoras know 
will be considered unusual, astonishing, difficult, and divine, but never useful, for their 
concern was not with the good of humanity.‖384  Adopting Aristotle‘s judgment, 
Nietzsche differentiates philosophy from ―intellectual cleverness‖ by the former‘s 
―emphasis on the useless.‖385  The Stoics in their reading of Heraclitus have moved away 
                                                             
379 World as Will and Presentation, Volume I, 271.  
380 PTAG, 65. 
381 Ibid. 
382 Ibid. 
383 Ibid. 
384 Aristotle, 1141b, 4–8.  I have quoted Nietzsche‘s translation from PTAG, 43. 
385 PTAG, 43.  Note that Cowan has translated the German term Klugheit as ―intellectual cleverness,‖ but it 
can also be rendered more generously as ―prudence.‖ 
98 
 
from philosophy into the realm of science and into the more mortal, less discriminating 
realm of science.  Rather than ―name-giving‖ and ―legislating‖ greatness as philosophers 
do when dealing with aesthetic ideas,
386
 the Stoics translate it into ―crude optimism.‖387 
They have taken the lofty philosophy of Heraclitus down to ―Tom, Dick, and Harry,‖ an 
unforgivable act of democratization.
388
  Not only have they taken the flame of the gods 
down to man, this Promethean rabble use it to invite hoi polloi with the concluding 
injunction of Roman comedy: plaudite amici.
389
  
  
2.4.2 Adapting a Preface 
 
This attack on ―Tom, Dick, and Harry‖ and those who would cater to them, appropriately 
leads into the eighth chapter of PTAG.  Nietzsche here describes the pride of Heraclitus, 
but also commits a strange act of self-plagiarism.  While there are probably several other 
reasons for his disapproval, Richard Wagner may have had an experience of déjà vu 
when reading PTAG.  Several months before his presentation and eventual abandonment 
of PTAG, Nietzsche had provided Cosima Wagner with a collection of five essays, titled 
Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books as a Christmas gift.
390
  The work was then read 
aloud by the Wagners on New Year‘s Day 1873.391  Included among those five prefaces 
was ―On the Pathos of Truth,‖ which included a passage regarding Heraclitus that 
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Nietzsche would recycle nearly verbatim in the eighth chapter of PTAG.
392
  As ―On the 
Pathos of Truth‖ is a discourse on fame and how it relates to philosophers, Heraclitus 
would be an obvious subject for Nietzsche.  When it came time, several months later to 
revisit Heraclitus, Nietzsche removed the first three paragraphs of ―On the Pathos of 
Truth,‖ changed the focus of the fourth paragraph from a hypothetical philosopher to 
Heraclitus explicitly, and replaced the final paragraphs with a new conclusion.
393
 
 
2.4.3 Heraclitus’s Solitude 
 
Nietzsche‘s characterization of Heraclitus in this chapter is marked by a heroic solitude.  
He is portrayed predominantly as a lonesome hermit, one who despises the company of 
the public.  In this reading, Nietzsche is not straying far from the traditional view of 
Heraclitus espoused by Diogenes Laertius.  The doxographer describes him in the very 
first paragraph of the account of his life as ―lofty-minded beyond all other men, and 
overweening.‖394  Later in his life, Heraclitus became ―a hater of his kind and wandered 
on the mountains,‖ living on a ―diet of grass and herbs‖ that led to his eventual death by 
dropsy.
395
  Thus the image of the philosopher who walks ―alone along a lonely street‖ is 
part of the traditional image of Heraclitus.
396
   
 Several of the anecdotes Diogenes relates about Heraclitus make their way into 
Nietzsche‘s writings. Heraclitus is used to continue the archetype of the philosopher who 
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chooses not to be a leader of men.
397
  Diogenes Laertius reproduces two epistles 
exchanged between King Darius of Persia and Heraclitus, wherein Darius invites 
Heraclitus to teach him philosophy and Greek culture, particularly because Darius 
believes that the Greeks ―are not prone to mark their wise men,‖  while the Persians wish 
to hear what the great philosopher has to say.
398
  But as Nietzsche states in his lectures, 
Heraclitus scorned this invitation.
399
  As with many of Diogenes Laertius‘s tales, this one 
is probably apocryphal, but Nietzsche thought it worthy of noting as it supports his vision 
of the Ephesian philosopher.  Heraclitus desires fame, not among mortals, not even the 
most powerful king, but the fame of immortality.
400
 
 A story regarding Heraclitus that leaves a deeper impression on Nietzsche‘s work 
is the one regarding his retreat to the temple of Artemis. After describing how Heraclitus 
refused to create laws for Ephesus, seeing it as already having a bad constitution, 
Diogenes Laertius says the following: 
He would retire to the temple of Artemis and play at knuckle-bones with the boys; 
and when the Ephesians stood round him and looked on, ―Why, you rascals,‖ he 
said, ―are you astonished?  Is it not better to do this than to take part in your civil 
life?
401
 
 
The report of this incident definitely made an impression on Nietzsche. It is repeated in 
the first paragraph of his lecture on Heraclitus, wherein he refers to him as a ―merciless 
opponent of democratic parties‖ and speaks of his retreat from the political life.402  While 
there is not a complete retelling of the tale in PTAG, Nietzsche does give Heraclitus the 
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epithet, ―the Ephesian hermit of the temple of Artemis,‖ further demonstrating the 
vividness of this tale in Nietzsche‘s portrait of Heraclitus.403 
 While it should come as no surprise that Nietzsche would relate such a story in 
works primarily concerned with Heraclitus, what is more interesting is that this incident 
would appear in his writings over a decade later.  In the third essay of On the Genealogy 
of Morality, ―What Do Ascetic Ideals Mean?,‖ Nietzsche describes the influence of the 
ascetic ideal on philosophers and recounts the incident as an example, albeit with more 
commentary than in previous iterations: 
When Heraclitus withdrew into the courts and colonnades of the immense Temple 
of Artemis, I admit that this ‗desert‘ was more dignified: why do we lack temples 
of that sort? (– maybe they are not lacking: I am just thinking of my nicest study, 
Piazza di San Marco, spring, of course and in the morning, the time between ten 
and twelve).  But what Heraclitus was trying to avoid is the same that we try to 
get away from: the noise and democratic tittle-tattle of the Ephesians, their 
politics, news of the ‗Empire‘404 (Persia, you understand), their market affairs of 
‗today‘, – because we philosophers need rest from one thing above all: anything 
to do with ‗today.‘405 
 
Here Heraclitus‘s retreat to the Temple of Artemis represents his removal of himself from 
the concerns of lesser men for all things temporary and fleeting.  This echoes his 
description in ―On the Pathos of Truth‖ of the philosopher who seeks fame, not out of 
―self-love,‖ nor to please the masses, but to achieve something that is ―eternally 
present.‖406  According to PTAG, ―a lack of consideration for what is here and now is at 
the very core of the great philosophical nature.‖407   
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There might seem to be some a conflict between a philosophy of Becoming and a 
focus on that which is eternal.  But there is no worry: the philosopher himself is fleeting; 
he does not need ―the immortality of the man Heraclitus.‖408  And even ―the ‗truth‘ of 
Heraclitus‖ is gone like a ―vanished dream, wiped from faces of mankind.‖409  Can we 
attribute any sort of immortality to Heraclitus, whose works have fallen to a sort of 
malicious ―fatum libellorum‖?410  If we can, it is only through the scant fragments that 
survive and, more importantly to Nietzsche, the nearly mythic figure of Heraclitus that 
PTAG reveals.  
 Heraclitus is marked in Nietzsche‘s writings by his solitude, his pride, and his 
coldness, or distance.  Nietzsche obviously wants to present Heraclitus as a truly solitary 
creature.  He paints a rather romantic picture of this solitude. 
 
 
His activities never directed him toward any ‗public,‘ toward any applause from 
the masses or toward the encouraging chorus of his contemporaries.  To walk 
alone along a lonely street is part of the philosopher‘s nature.  His gift is the rarest 
gift of all, the most unnatural one in a certain sense, exclusive and hostile even 
toward others with similar gifts.  The wall of his self-sufficiency must be built of 
diamonds if it is not to be destroyed and broken into, for everything and everyone 
is in league against him.  His journey toward immortality is more difficult and 
burdensome than that of other men.
411
 
 
What is ironic about such quotations is that they appear during what was probably the 
most socially well-adjusted period of Nietzsche‘s life.  His friendships with Burckhardt, 
Overbeck, and von Meysenbug, his cohabitation with Elizabeth, and his increasing 
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renown in Wagner‘s circle led to high spirits and a rare sense of belonging.412   
Nonetheless he glorified the lifestyle of the eremite.  Heraclitus‘s disdain for his fellow 
man defines his philosophical type.  The self-imposed exile is prudent, moreover, 
because ―everything and everyone is in league against him.‖413  Even had he wished to 
live amongst men, the very nature of his type would have made it nearly impossible.   
  
2.4.4 Heraclitus’s Pride 
 
Diogenes Laertius had described Heraclitus as overweening, and Nietzsche‘s depiction of 
him does little to dispel that description.
414
  Nietzsche begins the section on Heraclitus‘s 
character by announcing his pride and stating that ―when a philosopher exhibits pride, it 
is a great pride indeed.‖415  Later in the same paragraph, he describes the ―regal self-
esteem‖ of Heraclitus that springs from his conviction that ―he is the only rewarded 
wooer of truth.‖416   This pride is seen by Nietzsche as being so extreme as to be nearly 
unimaginable to the average reader of the history of philosophy, unless presented with the 
actual example of Heraclitus.
417
  This pride provides Heraclitus with an inner ―fortress‖ 
that beats back ―the waves of illusion and of wrongness.‖418  Note the similarity in 
language between this and Marcus Aurelius, who says ―Free from the passions, the mind 
is a veritable fortress.‖419  Marcus as a Stoic was greatly influenced by Heraclitus, whom 
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he spoke of with great reverence.
420
  There are no clear indications that Nietzsche is 
intentionally referencing Marcus, but the similarity in metaphors is interesting. 
 
2.4.5 Heraclitus’s Coldness 
 
Due to his isolation and his feeling of superiority over his fellow man, Nietzsche‘s 
Heraclitus is an extremely cold and distant figure.  Nietzsche goes so far as to describe 
him as living inside his ―own solar system.‖421  Later, he is said to be a ―star devoid of 
atmosphere.‖422  Due to his preoccupation with the ―game of the great world-child, 
Zeus,‖ Heraclitus is not interested in other men, even those who would seek out his 
teachings.
423
  Like the oracle of Delphi, men seek him, but he does not seek them.  
Nietzsche, chillingly and succinctly states that ―the world forever needs the truth, hence 
the world forever needs Heraclitus, but Heraclitus does not need the world.‖424 
In fact, Heraclitus is a man who treats himself ―almost with religious reverence‖ 
and ―super-human esteem,‖ not unlike Pythagoras or Empedocles.425  But even these 
legendary, self-proclaimed deities are in a lower sphere than the Ephesian hermit, for 
they are caught up in metempsychosis and ―the unity of all life.‖  Those doctrines teach 
them that all living things are essentially one and thus drag them ―back to other human 
beings for their salvation and redemption.‖426  In his lecture notes, Nietzsche also 
contrasts Heraclitus with Pythagoras, but replaces Empedocles with Socrates, and uses a 
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less pejorative tone.
427
  There Nietzsche compares the three unifying ideas of the three 
―purest paradigms‖ of philosophy: Pythagoras‘s metempsychosis, Socrates‘s unity 
through thought, and Heraclitus‘s belief in ―the oneness and eternal lawfulness of 
nature‘s processes.‖428  If Nietzsche is being consistent between the two works, we must 
assume that Heraclitus‘s belief in the unity of nature through the lawfulness of its 
processes does not lead man back to other men in the same way as a belief in some sort 
of reincarnation. 
 
2.4.6 Thus Spoke Heraclitus? 
 
Nietzsche obviously means to communicate his admiration for the nearly superhuman 
figure of Heraclitus.  In fact, there is good reason to suppose that Nietzsche uses the 
Ephesian philosopher as a model for his later literary re-imagination of an ancient figure, 
Zarathustra.  Both seem to invoke the same spirit of reverence in Nietzsche and share 
similar defining characteristics.   In fact, Nietzsche in his attempt to find a ―tragic 
philosopher‖ as a precursor to both himself and his creation, Zarathustra, fingers 
Heraclitus as the only figure to come close: 
 
 
Nobody has ever turned the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos before: tragic 
wisdom was missing, – I could not find any sign of it, even among the eminent 
Greek philosophers, those from the two centuries before Socrates.  I had some 
doubts in the case of Heraclitus; I generally feel warmer and in better spirits in his 
company than anywhere else.  The affirmation of passing away and destruction 
that is crucial for a Dionysian philosophy, saying yes to opposition and war, 
becoming along with a radical rejection of the very concept of ‗being‘– all these 
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are more closely related to me than anything else people have thought so far.  The 
infinitely repeated cycle of all things– this is Zarathustra‘s doctrine, but ultimately 
it is nothing Heraclitus couldn‘t have said too.  At least the Stoics have traces of 
it, and they inherited almost all of their fundamental ideas of Heraclitus.‖429 
 
So Nietzsche does not actually equate Heraclitus with his Zarathustra, but does see him 
as a forerunner.   
The differences between the Heraclitus of PTAG and the eponymous character of 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra are marked, albeit subtle.  By a superficial reading, Nietzsche‘s 
epic may just as well have been titled ―Thus Spoke Heraclitus,‖ seeing how Zarathustra‘s 
metaphysical views seem to be, by Nietzsche‘s admission, quite similar.430  Perhaps more 
importantly, Zarathustra seems to have been cast in the archetypical mold of Heraclitus.  
The signature Heraclitean characteristics of solitude, pride, and distance may all seem to 
be embodied by Zarathustra.  The extreme pride of Heraclitus is also a feature that 
Nietzsche gives his Zarathustra.  Humility is hardly a virtue one would give to a creation 
that supposedly breathes air that Goethe and Shakespeare could not stand for a second 
and contains more genius in a single speech that he gives than all the great spirits in 
history could conjure.
431
  But while the other two virtues are not absent in Zarathustra, 
they are not celebrated in the same way that PTAG celebrates them in Heraclitus. 
The two characters both made a decision to remove themselves from society and retreat 
into the mountains.  Heraclitus makes the decision to remove himself from Ephesian 
society rather late in life after a lifetime of disagreement with other citizens.
432
  
Zarathustra makes his sojourn at the relatively young age of thirty, leaving his home to 
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enjoy ―his spirit and solitude,‖ but no explicit reason is given for his leaving, neither do 
we discover whether his relation to his hometown influenced this decision.
433
  There is 
therefore a somewhat reactive element to Heraclitus‘s self-imposed exile which is lacking 
in Zarathustra.   
It is the prospect of return that is most interesting. If the doxographies that 
Nietzsche credits are to be believed, Heraclitus never returns from his exile, succumbing 
to illness and a rather absurd quack cure.
434
  Zarathustra, however, after a decade of 
solitude descends back into the valley, ―his heart transformed.‖435 Heraclitus, particularly 
the idealized version of him in PTAG, is sickened by his fellow man, and thus turns his 
back on human beings.
436
 He has his ―immortal wisdom‖ and therefore does not need 
other men.
437
  Zarathustra‘s relation to his wisdom is quite different; he has grown weary 
of it.
438
  Thus ―like a bee that has gathered too much honey,‖ he needs ―hands that reach 
out.‖439  Zarathustra needs his fellow human beings, even if it is merely because he needs 
someone to whom he may impart his wisdom.  But, as mentioned above, the younger 
Nietzsche of PTAG, champions Heraclitus‘s complete lack of need for his fellow man.440 
A shining example of the contrast between PTAG and Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
can be found in the celestial imagery used in both.  In PTAG, Heraclitus is described as 
being ―a star devoid of atmosphere.‖441  Men like him ―live in their own solar system‖ 
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and can be found only if they are sought out.
442
  Yet Zarathustra compares himself not to 
a star off in a distant galaxy, but instead to the sun that shines upon our own Earth.  As he 
decides to wander down into the valley, he makes the following ode to the sun. 
 
 
You great star!  What would your happiness be if you had not those for whom you 
shine?  For ten years you have come up here to my cave: you would have tired of 
your light and of this route without me, my eagle, and my snake.  But we awaited 
you every morning, took your overflow from you and blessed you for it… I want 
to bestow and distribute until the wise among human beings have once again 
enjoyed their folly, and the poor once again their wealth.  For this I must descend 
into the depths, as you do evenings when you go behind the sea and bring light 
even to the underworld, you super-rich star.
443
  
 
Rather than reveling in being off in the heavens keeping its light in the void of space, the 
sun draws its pleasure from sharing its light with the planets and creatures that orbit it.  
The sun does not stay in the heavens. It brings its light down to Earth: it goes under.  
Zarathustra cannot live as Heraclitus, as a misanthrope.  He must share his wisdom.  
 The solar metaphor is revisited in the second book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
where the sun is contrasted with the moon.  Lunar love is ―content in viewing, with dead 
will, without grasp and greed of selfishness‖; it is an ―immaculate perception.‖444  
Heraclitus‘s vision in PTAG is described in similar terms: ―his eye, flaming toward its 
inward center, looks outward dead and icy, with but the semblance of sight.‖445  Solar 
love, on the other hand, kisses and sucks on the land; it does not attempt to remain at a 
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distance from the Earth, rather it caresses it.
446
  Zarathustra wishes to be as the sun, 
loving ―life and all deep seas.‖447 
While the Heraclitus of PTAG is no pessimist, he certainly is a misanthrope.  To 
draw out firmament metaphors one last time, Heraclitus is shown to see the highest 
principle of fire ―as exemplified by celestial bodies,‖ not as ―irrational man.‖448  
Considering his lack of need for other human beings, Heraclitus resembles less 
Zarathustra than he does the first person whom Zarathustra meets after leaving the 
mountain.  The saint in the woods is yet another hermit, but one who left society out of 
his love for mankind, a trait that differentiates him from both Heraclitus and 
Zarathustra.
449
  But his hermitry has taught him to despise human beings, saying ―now I 
love God: human beings I do not love. Human beings are too imperfect a thing for 
me.‖450  While Heraclitus never aims at loving God, he does focus on those things which 
are not as imperfect and fleeting as man.  Heraclitus has ―no bridge to lead him to his 
fellow man.‖451  Yet Zarathustra recognizes something more in man, declaring ―what is 
great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not a purpose.‖452  While 
Zarathustra has not become a lover of man as man, he at least sees a reason to come 
down from the mountains and once again live among them. 
This move away from the misanthropic hermit to Zarathustra represents a major 
progression in Nietzsche‘s works.  He acknowledged in Ecce Homo that his ―danger is 
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disgust with people.‖453  The decade between PTAG and Thus Spoke Zarathustra was a 
particularly tumultuous one for Nietzsche, containing the loss of his teaching position, his 
friendships with Wagner, Salomé, and Rée, and his belief in Schopenhauerian doctrines.   
Through it all, the Nietzsche of Zarathustra seems to overcome the misanthropy and 
distance of the Nietzsche of PTAG.  
Thus we have a response to the problem of Anaximander‘s pessimism.  The 
Heraclitean man has the sort of character that is not brought low by the Becoming of the 
world.  He has developed a definition of justice that does not see the flux of the world as 
a punishment for perceived injustices brought on by existence, but rather as the natural, 
playful justice of agon.  This is not optimism since that would assume that the world 
needs justification.
454
  This is instead a way of being that transcends optimism and 
pessimism, that acknowledges existence‘s playful destruction.  Heraclitus provided an 
answer to Anaximander that finds redemption in the world, but as we shall see, there are 
others who find it without.   
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3. Parmenides 
 
3.1 The Icy Truth-Teller 
 
While Heraclitus provides the young Nietzsche with one possible solution for those who 
do not wish to succumb to Schopenhauerian pessimism, Nietzsche dedicates a long 
portion of Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks to an alternate method of coping.  
Just as Heraclitus was cast as the hero of PTAG, Parmenides is the antagonist whom 
Nietzsche chooses as the representative of those who embrace an otherworldly solution to 
the problem of Anaximander.  Despite this antagonism, Nietzsche shows quite a bit of 
respect for his foe.  He introduces him in heroic terms as Heraclitus‘s foil.  
 
 
While each word of Heraclitus expresses the pride and the majesty of truth, but of 
truth grasped in intuitions rather than attained by the rope ladder of logic, while in 
Sibylline rapture Heraclitus gazes but does not peer, knows but does not calculate, 
his contemporary Parmenides stands beside him as counter-image, likewise 
expressing a type of truth-teller but one formed of ice rather than fire, pouring 
cold piercing light all around.
1
 
 
Parmenides is included in the pantheon of the Pre-Platonic philosophers, but in this case 
we do not have a figure whom Nietzsche aspires to emulate; his is a cautionary tale.  The 
story of Parmenides demonstrates the dangerous pitfalls that await those who follow in 
the foot-steps of Anaximander, or any great pessimist.  Parmenides attempts to bring 
―forth an organized philosophic-physical system in answer to Anaximander‘s questions.‖2  
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Like Heraclitus, he ―sought a way out of the contradictoriness and disparity of a double 
world order‖ as first problematized by Anaximander.3  Yet Parmenides‘ method of 
coping with the ―deep night‖ of Anaximander was not the ―divine stroke of lightning‖ of 
Heraclitus, but a much colder light.
4
 
  
3.1.1 The Two Eras of Parmenides 
 
Unsurprisingly, Nietzsche‘s reading of Parmenides contains idiosyncratic and unorthodox 
elements.   The most striking at the outset of the section on Parmenides is his division of 
the philosopher‘s career into an early and a later period.5  Parmenides‘ philosophical 
work is clearly bifurcated between sections on ―Truth‖ and ―Mortal Opinion,‖ which are 
two ―roads of inquiry.‖6  The first is ―the one, that it is not possible for it not to be,‖ while 
the second is that which is and is not.‖7  Parmenides‘ language in describing the two may 
cause one to question why only Heraclitus is referred to as ―the Obscure,‖ but at least 
provides the reader with the impression that the first road is to be followed and the 
second is to be avoided.
8
  Surprisingly, Parmenides wrote sizeable sections on both the 
reliable way of truth and the fallible way of opinion.
9
    In fact, the section concerning 
opinion was probably much longer than the section concerning truth.
10
  What reason 
could he have for devoting the majority of his poetic expression of his philosophy to 
untruth as he does to truth?  
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 In characteristic style, Nietzsche gives a psychological explanation to explain this 
aberration in Parmenides‘ philosophy.  In his lecture notes, Nietzsche imagines that the 
listener might believe that this was Parmenides‘ attempt to please the masses, but he 
quickly dismisses such a notion.
11
  In PTAG, he explains that late in life, in ―a moment of 
purest absolutely bloodless abstraction, unclouded by any reality,‖ Parmenides had a 
revelation.
12
  Nietzsche sees the early Parmenides, and for that matter the history of 
philosophy up to that moment, as being fundamentally Anaximandrian.  This event 
proves to be a ―boundary stone that separates two periods‖ and ―divides pre-Socratic 
thinking into two halves.‖13  It bears noting that this interpretation is not found in 
Diogenes Laertius, nor does any other ancient source describe this chronological reading.  
Regardless, Nietzsche sees the Way of Mortal Opinion as being the early period of 
Parmenides‘ philosophy and the Way of Truth as the late.  The early work ―still bears 
Anaximandrian traces‖ and offers a ―philosophic-physical system in answer to 
Anaximander‘s questions.‖14  As it is speculated that the mostly lost Way of Mortal 
Opinion probably ―contained a cosmogony and a cosmology,‖ Nietzsche‘s theory that the 
early Parmenides was a physical philosopher seems apt.
15
  Thus, in Nietzsche‘s account, 
the young Parmenides attempted to answer the philosophical problems of Anaximander 
via an account of the natural world, not ontology.  It was only in the moment of the ―icy 
tremor of abstraction‖ that Parmenides cast his natural philosophy into ―the rubbish heap 
of the older doctrines.‖16 
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 Nietzsche‘s chronological reading provides a reason for the existence of two 
separate Parmenidean philosophies, but not their coexistence in one poem.  Had he truly 
disposed of the early philosophy, would he not have excised it from his work rather than 
looked for a way to make it compatible with his late philosophy?  This is where 
Nietzsche brings in his psychological approach for understanding Parmenides.  In a 
surprising show of humanity, Parmenides felt ―paternal good-will‖ and ―solicitude‖ 
towards his early work.
17
  Parmenides believed that his late work was the only way to 
truth, but provided his early work as a consolation prize to those who could not reach the 
dizzying, airless heights of the former.
18
  Nietzsche does not present this as Parmenides 
believing that his old system deserves this privileged position based on its veracity, but 
rather on the Eleatic‘s sentimental feelings towards the work of his youth.  In fact, 
Nietzsche sees this as being the sole remnant of the humanity that was lost to 
Parmenides‘ philosophizing.  It was ―the only trace of human sentiment in a nature 
wholly petrified by logical rigidity and almost transformed into a thinking machine.‖19   
This image of the philosopher made by his thinking into an inorganic thing, such 
as a machine or even a sculpture, is a recurring theme in Nietzsche‘s writing on 
Parmenides.   The coldness of his philosophy leaves him as something that is no longer 
truly alive or participating in the world of Becoming.  Still, there is a tragic element to the 
tale of Parmenides.  His early philosophy had a brilliance to it, manifesting its fertile 
influence on thinkers such as Empedocles and later Pythagoreans.
20
  Like Heraclitus, he 
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is called on to face the potentially life-destroying truths of Anaximander, but due to his 
very different character, his fate is not apotheosis, but petrification. 
 
3.1.2 The Influence of Anaximander  
 
The catalyst for Parmenides‘ transformation is his encounter with Anaximander, though 
in Nietzsche‘s account, this occurred in stages.  Diogenes Laertius reports that 
Theophrastus stated that Parmenides was possibly a student of Anaximander.
21
  Nietzsche 
finds this theory to be believable largely because of the obvious similarities in the two 
philosophers‘ ―distrust toward a world which only is and a world which only comes to 
be.‖22  Regardless of whether they actually met in the flesh, Nietzsche believes that the 
touch of Anaximander left its mark on both Parmenides and, as we have previously seen, 
Heraclitus. 
 
 
The leap into the indefinite, un-definable, by which Anaximander had once and 
for all escaped the realm of come-to-be and its empirically given qualities, did not 
come easy to minds as independent as those of Heraclitus and Parmenides.  They 
sought to stay on their feet as long as they could, preserving their leap for the spot 
where the foot no longer finds support and one must jump to keep from falling.  
Both of them looked repeatedly at just that world that Anaximander had 
condemned with such melancholy and had declared as the place of wickedness 
and simultaneously of atonement for the unjustness of all coming-to-be.
23
   
 
                                                             
21 Diogenes Laertius, IX, 21.  
22 PTAG, 70.  It should be noted that Nietzsche‘s view is not supported by any sources outside of 
Theophrastus.  In fact, there is a fair amount of doubt that Parmenides was personally acquainted with 
Xenophanes, let alone Anaximander (see Coxon, 17–18).  It is suspected though that Parmenides was 
aware of the ideas of Anaximander, based not only on the similarity of the apeiron and the One, but also 
the ―spherical astronomy‖ that both accepted, but had been rejected by Xenophanes, Anaximenes, and 
Heraclitus (Ibid. 19).  
23 Ibid. 
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Let us first note that Nietzsche once again uses the metaphor of the unsteadiness of the 
earth below the philosophers‘ feet.  The transformative power of Anaximander‘s 
pessimism scars the minds of these early philosophers in the same way that the Lisbon 
earthquake scarred those of the Enlightenment philosophers.
24
  Also, describing the world 
as ―the place of wickedness and simultaneously of atonement‖ further strengthens the 
link between the Nietzschean readings of Anaximander and Schopenhauer.  After all, 
Schopenhauer‘s pessimistic outlook on the world is one of his defining characteristics;25 
as we have seen in our discussion of Anaximander, Schopenhauer also sees this world as 
the crucible of cosmic justice.
26
 
 Nietzsche goes on to remark that Heraclitus ―discovered what wonderful order, 
regularity, and certainty manifested themselves in all coming-to-be.‖27  This is to remind 
the reader that when one is faced with the supposed horrors of the Anaximandrian world, 
there are still ways of interacting with it that do not involve denigrating it.  But Nietzsche 
must now show the alternative that was chosen by Parmenides, an alternative that would 
prove to be an indicator of the strategy that most subsequent philosophers would adopt 
when faced with the problem of pessimism.  
 
 
                                                             
24 See Chapter 1.  
25  Perhaps the most extreme such statement is the above-mentioned ―worst of all possible worlds‖ 
comment in World as Will and Presentation, Volume 2, 667, but Schopenhauer‘s work are overabundant 
with extreme pessimism.  Other contenders for the superlative example of pessimism include ―Additional 
Remarks on the Doctrine of the Vanity of Existence‖ (Parerga and Paralipomena, Volume 2, 283–90) and 
―Additional Remarks on the Doctrine of the Suffering of the World‖ (Ibid. 291–305), the latter of which 
begins with the lines, ―If suffering is not the first and immediate object of our life, then our existence is the 
most inexpedient and inappropriate thing in the world‖ (Ibid. 291).  
26 World as Will and Presentation, Volume 1, 414f.  
27 PTAG, 71. 
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3.2 Parmenides’ Strategy Against Pessimism 
 
3.2.1 Negation 
 
 Parmenides‘ strategy is one of ―negation.‖28 When presented with two 
alternatives that seem to produce a contradiction, Parmenides does not respect the 
plurality of existence, but rather interprets one of the members of the dyad as being 
actually existent and the other as being a mere lack of the former.
29
  Nietzsche lists 
several examples of these pairings of existent and nonexistent qualities, but neglects to 
mention that Aristotle reports a similar list in his Metaphysics, attributing it to the 
Pythagorean, Alcmaeon of Croton, who is said to have compiled it to show the sets of 
opposites that make up the world.
30
  Nietzsche‘s list, which he takes from the fragments 
of Parmenides‘ poem, bears a striking resemblance to Aristotle‘s, but there is no mention 
of the Pythagoreans.
31
  He makes it seem as if Parmenides‘ revelation comes merely from 
his ―defiant talent for abstract-logical procedure.‖32  Nietzsche was obviously not 
ignorant of Alcmaeon‘s table, citing it in his lectures on Pythagoreans and stating that it 
―recalls the exemplary table of Parmenides.‖33  This once again makes it clear that in 
PTAG, Nietzsche is not concerned with philological matters, but rather the effects of 
philosophical systems on thinkers that fall into different archetypes.  The historical 
context can be suspended to allow comparisons between philosophers of different eras.    
                                                             
28 Italics in the original.  Ibid.  
29 Ibid. 72. 
30 Metaphysics, 986a22–b2.  Note that Diogenes Laertius states that Parmenides was possibly the pupil of a 
Pythagorean named Ameinias (IX, 21).  
31 Parmenides, DK28, B8. 
32 PTAG, 72. 
33 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 132–33. 
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 Having divided the world into those things which are existent and those that are 
not, Parmenides now looks at what we can say about the existent and its relationship to 
coming-to-be.  Nietzsche points out that unlike Anaximander, whose apeiron is outside 
the world, ―beyond our horizon,‖ Parmenides introduces an immanent being.  ―Right here 
before us, everywhere, in all coming-to-be, there is contained an active something which 
is existent.‖34  While this seems to promise an almost worldly philosopher, Parmenides is 
still faced with the question of ―What is coming-to-be?‖35  Like Heraclitus, he turns his 
gaze upon the impermanence of the world and attempts to form a cosmodicy.
36
  In other 
words, Parmenides has to solve the problem of coming-to-be and passing away as 
originally posed by Anaximander: ―How can anything pass away which has the right to 
be?‖37  As we have seen, there must be some sort of injustice involved; otherwise such a 
thing could never occur.  Not satisfied with the sort of justification that Heraclitus 
provided, Parmenides seeks out the culprit of Becoming.  It seems inconceivable to 
Nietzsche‘s Parmenides that the existent could be ―guilty of passing away."38  After all, if 
it truly is existent, it could not be passing away.   
 
3.2.2 Aphrodite 
 
So who is the guilty party?  The only other possibility is that the nonexistent is 
responsible for change.  Yet there could not be any change, coming-to-be, or passing 
away if the existent did not interact with the nonexistent.  Nietzsche paraphrases the view 
                                                             
34 PTAG, 72. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 73. 
37 Ibid. 48. 
38 Ibid. 73. 
119 
 
of Parmenides: ―For coming-to-be, the existent as well as the nonexistent are necessary; 
whenever they interact, we have coming-to-be.‖39  To account for this, though, there 
needs to be some principle that brings these two disparate elements together.  Luckily for 
Nietzsche, Parmenides‘ poem is dedicated to a goddess who has such a power, namely 
the goddess of love, Aphrodite.
40
  The bond is explicitly described as being the province 
of the goddess in the Way of Mortal Opinion: ―For [the goddess] rules over hateful birth 
and union of all things, sending the female to unite with male and in opposite fashion, 
male to female.‖41 Nietzsche sums up this process by stating 
 
 
It is the power of Aphrodite that weds the opposites, the existent with the 
nonexistent.  Desire unites the contradictory and mutually repellent elements: the 
result is coming-to-be.  When desire is satiated, hatred and inner opposition drives 
the existent and the nonexistent apart once more — and man says, ―All things 
pass.‖42 
 
At this point, other philosophers might have accepted this as an acceptable 
metaphysical system.  The appeal to, as Nietzsche puts it, a ―qualitas occulta,‖ such as 
Aphrodite, may seem to be overly obscure, but this is not unheard of in the philosophy of 
the era.
43
  A generation later, Empedocles would express a similarly all-encompassing 
force in the cosmic Love that is always in struggle with its antithesis, Strife.
44
  In 
Nietzsche‘s description of Parmenides‘ Aphrodite, we even hear the echo of Heraclitus, 
who also describes his divine fire as being the interplay between desire and satiety.
45
  In 
                                                             
39 Ibid. 
40 Parmenides, DK 28, B1. 
41 Ibid. DK28, B12. 
42 Ibid. 73–74. 
43 Ibid. 73. 
44 Empedocles, DK 31, B35. 
45 Heraclitus, DK22, B65a. 
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his lectures notes, in fact, Nietzsche compares and contrasts the early Parmenidean view 
with the Heraclitean view. 
 
 
Were we to compare this view of the world with [that of] Heraclitus, [we would 
see that] they share the beliefs that opposed qualities are active in each thing that 
becomes and that the thing perishes on them as well.  But whereas Heraclitus sees 
only the endless transformation of one fire in all qualities, Parmenides in general 
perceives the transformation of two opposing elements.  War, for Heraclitus, is a 
game, the characteristic mark of hatred here, yet the hateful elements have an 
instinct toward each other.  This is a very significant conception, for the world of 
Heraclitus was without instincts: knowing and not knowing, fire and water, war 
— yet there is nothing in them that explains drive, instinct.  It is an aesthetic view 
of the world.  Here with Parmenides, everything aesthetic ends; hate and love are 
not a game but rather effects of the same daimon.  We see in this genius the 
struggle to overcome dualism, yet it transpires in only a mythical manner — the 
notion of reducing Becoming and passing away to a love struggle between Being 
and Not-being.  What a colossal abstraction!
46
  
 
While Parmenides chose an artistic manner to express his philosophy, he is not satisfied 
with aesthetic explanations for the drama of coming-to-be.  Unlike the great logical 
criminal, Heraclitus, who has no trouble brazenly sinning against the principle of non-
contradiction, Parmenides remains loyal to it.
47
  Once again, the principle, as defined by 
Aristotle, states that ―the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to 
the same subject in the same respect.‖48  Parmenides, had formulated similar thoughts 
long before Aristotle, saying ―that it is not and that it is necessary for it not to be, this I 
point out to you to be a path completely unlearnable, for neither may you know that 
which is not (for it is not to be accomplished) nor may you declare it.‖49   So rather than 
accept love and hate as being linked in a manner that would confound a mind that relies 
                                                             
46 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 82–83.  
47 PTAG, 52. 
48 Metaphysics, 1005b, 19–20. 
49 Parmenides, DK28, B2. 
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on the principle of non-contradiction, Parmenides must construct a myth, albeit one that 
he cannot fully believe.  The myth is not to be read literally, but as a ―colossal 
abstraction.‖50 
 
3.2.3 Rejecting What is Not 
 
Unsurprisingly, a mind as logical as that of Parmenides cannot stay happy with a 
mythological explanation that seems to fly in the face of reason. 
 
 
But no one lays hands with impunity on such fearsome abstractions as ―the 
existent‖ and ―the nonexistent.‖  Slowly, upon touching them, the blood congeals.  
There came the day when a strange insight befell Parmenides, an insight which 
seemed to withdraw the value from all his old combinations so that he felt like 
throwing them away like a bag of old worn-out coins.
51
 
 
Nietzsche states that this has often been seen as having been the result of external events, 
namely Parmenides meeting Xenophanes of Colophon.
52
  But he disagrees with this 
reading, stating that ―it seems no more than accidental that in the same place, in Elea, two 
men should be living for a while who both carried in their minds a concept of unity.‖53  
Going by the accounts of Diogenes Laertius, Xenophanes was not a native of Elea, but 
did live in the Eleatic colony of Zancle in Sicily, so an Eleatic connection is not far-
fetched.
54
  The approaches of the two men are utterly different according to him.  
―Whereas Parmenides came to the unity of the existent purely by adherence to his 
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51 PTAG, 74. 
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid. 75. 
54 Diogenes Laertius, IX, 18. 
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supposed logic, spinning it out of the concepts of Being and Nonbeing, Xenophanes was 
a religious mystic who, with his mystic unity, belongs very typically to the sixth 
century.‖55  Later, Nietzsche says of Parmenides‘ philosophy that it was ―not evoked by a 
profound religious conviction.‖56  While Nietzsche had credited Xenophanes with 
influencing Parmenides in his lecture notes, he distances the two in PTAG.
57
  The 
Parmenides of PTAG is more the product of the problem of Anaximander and his own 
peculiar character. 
 In Nietzsche‘s account of the genesis of the Eleatic notion of Being, Parmenides 
tests his solution to the Anaximandrian problem and finds it to be deficient.  He had 
proposed Nonbeing as one of the components of his ontology, but it raises a troublesome 
question: ―can something which is not, be?‖58  After all, the principle of identity claims 
that ―A=A,‖ that is to say ―what is, is,‖ so should it not follow that ―what is not, is not‖?59  
Nietzsche characterizes Parmenides as having up to this point ―light-heartedly‖ assumed 
the existence of negative qualities.
60
  The early philosophy of Parmenides had not 
succumbed to the gloom brought by pessimism, be it Anaximandrian or 
Schopenhauerian, but it had also not taken its own conclusions as seriously as such heavy 
matters warrant.  It was only now that he realized the weight of the matter.  In his early 
philosophy, Parmenides had been content with speaking both of existent and non-existent 
things, but this sort of compromise between the two did not directly address the 
seriousness of the Anaximandrian dilemma.  Not only did this dualistic worldview not 
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satisfy the problem of a just world, but it also was riddled with contradictions.  How 
could things both be and not be?  Every time that Parmenides attempted to make this 
defense, he realized that he was speaking nonsense to the judge of reason.   ―Suddenly 
Parmenides felt a monstrous logical sin burdening his whole previous life.‖61  Nietzsche 
even refers to Parmenides‘ former philosophy as ―total perversity of thought.‖62  This 
represents a second catastrophic philosophical discovery in Parmenides‘ career, and it 
leaves its mark.  
  
3.3 The Character of Parmenides 
 
3.3.1 Against Heraclitus  
 
While Nietzsche describes Parmenides in terms that make him seem far too frigid to fall 
prey to ―human sentiment‖, the Nietzschean Parmenides reacts to the revelations of his 
philosophy passionately.
63
  It is worth mentioning that the writings of Diogenes Laertius 
neither confirm nor deny an emotionless Parmenides.  The sole clue to his character in 
Lives of Eminent Philosophers is that he lived ―the peaceful life of a student.‖64  But 
Nietzsche paints a picture of a philosopher who is an Achilles of rage.  The most focused 
instance of his rage is his ―unhappy encounter‖ with Heraclitus.65  Nietzsche‘s prose is 
particularly colorful in describing the seething hatred that Parmenides feels.  
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Caring now for nothing except the strictest separation of being from nonbeing, he 
must hate in his deepest soul the antinomy-play of Heraclitus.  Propositions such 
as ―We are and at the same time are not‖ or ―Being and nonbeing is at the same 
time the same and not the same,‖ tangle and cloud everything which he had just 
illuminated and distinguished.  They drove him to fury.  ―Away with those 
people,‖ he screamed, ―who seem to have two heads and yet know nothing.  
Everything is in flux with them, including their thinking.  They stand in dull 
astonishment before things and yet must be deaf as well as blind to mix up the 
opposites as they do!‖66  
 
Parmenides can be seen as the first to have taken Heraclitus to task for his sins against 
logic.  While earlier Nietzsche had described Aristotle as the one to summon Heraclitus 
before ―the tribunal of reason,‖ Parmenides is the original prosecutor.67  The shock of the 
Anaximandrian revelation has seriously shaken Parmenides, literally to the core of his 
being, and he is not impressed by Heraclitus‘s attempts to solve the cosmic problem with 
illogic.  Nietzsche interprets this as not merely a disagreement, but the product of hatred.  
Ontology in the tragic age was personal.  
  
3.3.2 Against the Masses and the Senses 
 
In Nietzsche‘s account Parmenides and Heraclitus share many characteristics, which is 
not uncommon for enemies.  Parmenides‘ anger that is not focused on his Ephesian 
contemporary is often directed at targets who both philosophers condemn.  While 
Parmenides may have Heraclitus in mind when speaking of those who ―knowing nothing, 
two-headed, wander,‖ he does not see Heraclitus as being the originator of such 
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thinking.
68
  Rather, it is the masses who have always thought this way, though Heraclitus 
has justified their opinions.  For as much as Heraclitus chided the common people, 
Parmenides thinks that he justified their foolishness.  For Parmenides, ―the irrationality of 
the masses, glorified in playful antinomies, and lauded as the culmination of all wisdom 
was now a painful and incomprehensible experience.‖69  Parmenides and Heraclitus both 
agree that one needs to separate oneself if one wishes to understand the truth, but they 
disagree about the content of the truth and the content of the crowd‘s opinion.  As far as 
Parmenides is concerned, Heraclitus is the epitome of the two-headedness of the 
masses.
70
   
Heraclitus also shares with Parmenides a disdain of the senses.  Once again, 
though, we see subtle differences.  Heraclitus‘s problem with the senses is that they make 
bad witnesses, at least to those with barbarous souls.
71
  Later in his career, Nietzsche 
notes that this is disdain for their making things seem ―permanent and unified.‖72  
Parmenides clearly differs in his reasons for finding them to be bad witnesses, but 
Nietzsche presents his affect as being quite different as well.  
 
 
And now, whenever Parmenides glances backward at the world of come-to-be, 
the world whose existence he used to try to comprehend by means of ingenious 
conjectures, he becomes angry with his eyes for so much as seeing come-to-be, 
with his ears for hearing it.  ―Whatever you do, do not be guided by your dull 
eyes,‖ is now his imperative, ―nor by your resounding ears, nor by your tongue, 
but test all things with the power of your thinking alone.‖  Thus he accomplished 
the immensely significant first critique of man‘s apparatus of knowledge.73 
 
                                                             
68 Parmenides, DK 28, B6.  Note that the theory of Heraclitus influencing Parmenides has been examined at 
great length, notably in Daniel Graham‘s essay, ―Heraclitus and Parmenides.‖  
69 PTAG, 78. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Heraclitus, DK 22B, 107. 
72 Twilight of the Idols, Reason in Philosophy, 2 (167–68). 
73 PTAG, 79. 
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This is the inverse of the sort of prejudice against the senses that Nietzsche found in 
Heraclitus.  The senses betray us by presenting us with Becoming.  Unlike the merely ill-
suited senses of Heraclitus, these are complicit in the ―crime against logic‖ that earns 
Parmenides‘ ire.74 
 Nietzsche, in turn, condemns Parmenides‘ campaign against the senses, accusing 
it of having ―dire consequences‖ that the Eleatic philosopher could not have predicted.75  
The later Nietzsche would list Plato as the first step in the formation of the fable of the 
real world,
76
  but the younger Nietzsche of PTAG gives this role to Parmenides. To be 
precise, he sees Plato as being a defining figure in the deformation of the philosophical 
concept of the world, but in this Parmenides was a forerunner.
77
  To his credit, 
Parmenides was innocent of the ―curse‖ that has plagued philosophers since Plato, 
namely ―the wholly erroneous distinction between ‗spirit‘ and ‗body‘.‖78  In Parmenides‘ 
cleaving of the world into two, Nietzsche stresses that the ―dichotomy between ‗spirit‘ 
and ‗matter‘ is absent.‖79  Despite this, Nietzsche believes that ―wrenching apart the 
senses and the capacity for abstraction‖ opened the door for the cleaving of the body and 
the mind, by making it seem as if men were composed of two opposing minds.
80
  The 
senses have already been indicted as liars in the service of Becoming, so one would want 
to distance oneself from them.  Moreover, the part of the mind that performs abstraction 
participates in Being, not Becoming.  Indeed, Parmenides goes so far as to say that 
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―thinking and being are the same.‖81  German scholars of Nietzsche‘s day typically 
interpreted this as meaning that thinking and Being are identical.
82
  The attempt to follow 
Plato‘s imperative for the philosopher to ―liberate himself as much as possible from the 
bodily, meaning from the senses‖ seems to follow if one believes that pure thinking 
unites one with the nature of Being while the senses can only supply us with deceptions.
83
  
Nietzsche sees this as being ―the most dangerous of false paths, for no true philosophy 
can construct itself from this empty hull; it must proceed from intuition of reality.‖84 Note 
that Nietzsche still champions the Schopenhauerian notion of intuition, as distinct from 
and superior to the ―faculty of abstraction.‖85  
  
2.4 Parmenides the Spider 
 
This divorce from the senses and the world of Becoming leads Nietzsche to pen some of 
the most beautiful and caustic statements of his early career.  For example, he provides 
this vivid description of Parmenides leaving the world as an empty husk.  
 
 
All the manifold colorful world known to experience, all the transformations of its 
qualities, all the orderliness of its ups and downs, are cast aside mercilessly as 
mere semblance and illusion.  Nothing may be learned from them.  All effort 
spent upon this false deceitful world which futile and negligible, faked into a 
lying existence by the senses is therefore wasted.  When one makes as total a 
judgment as does Parmenides about the whole of the world, one ceases to be a 
scientist, an investigator into the world‘s parts.  One‘s sympathy toward 
phenomena atrophies; one even develops a hatred for phenomena including 
oneself, a hatred for being unable to get rid of the everlasting deceitfulness of 
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sensation.  Henceforward truth shall live only in the palest, most abstracted 
generalities, in the empty husks of the most indefinite terms, as though in a house 
of cobwebs.  And beside such truth now sits our philosopher, likewise as 
bloodless as his abstractions, in the spun out fabric of his formulas.  A spider at 
least wants blood from its victims.  The Parmenidean philosopher hates most of 
all the blood his victims, the blood of the empirical reality which was sacrificed 
and shed by him.
86
  
 
This analogy provides a vivid image of the danger of Parmenidean philosophy.  While 
Alan Schrift, in his otherwise excellent ―Arachnophobe or Arachnophile: Nietzsche and 
His Spiders,‖ claims that the spider here is ―a positive image of self-generating creation 
and predation,‖ I see this as one of the most severe criticisms in all of Nietzsche‘s corpus 
and the forerunner to many of his later attacks.
87
  While Heraclitus had watched the same 
display of orderly chaos as a ―blissful spectator,‖ Parmenides can no longer watch such a 
shameful display and so turns his back on it.
88
  Without the senses, empiricism can no 
longer be accepted as a methodology; nor, then, can science as a whole.  In the earlier 
chapter of PTAG, regarding Thales, Nietzsche said that philosophy differentiates itself 
from science through its discrimination on the basis of ―taste‖; Parmenides has found the 
entire world of the senses distasteful.
89
 
 Note that while Parmenides is trying to make himself into this cold, unfeeling 
arachnid, he finds himself more tangled in his own feelings of hatred.  The hatred begins 
as an outward feeling, but ultimately it must turn itself inward.  The Parmenidean 
philosopher must loathe himself as he is the one who ultimately has let in the hordes of 
deceitful sensations.  In fact, Nietzsche sees this as the reason why Parmenides cannot be 
considered a Kantian.  The things that Parmenides tries to scrape out of his soul, ―time 
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and space, substance‖ are for Kant, ―necessary presuppositions of the world of 
representations.‖90  In fact, since these are preconditions for Kant, the thing-in-itself 
would appear to be a return to the problematic apeiron.    If thought and Being are indeed 
the same thing, Kantian metaphysics would appear to be a philosophy of Nonbeing.  The 
thing-in-itself lacks any definite qualities that we can cognize and lies totally outside of 
our ability to make logical statements about it.  ―Parmenides would have immediately 
rejected the thing-in-itself, for it would present itself to him as a Not-Being.‖91  The 
thing-in-itself not being comprehensible makes it impossible to be the Parmenidean 
Being since what cannot be thought cannot be identical with thinking itself.  Regardless 
of whatever else Nietzsche thinks of Kant, he does not see him as a strict Parmenidean.  
 Having found himself to be as loathsome as any vermin, the Parmenidean decides 
that he will act like his eight-legged cousins and protect himself with a web, not of silk, 
but of abstractions.   The spider is centered in his web, letting it spread outward from 
him, but always traceable back to him.  In the same way, one can always find traces of 
the philosopher‘s personality in his system; a philosopher sits in the middle of every 
system.  The sensory world is like a swarm of flies, flitting and mobile, but ungrounded.  
These phenomenological gnats, with their thoughtless flight patterns, are in danger of 
coming into contact with the web that has been consciously constructed to catch them. In 
a way that would make any geometer envious, the web has precision and regularity in 
form, much like an intricate philosophical system.  And once the web is touched, there is 
no way to remove its adhesive residue, not unlike the metaphysical doubts about the 
world that are difficult to dispel once Parmenides has introduced them.  A lucky insect 
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will fly away, albeit never able to fully wash it off, but most will find themselves stuck.   
The spider can then come close and with the very same sticky substance that built the 
web encase the insect, leaving it immobile.  While the next step would be the climax for 
an actual spider, for the Parmenidean spider, it is a necessary, but distasteful evil.  The 
actual spider hungers for the life essence that flows in things, but to the Parmenidean, it is 
merely a waste product. But after this, we have a lovely husk that will not offend anyone 
with movement or change.   
 The similarities between the spider and any metaphysician in the Parmenidean 
sense are striking.   A metaphysician is hungry for content; he is initially empty.  He has 
only his a priori ideas.  Like the spider, all he can do initially is craft this web, this 
system of ideas.  He claims not to have learned these ideas; they are after all innate.  As 
such they have a structure that is precise and intricate like a spider‘s web, but also as thin 
and full of holes.  The joy of the system though is that in its web it can catch the buzzing, 
bustling confusion of the sensible, the lived, and the changing.  So-called logic provides 
the adhesive strength of the web‘s strands.  Spider silk is stronger than steel and 
abstractions are even more durable, even if just as thin.  The prey is caught and the 
metaphysician moves out from the center of the system to assimilate the victim. The 
argument has to engulf the fact, make it part of itself.  Then the metaphysician injects 
venom like that of the spider to dissolve the life out of the fact.  The life in this case can 
be seen as that which is changing.  Life, after all, is a process and thus not compatible 
with unchanging eternals.  For instance, the human being comes into existence, grows, 
changes, deteriorates, and inevitably goes out of existence.  This fact gives us a creature 
that from an Anaximandrian or Parmenidean perspective is deeply flawed; a creature that 
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would make a poor subject of this sort of philosophy.  The trick that those of a 
Parmenidean disposition pull is to remove those protean motions and temporary aspects 
from the human being and leave behind an immortal, unchanging soul.  Anything that 
changes is merely accidental to the eternal thing that is the proper subject.  This leaves a 
subject whose life has been removed; a husk of permanence remains.  Yet Nietzsche 
acknowledges that there is a difference between the metaphysician and the spider that 
goes beyond number of legs.  The spider savors that which it sucks out of its prey.  The 
spider is nourished by the life substance that it steals, but the metaphysician hates this 
substance.  He wishes simply to make it go away.   
 
3.4.1 Nietzsche’s Other Spiders 
 
This analogy of the spider foreshadows many other accounts of web-weavers, both literal 
and figurative in Nietzsche‘s writings.92  Schrift‘s exhaustive listing of spider references 
makes listing every single example of them redundant, but let us focus on a few that are 
particularly relevant.  In Daybreak, Nietzsche actually presents us all as spiders that are 
stuck in the centers of our respective webs, never able to move into any sort of ―real 
world.‖93  The aphorism is titled ―In prison,‖ by which Nietzsche refers to our limited 
perspectives as human beings.  Not unlike the passages in his lecture notes on Heraclitus 
regarding our perception of time, he imagines scenarios where our senses are set to scales 
that allow us views of the macroscopically large or the microscopically small.
94
   Here 
Nietzsche wishes for us to understand that we are always in the midst of ―the habits of 
                                                             
92 Schrift, 62. 
93 Daybreak, 117. 
94 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 60–62.  See also my commentary on this passage in chapter 2 of this work.  
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our senses.‖  He writes: ―We sit in our webs, we spiders, and whatever we may catch in 
it, we catch nothing at all except that which allows itself to be caught in precisely our 
net.‖95  All of our webs resemble the Parmenidean schema, allowing only imperfect 
conceptions of the world.  Like the Parmenidean, the weaver of these perspectival webs 
forms a limited worldview through a particular mental fiction, though he need not 
exsanguinate everything he catches.  
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, spiders are a frequent image.
96
  At perhaps their most 
Parmenidean, Nietzsche has them represent the virtue of the ―teachers of resignation,‖ the 
nihilists.  The target here appears to be a sicklier spider than Parmenides.  Rather than a 
web of pure metaphysics, these spiders have woven webs of supposed morality.  They 
claim to be virtuous, but their virtue is simply their desire not to be harmed.
97
  Zarathustra 
has contempt for these tiny creatures and describes them as spiders.   ―And even what 
you abstain from weaves at the web of all future humanity; even your nothing is a spider 
web and a spider that lives off of the blood of the future.‖98  The webs in this instance are 
the tiny, life-defying morals that trap any future possibilities of life.   The blood, 
representing life, is once again what the world-hating spider must drain from the world. 
99
  
 The section of Twilight of the Idols titled ―Reason in Philosophy‖ shows that the 
Parmenidean spider that disgusted Nietzsche in the beginning of his career was still 
lurking in his last days.  In the first section, Nietzsche uses another figure that delights in 
wrapping up its charges and removing their organs: the Egyptian embalmer.  Possessed of 
                                                             
95 Daybreak, 117. 
96 Schrift, 65. 
97 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Book III, ―On Virtue that Makes Small,‖ 2.  
98 Ibid. 3. 
99 Twilight of the Idols, ―Reason in Philosophy,‖ 1 (167). 
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a ―hatred of the very idea of becoming,‖ these mummy-makers attempt to remove the 
innards of whatever ends up on their tables.   
 
 
Nothing real makes it through their hands alive.  They kill and stuff the things 
they worship, these lords of concept idolatry — they become mortal dangers to 
everything they worship.  They see death, change, and age, as well as procreation 
and growth as objections, — refutations even.  What is, does not become; what 
becomes, is not…  So they all believe, desperately even, in being.  But since they 
cannot get hold of it, they look for reasons why it is kept from them.  ―There must 
be some deception here, some illusory level of appearances preventing us from 
perceiving things that have being; where is the deceiver?‖ — ―We‘ve got it!‖ they 
shout in ecstasy, ―it is in sensibility!  These senses that are so immoral anyway, 
now they are deceiving us about the true world.  Moral: get rid of sense-
deception.‖100  
 
Like the Parmenidean spider, the embalmer must remove viscera because they represent 
the voluptuousness of the senses and the never-ending mutability of Becoming.  
Nietzsche harks back to PTAG even more explicitly when he later refers to these 
philosophical taxidermists as ―sick cobweb-weavers,‖ who have constructed the emptiest 
concept, God.
101
  
 
3.4.2 God the Spider 
 
God is promoted from cobweb to spider in Nietzsche‘s penultimate work, The Antichrist.  
Nietzsche here posits that the ―cobweb-weavers‖ have made for themselves an idol that 
acts as they wish they could act.  By shifting the emphasis from themselves to their 
hypothetical construct, metaphysicians can express their bloodless ideals without having 
to live up to them.  Thus, the Judeo-Christian god, having wrested control from the 
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pagans of the Roman world stays in a subterranean kingdom of decadence and finds 
himself going through a reverse apotheosis at the hands of metaphysicians.   
 
 
Nonetheless, the God of the ―great numbers,‖ the democrat among gods, did not 
become a proud, heathen god: he stayed Jewish, he was still the cranny God, the 
God of all dark nooks and corners, of unhealthy districts the world over!...  His 
empire is as it ever was, an empire of the underworld, a hospital, a basement-
kingdom, a ghetto-kingdom… And he himself, so pale, so weak, so decadent… 
Even the palest of the pale would still get the upper hand over him, our dear 
Messrs Metaphysician, the conceptual albinos.  They spun around him for so long 
that in the end he was hypnotized by their movement and became a spider, a 
metaphysicus himself.  Then he spun the world from out of himself again, — sub 
specie Spinozae —, then he transfigured himself into something increasingly thin 
and pale, became ―Ideal,‖ became ―pure spirit,‖ became ―absolutum,‖ became 
―thing-in-itself‖…102  
   
The next section continues the metaphor.    
 
 
The Christian idea of God – God as a god of the sick, God as spider, God as 
spirit—is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God the world has ever seen; this 
may even represent a new low in the declining development of the types of god.  
God having degenerated into a contradiction of life instead of its transfiguration 
and eternal yes!  God as declared aversion to life, to nature, to the will to life!  
God as the formula for every slander against ―the here and now,‖ for every lie 
about the ―beyond!‖ God as the deification of nothingness, the canonization of the 
will to nothingness…103 
 
The god in these descriptions is the ideal Parmenidean.  He has retreated from a world 
that has been found to be wanting and unjust.  Therefore, he retreats from the world of 
Becoming and enters into the heaven of Being.  By becoming ―pure spirit‖ he has 
achieved the epitome of stasis.  The spider here is nearly identical to the spider described 
in PTAG, but with one crucial difference: he does not actually dwell within the world of 
                                                             
102 The Antichrist, 17.  Note that at this point in his career, Nietzsche has ceased differentiating between the 
Parmenidean ideal and the Kantian thing-in-itself. 
103 Ibid. 18. 
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Becoming.  He does not have to worry about ingesting blood, as the actual Parmenidean 
does, because he does not exist; he has escaped life and become its contradiction.  
Moreover, since he exists outside of this world, the metaphysician cannot seek to become 
like him in this life, as Parmenides did in vain, but must wait until the next.
104
  Thus 
metaphysicians have an excuse for why they are never able to comprehend true Being 
while they are still alive.   
  
3.5 Parmenides and the Ascetic Ideal 
 
3.5.1 The Philosopher as Ascetic Ideal  
 
The metaphysical desire for an objective world and the religious desire for a god both 
arise from the ascetic ideal, a topic covered in the third essay of Nietzsche‘s On the 
Genealogy of Morality, titled ―What do Ascetic Ideals Mean?‖  While Parmenides is 
never explicitly mentioned in this work, the archetype that he represents is definitely 
being described.  The echo of the Parmenidean contempt for the senses resounds in 
statements such as the following: ―as long as there are philosophers on earth and 
whenever there have been philosophers (from India to England, to take the opposite poles 
of a talent for philosophy), there exists a genuine philosophers‘ irritation and rancor 
against sensuality.‖105  Dating back nearly to the dawn of Western philosophy, perhaps 
the moment that Parmenides encountered Anaximander‘s dark wisdom, the philosopher 
has rejected the senses and the ambiguity that accompanies them.  In fact Nietzsche sees 
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105 On the Genealogy of Morality, III, 7. 
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this disposition as having become nearly synonymous with being a philosopher.  He 
refers to it as ―the peculiarly withdrawn attitude of the philosophers, denying the world, 
hating life, doubting the senses, desensualized, which has been maintained until quite 
recently to the point where it almost counted for the philosophical attitude as such.‖106  
Parmenides, in his attempt to escape the problem of Becoming, created a ―dangerous 
conceptual fairy-tale,‖ that there could be such a thing as a ―pure, will-less, painless, 
timeless subject of knowledge.‖107   
As with all other forms of the ascetic ideal, the philosophical urge comes from 
bad conscience, which is itself the ―instinct for freedom‖ or ―will to power‖ being turned 
in on itself because of its inability to be directed outside of itself.
108
  For the philosopher, 
Nietzsche claims that the ascetic ideal is like a sense of smell directed towards ―the most 
favorable conditions of higher intellectuality.‖109  In other words, the philosopher‘s 
ascetic ideals are those motivations that drive him towards ―being elsewhere‖ from the 
world.
110
  The philosopher has a great desire for freedom and wishes to clear away every 
obstacle, even if that leaves a vast desert before him.
111
  Nietzsche believes that the 
philosopher is not truly attempting to negate when doing so, but is affirming in a strange 
way. 
 
 
What does the ascetic ideal mean for a philosopher?  My answer is – you will 
have guessed ages ago: on seeing an ascetic ideal, the philosopher smiles because 
he sees an optimum condition of the highest and boldest intellectuality, – he does 
not deny ―existence‖ by doing so, but rather affirms his existence and only his 
                                                             
106 Ibid. III, 10. 
107 Ibid. III, 12. 
108 Ibid. II, 18. 
109 Ibid. III, 1.  Nietzsche‘s term for intellectuality is ―Geistigkeit.‖  
110 Ibid. III, 13. 
111 Ibid.  III, 7. 
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existence, and possibly does this to the point where he is not far from making the 
outrageous wish: pereat mundus, fiat philosophia, fiat philosophus, fiam!...
112
  
 
In other words, the philosopher, having felt disenfranchised by the disorder and suffering 
of the world uses his philosophy to affirm himself and his place in the world.  This may 
very well entail excising portions in the world, such as Parmenides draining the world of 
everything but Being.  The philosopher following the ascetic ideal is doing so to preserve 
himself; as Nietzsche puts it, ―the ascetic ideal springs from the protective and healing 
instincts of a degenerating life.‖113  Having faced the horrors of the Anaximandrian 
worldview, it makes perfect sense for the Parmenidean to attempt to remove from the 
world all of those things which he cannot control so that he can reaffirm his own power.  
While the ascetic ideal is too vast a concept to be traced back to a single figure, the model 
for its incarnation as philosopher seems to be the Parmenides of PTAG. 
 
3.5.2 The Secular Parmenides  
 
It should be noted that while later thinkers used the Parmenidean conclusion to create 
religious dogmas that posited Being as some sort of deity, Nietzsche does not think this is 
the aim of Parmenides.  Eleatic philosophy was ―not evoked by a profound religious 
conviction,‖ nor some sort of attempt to join with the ―one all-sufficing ecstatic state of 
mind which is the enigma and vexation of ordinary minds.‖114  Parmenides‘ icy way of 
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thinking should not be confused with the rapturous escape of the mystic.
115
  Nietzsche 
points out that ―Parmenides‘ thinking conveys nothing whatever of the dark intoxicating 
fragrance of Hindu wisdom which is not entirely absent from Pythagoras and 
Empedocles.‖116  Note Nietzsche‘s invocation of Hinduism, recalling his earlier mention 
of Schopenhauer‘s breathing ―India‘s clear air‖ in the sections regarding Anaximander.117  
Nietzsche here is once again contrasting the pessimistic approach with the Parmenidean 
approach to the Anaximandrian problem.  As for the mention of Empedocles, note that 
while PTAG was aborted before the Empedocles section could come to term, we have 
Schopenhauer‘s own explicit approval of Empedocles.  Schopenhauer praised the 
―decided pessimism‖ of Empedocles and says that he recognized the ―same fundamental 
wisdom constituting the basic wisdom of Brahmanism and Buddhism.‖118   
Thus I think it safe to assume that Nietzsche is here contrasting Schopenhauer, 
who always has his eyes on the suffering of the world with the Parmenidean who has 
taken great efforts to deny such imperfections.  In his lecture notes, he even explicitly 
contrasts Parmenides with the Buddha, saying we must not mistake the two.  ―For 
Buddha it is an ethical, religious conviction to nothingness, to sorrow, to the perishability 
of all things: the world is Buddha‘s dream.‖119   It seems as if the expected response to 
the problem of Becoming is a retreat into the mystical.  But the Parmenidean, having 
already rejected the untrustworthy senses, is not about to throw in his lot with those who 
inhale the dreamy smoke of mysticism.  The offer of understanding the world in terms of 
                                                             
115 Nietzsche‘s description of Parmenides as an entirely secular figure is not universally accepted.  Miller 
for instance poses the possibility of Parmenides being a ―priest of Apollo.‖  This reading does not make 
Parmenides into the sort of mystic who is enamored with irrationality, as he follows the divine rationality 
of the logos.  Miller, 52–54.   
116 PTAG, 81. 
117 Ibid. 46. 
118 Parerga and Paralipomena Vol 1, 35. 
119 Pre-Platonic Philosophers, 86–87. 
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a dream is about as far from the Parmenidean project as is possible.  He craves 
―certainty‖ above all else.120  One almost gets the impression from Nietzsche that he 
admires Parmenides for his refusal to accept the religious solution.  While he may 
attempt to banish the world, he at least does not let himself be intoxicated by the thick 
clouds of incense that would lull many of his descendants to sleep.  
 
3.5.3 Motion, Deceit, and Failure 
 
Nietzsche is nevertheless critical of Parmenides‘ attempts to undo the Anaximandrian 
dilemma by means of reason.  Parmenides might be able to suck the life out of the world 
by means of his cosmic spider web, but the motility of his own arachnid mind remains.  
He might envision a world that has become utterly unchanging, but his very envisioning 
has made him the thing he hates.  For the mind ―moves from concept to concept,‖ says 
Nietzsche; later ―it is quite impossible to designate thinking as a rigid persistence, as an 
eternally unmoved thinking-in-and-on-itself on the part of unity.‖121  If change and 
movement were truly impossible, the mind should not be able to focus on, let alone think 
of, different things at different times.  The mind should be as static as being itself.  
Parmenides‘ own mind has betrayed him.  A later critic of Parmenides asked if the 
Eleatic and his goddess had succeeded and found his solution wanting.  
 
 
For our part, we cannot think or say they have [succeeded].  They cannot have 
thought or spoken in time, for example, because the passage of time, from non-
being into non-being, is unthinkable and unspeakable; neither past nor future can 
be.  Nor can we think or say that either Parmenides or his goddess has changed in 
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any way; we can think and speak only of the changeless.  Finally, we cannot think 
or say anything that requires either to be an individual, divided from whatever 
else is.  We must think and speak only of it:  undivided, homogenous, perfect and 
static being.
122
   
 
If Parmenides cannot escape from the mobility of thought, he cannot escape from 
Becoming itself. 
Even his denial of the senses is futile: experiencing a semblance is experiencing 
an illusion produced by something. ―Nonbeing cannot even practice deceit.‖123  In other 
words, if Nonbeing cannot even exist, how could it provide us with actual experiences of 
being deceived?  If Being is all that there is, then it is Being itself that is deceitful.  But 
was the move towards Being not at least partially inspired by the attempt to escape the 
false testimony of the senses?  It seems as if there is any deceit occurring and if 
Becoming is truly nonexistent, we must acknowledge the deceitfulness of Being.  And if 
Being is producing deceit, can we call it either timeless or unified?  Moreover, the flight 
into pure Being is no longer protection against being deceived.      
   The Parmenidean project is doomed because the mind that conceives of it is 
always situated within the world of Becoming.  The argument from motion proves the 
necessity of a subject situated in Becoming while the problem of deception shows the 
inescapability of Becoming.  The subject is always coming from a particular perspective.  
Nietzsche makes a very similar plea against this sort of philosophizing in a passage in On 
the Genealogy of Morality that was briefly touched upon above.  
 
 
From now on, my philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of the dangerous 
old conceptual fairy-tale which has set up a ―pure will-less, painless, timeless 
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subject of knowledge,‖ let us be wary of the tentacles of such contradictory 
concepts as ―pure reason,‖ ―absolute spirituality,‖ ―knowledge as such:‖ – here 
we are asked to think an eye turned in no direction at all, an eye where the active 
and interpretative powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through which seeing 
still becomes a seeing-something, so it is an absurdity and non-concept of eye that 
is demanded.  There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ―knowing;‖ 
the more affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, 
various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our 
―concept‖ of the thing, our ―objectivity.‖  But to eliminate the will completely and 
turn off all the emotions without exception, assuming we could: well?  Would that 
not mean to castrate the intellect?...
124
  
 
Besides making a eunuch of the intellect, the philosopher who has eliminated any 
perspectives besides that of ―pure reason,‖ has greatly limited our view of the object.  
Moreover, and perhaps even more damningly to Parmenides, Nietzsche believes that this 
sort of thinking actually produces a contradiction.  The eye must be seeing from 
somewhere and a context-free subject, such as one that is identical to Being, is essentially 
seeing from nowhere; as such, it does not not exist.   Do note that Nietzsche attempts to 
play Parmenides‘ advocate in the section of PTAG concerned with Anaxagoras by 
presenting a pseudo-Kantian answer that we are conscious of pure thinking through our 
inner sense, but that this consciousness is not the pure thinking itself.
125
  Nietzsche says 
that ―it is probable that this would have been Parmenides‘ way out,‖ but that it would be 
countered in a similar fashion as how the Neo-Kantian philosopher, African Spir, 
countered Kant.   Spir is quoted as saying that ―succession indubitably has objective 
reality‖ and that ―semblance itself is something objectively given.‖126 
 Ultimately, Nietzsche sees the Parmenidean project as an abject failure.   
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Yet of all standpoints, Parmenides‘ later one is the most void of content, the least 
fruitful, because it clarifies nothing at all: Aristotle rightfully calls him no natural 
philosopher.  It is also the sole piece of evidence for a sharpness of the dialectical 
sense, but not for deep thought and contemplation; because of this, his school of 
eristic dialectics also declined.  His first system had a more powerful, lasting 
effect, yet it was only an exposition of Anaximander‘s dualism.  Through him, 
specifically, the problem of Becoming came into philosophy, not through the 
Eleatics.  That they deny it is the shortest way out, yet the least illuminating.  
With this ceases all observations of nature, all desire to learn from things.  Then 
the fundamental failure remains, that the apparatus of the senses is inexplicable: it 
moves itself; it is in plurality.  If it itself is a delusion, how can it be the final 
cause of a second delusion?  The senses deceive, but what if the senses did not 
exist?  How could they deceive? So plurality of the senses certainly exist, and so 
everything else may be moved and manifold.
127
  
 
To Nietzsche, Parmenides‘ early exposition of Anaximander was a more fruitful 
philosophical project.  The Anaximander fragment is where the problem of Becoming 
first finds its way into Western philosophy.  At best, Parmenides‘ denial of the problem is 
a clever bit of sophistry.  At worst, it has introduced an obsession with a world beyond 
this one that is somehow free from deception that can never be satisfied and shall always 
lead people away from life.  The pessimist‘s dilemma cannot be solved by simply 
denying the tragedy of coming-to-be and passing-away.  
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4. Conclusion  
 
In the Preface to Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, Nietzsche made the promise 
that his work would do more than had been done in previous examinations of early Greek 
philosophers.  
 
 
I am going to tell the story – simplified– of certain philosophers.  I am going to 
emphasize only that point of each of their systems which constitutes a slice of 
personality and hence belongs to that incontrovertible non-debatable evidence 
which it is the task of history to preserve.  It is meant to be a beginning, by means 
of a comparative approach, toward the recovery and re-creation of certain ancient 
names, so that the polyphony of Greek nature at long last may resound once more.  
The task is to bring to light what we must ever love and honor and what no 
subsequent enlightenment can take away: great individual human beings.
1
  
 
The system of a philosopher is to Nietzsche an outgrowth of the soil of the philosopher‘s 
temperament.
2
  There was no point in examining the system as an attempt to form new 
philosophical propositions since the system of a philosopher can only be ―wholly true‖ 
for the philosopher himself.
3
  Yet the system can still be of interest to the reader as long 
as he seeks the correct form of content from it.  Nietzsche said that ―whoever rejoices in 
great human beings will also rejoice in philosophical systems, if completely erroneous.‖4  
The joy of a philosophical system comes from the one thing that cannot be taken away 
from it: ―personal mood, color.‖5  From this we learn the most from a philosopher.   
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Nietzsche would later say, in ―Schopenhauer as Educator‖ that ―I profit from a 
philosopher only insofar as he can be an example.‖6  This is followed by his assertion that 
philosophy teaches in the way ―which the philosophers of Greece taught, through their 
bearing, what they wore and ate, and their morals, rather than by what they said, let alone 
by what they wrote.‖7  While the talk of diet may seem to be irrelevant, Nietzsche did say 
the following in a note from late 1873:   
 
 
I am thinking of the first night of Diogenes
8
: all ancient philosophy was aimed at 
simplicity of life and taught a certain absence of needs, the most important 
remedy for all thoughts of social rebellion.  In this respect the few philosophical 
vegetarians have accomplished more for humanity than all the more recent 
philosophies taken together; and as long as philosophers do not muster the 
courage to advocate a lifestyle structured in an entirely different way and 
demonstrate it by their own example, they will come to nothing.
9
 
 
The published writings and manuscript for PTAG never take diet quite so seriously, but 
despite this hyperbole, the character of the philosopher still seems to be a prominent 
theme from this period of Nietzsche‘s writings (1873-74). 
 Yet the actual structure of PTAG is not one that merely examines anecdotes about 
the great philosophers in the manner that Diogenes Laertius would and then examines 
them, despite Nietzsche‘s promise that this is what he is going to do.10   The apparent 
reason for Nietzsche‘s departure from this format is that he is actually focusing on a 
philosophical problem, albeit one that is faced in different ways by philosophers of 
differing temperaments.  
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According to Nietzsche, the question is the one that was posed recently by ―the 
only serious moralist of our century,‖ Schopenhauer, and much earlier by the first man to 
ask ―the profoundest problem in ethics,‖ Anaximander.11  As Nietzsche elegantly 
summarized it, ―how can anything pass away that has the right to be?‖  This question 
entails both metaphysical and ethical concerns, examining the ontological problems of 
being and becoming, in addition to the problem of assigning value to existence.  
Nietzsche shows these two sorts of problems to be intertwined and the answer given by 
both is the product of the temperament of the philosopher who asks the question.  
The question is undoubtedly born of the pessimistic character possessed by 
Anaximander and Schopenhauer, but its danger is believed by Nietzsche to be felt by any 
subsequent philosopher who comprehends its depths.  In PTAG, Nietzsche highlights the 
challenge as it is posed first to Heraclitus and then Parmenides.  Heraclitus walked 
―straight at that mystic night in which was shrouded Anaximander‘s problem of 
becoming‖ and ―illuminated it by a divine stroke of lightning,‖ an entry that highlights 
both Heraclitus‘s heroism and the pervasive darkness that Anaximander had 
summoned.
12
  Parmenides‘s response is not the confident stride of Heraclitus, but rather a 
―climb down, into the abyss of all things.‖13  Both men though are described by 
Nietzsche as attempting to ―escape‖ from Anaximander and to keep their footing in the 
upheaval that such a doctrine inflicts on a great thinker‘s worldview.14  The diametrically 
opposed philosophies that grew from exposure to the same doctrine are the results of 
Heraclitus‘s  view of the world being ―oriented from a point of view totally different 
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from that of Parmenides‖ and vice versa.15  Both were called upon to answer 
Anaximander‘s problem, yet they came to it from such different positions that Nietzsche 
asks us to imagine Parmenides meeting Heraclitus, the former repelling down into the 
depths of being and the latter scaling up to the heights of becoming.
16
  
As I have already shown that Nietzsche believes Anaximander‘s question is 
essentially the same as that posed by Schopenhauer, he also believes himself to be 
attempting to provide an answer, a project that spans his entire oeuvre.
17
  Nietzsche‘s 
responses to Schopenhauerian dilemmas were cleverly masked by the historical figures 
whom he used to represent them, but ultimately this work was an early attempt to develop 
his own philosophy, an attempt to examine Schopenhauer without being 
Schopenhauerian. Unfortunately, the first ears to hear this attempt were those of 
Nietzsche‘s then-mentor, Richard Wagner.18  Although Wagner was a dedicated 
Schopenhauerian, he seemed to miss the importance of the work to Nietzsche‘s 
continuing evolution as a philosopher.  Rather, he saw it as a an irrelevant work of 
academic philology that committed the grave sin of not being about Wagner himself, in 
the way that Birth of Tragedy had been.
19
  Sadly, Nietzsche‘s relationship to Wagner was 
still in such a stage that he was so taken aback by Wagner‘s displeasure that he 
immediately abandoned PTAG and sent his ―dearest Master‖ an obsequious letter 
wherein he begged Wagner to adopt him ―simply as a pupil.‖20  Attempting to select a 
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topic that was more appealing to the Wagners, he began the first of the Untimely 
Meditations, ―David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer.‖21 
 
 
4.1 Untimely Meditations  
 
4.1.1 Three Dangers 
 
Yet this was far from the end of Nietzsche‘s interest in how philosophers face the 
Anaximandrian question.  His third Untimely Meditation, ―Schopenhauer as Educator,‖ 
resurrects the notion of a philosopher‘s character being an essential component of his 
reaction to the pessimist‘s problem.  While this essay is ostensibly about Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche revealed what he claims were his true intentions in Ecce Homo.  He says ―what 
is basically at issue is not ‗Schopenhauer as Educator‘ but instead its opposite, ‗Nietzsche 
as Educator,‘‖ thus we can interpret this as more than simply a meditation on 
Schopenhauer, but rather an autobiographical piece.
22
  He states, tellingly, that this essay 
is his ―becoming‖ and that it marks his ―pledge‖ as to what he will write in the future.23  
The entire content of ―Schopenhauer as Educator‖ is beyond the scope of this piece, but I 
think we see the remnants of PTAG in key places.  
As we have seen, what defines a philosopher‘s reaction to the problems of 
Anaximander is his character.  Moreover, the early Greek philosophers were pure types: 
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their reactions were singular because their philosophies represented single, unmixed 
ideas.
24
  Bearing in mind that each of the philosophers had a unique response to the 
problem of pessimism, but that future philosophers could not be monomaniacal 
paradigms like the Pre-Platonic philosophers, we should expect to find Nietzsche‘s own 
response to the problem to be somewhat mixed.  Furthermore, as ―Schopenhauer as 
Educator‖ is giving us the account of Nietzsche himself, we can see this essay as giving 
us insight into Nietzsche‘s continuing attempts to deal with the problem of pessimism 
following the abandonment of PTAG.   
The most striking example of the continuation of the project of PTAG in 
―Schopenhauer as Educator‖ comes when Nietzsche gives an examination of the dangers 
that a philosopher such as Schopenhauer would face.  He states that a philosopher of this 
caliber is ―nothing less than a miracle‖ because ―he was pressed upon, from within and 
without by the most tremendous dangers which would have crushed or shattered any 
weaker being.‖25   Nietzsche then proceeds to describe ―three constitutional dangers‖ that 
not only threatened Schopenhauer, but ―threaten us all.‖26  The dangers are those that 
befall any man who asks the most dangerous question, ―What is life worth as such?‖27  
What I think marks these dangers as so interesting to the reader of PTAG is that each one 
of the dangers is one that was described as being an aspect of a different pre-Platonic 
philosopher in the earlier work.  Thus, I shall present the three dangers and show how 
they correspond to the thinkers of antiquity.  
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4.1.2 The First Danger 
 
Nietzsche does not begin his analysis with the danger faced by the chronologically first 
philosopher discussed in PTAG.  Rather, he begins with the trait that he sees as the most 
dangerous to both himself and Schopenhauer (it is important to bear in mind that he sees 
this essay as ―Nietzsche as Educator‖), not to mention the philosopher with whom 
Nietzsche most closely identifies.  This dangerous element is isolation, which Nietzsche 
had attributed to Heraclitus.
28
  Many philosophers, particularly in Germany, according to 
Nietzsche, for the sake of comfort nestle themselves into the institutions of the university 
and church.  The example Nietzsche uses here is that of Kant.
29
 To maintain his ―pure 
and truly antique attitude towards philosophy,‖ Schopenhauer required a certain amount 
of worldly resources.
30
  In other words, for Schopenhauer to remain a philosopher in the 
same sense that someone like Heraclitus was, he had to remain outside of the bondage of 
a career in academia or the church.  Similar incidents occurred with Heraclitus, both with 
his unwillingness to draft laws for his homeland of Ephesus and his refusal to serve King 
Darius as a tutor.
31
  The great philosophers are unwilling to make themselves beholden to 
the teaching requirements of the state.  It is worth mentioning here that Nietzsche at this 
time was still a professor at the University of Basel, so this may represent self-criticism, 
though when one considers his later life, the talk of isolation seems prophetic.  
 Nietzsche‘s dissatisfaction with German academia is made particularly blatant 
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when he says that ―the philosopher in Germany has more and more to unlearn,‖ and that 
we should look upon Schopenhauer as the model for living.
32
   
While this independence is laudable, it is also the most at risk.  The man who 
stands apart could be destroyed by his loneliness.  Nietzsche cites Hölderlin and Kleist, 
who succumbed to madness and suicide respectively, as forerunners who show the 
danger of having an independent spirit in Germany.
33
   Only those who had ―natures of 
iron, such as Beethoven, Goethe, Schopenhauer, and Wagner‖ are able to survive the 
solitude that they feel, though their miens reveal ―the wearying struggle that they have to 
engage in.‖34  The Germans do not punish their outcasts with inquisitions or arrests, but 
rather with ―unbreakable silence,‖ for they believe that this state of not thinking as your 
countrymen do is a conscious choice: ―anyone who feels unhappy and solitary among 
them has only himself to blame.‖35 
Schopenhauer is perhaps the worst victim of this sort of cultural abuse.  Nietzsche 
claims that he had a ―secret guilt on his conscience,‖ namely ―valuing his philosophy 
more than his contemporaries.‖36  His works were left unread, reduced to waste paper, 
and his followers were not gathered until the last decade of his life.
37
  We find a similar 
inability to be read in Heraclitus‘s attempts to leave his own book in the temple to 
Artemis.
38
  In fact, Nietzsche attributes Schopenhauer's personality to not only being a 
great philosopher, but also to one who had suffered much.   Schopenhauer was ―a total 
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solitary,‖ lacking a single close companion.39  Heraclitus too was a man lacking in 
friends, his close friend, Hermodorus, being driven out of Ephesus which convinced him 
that any good man would not be welcome in his hometown.
40
  Not unlike Schopenhauer, 
his lot was ―to walk alone along a lonely street.‖41  In fact, eventually he was seen as a 
misanthrope and left civilization for the mountains.
42
 This is not unlike how Nietzsche 
describes Schopenhauer, disappointed with his inability to connect with his fellow man, 
returning to his only true companion, ―his faithful dog.‖43   
The similarities between Nietzsche‘s versions of Heraclitus and Schopenhauer 
continue with the imagery of philosophy being a retreat from the world.   
 
 
Where there have been powerful societies, government, religions, public opinions, 
in short wherever there has been tyranny, there the solitary philosopher has been 
hated; for philosophy offers an asylum to man into which no tyranny can force its 
way, the inward cave, the labyrinth of the heart: and that annoys the tyrants.
44
  
 
Obviously when Schopenhauer retreated, it was not to a literal, external cave, but rather 
to the cave of his mind.  The cave as a hiding place for the philosopher would later be 
used by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where the eponymous hero spent ten years 
in a mountain cave to enjoy solitude.
45
  As we have seen, the philosophical hermitage of 
Zarathustra bears a striking resemblance to that of Heraclitus.
46
  The external exile of 
Heraclitus is translated, in an era when even the mountains are not distant enough, into a 
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purely internal exile.  Of course, this sort of inner retreat is not at all unknown to the 
Ephesian philosopher who went in search of himself.
47
 
 This sort of exile will rarely be unchallenged, so the philosopher still has some 
ties to his countrymen.  In the later works of Nietzsche, this would become a recurring 
motif.  Notable examples include the madman who declares the death of God but has 
come ―too early,‖ and  Zarathustra in his discussions with the townspeople who mistake 
his description of the overman as an advertisement for a tightrope walker.
48
  In 
―Schopenhauer as Educator,‖ though, the encounter between the philosopher and the non-
philosopher is set up as a much more antagonistic affair.  The solitary philosopher bears a 
―cloud of melancholy,‖ which Nietzsche sees as the product of being forced to present a 
false face to the world.
49
  Note that Heraclitus was described as a ―mob-reviler‖ by 
Timon and as a sufferer of melancholia by Theophrastus.
50
  Yet Nietzsche continues the 
Heraclitean imagery by speaking of how the ―perpetual bitter resentment of this 
constraint fills them with volcanic menace.‖51  Nietzsche says that these men were driven 
―so deep into themselves that when they re-emerge it is always as a volcanic eruption.‖52  
Heraclitus, of course, is one who was definitely acerbic to his fellow Ephesians.  He 
suggested that the lot of them should be put to death and that the city be left to the young 
boys.
53
  Short of giving Heraclitus volcanic eruptions, Nietzsche does describe him as 
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being ―nauseated‖ by his fellow man as he ―looks outward dead and icy‖ upon his lesser 
countrymen.
54
    
 
4.1.3 The Second Danger  
 
The second ―danger in whose shadow Schopenhauer grew up‖ was ―despair of the 
truth.‖55  To any reader of Schopenhauer, this danger should seem readily apparent.  We 
have already examined his pessimistic views in depth, but it should perhaps be repeated 
that even Bryan Magee, one of Schopenhauer‘s greatest living commentators, said that 
his worldview was ―totally bleak, without comfort.‖56  Nietzsche attributes this bleakness 
to the study of Kant: it ―attends every thinker who sets out from the Kantian philosophy, 
provided he is a vigorous and whole man in suffering and desire and not a mere clattering 
thought-and-calculating machine.‖57  In fact, Nietzsche does not seem to think that the 
full weight of Kantian philosophy has been felt in Europe. Otherwise, its effects would be 
immediately visible.  He states that if ―Kant ever should begin to exercise any wide 
influence we shall be aware of it in the form of a gnawing and disintegrating 
skepticism.‖58  The exception would be the ―most active and noble spirits‖ who would 
despair from the truth, such as Kleist, who lamented Kant‘s philosophy before his 
suicide.
59
  The advantage of Kleist, though, was that he understood that philosophy 
touches upon the ―most sacred part‖ of one‘s being.60   
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Schopenhauer is able to accomplish a similar depth with his work, without 
succumbing so deeply to the gloom of existence that it leads to his annihilation.  Rather, 
Schopenhauer gives us insight into how we deal with the problem of philosophical 
despair.   
 
 
And yet this must be done if we are to understand what, after Kant, Schopenhauer 
can be to us – namely the leader who leads us from the depths of skeptical gloom 
or criticizing renunciation up to the heights of tragic contemplation, to the 
nocturnal sky and its stars extended endlessly above us, and who was himself the 
first to take his path.  His greatness lies in having set up before him a picture of 
life as a whole, in order to interpret it as a whole; while even the most astute 
heads cannot be dissuaded from the error that one can achieve a more perfect 
interpretation if one minutely investigates the paint with which this picture is 
produced and the material upon which it is painted; perhaps with the result that 
one concludes that it is a quite intricately woven canvas with paint upon it which 
is chemically inexplicable.  To understand the picture one must divine the painter 
– that Schopenhauer knew.61 
 
In this passage, we see that the project of understanding philosophers through their 
personalities that Nietzsche had initiated in PTAG was not abandoned, even if the book 
had been.
62
  It appears as if the way that we can deal with the question of the value of 
existence is to divine ourselves as the painters of value.
63
   
The problem of Anaximander, like all great philosophical problems, must be 
understood not only as a problem on a cosmic level, but also one on a personal level.  
Nietzsche states that what every great philosophy says to us is that ―this is the picture of 
all life and learn from it the meaning of your own life.‖64  Yet, the reverse is also true: 
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―only read your own life and comprehend from it the hieroglyphics of universal life.‖65  
To master Schopenhauer‘s philosophy, one must first approach it from an individual 
level, understanding his own ―want and misery.‖66  This understanding will reveal to the 
nascent philosopher that his previous attempts at attaining happiness through wealth, 
esteem, or even learning had ultimately been in vain.  The only escape in the 
Schopenhauerian worldview is the renunciation of the ego.
67
  By understanding this, one 
can also understand the suffering of the world and the role of eternal justice.  I believe 
that Nietzsche here has made a bit of a step backward from PTAG.  While Nietzsche 
leaves Anaximander in the gloomy shadows that result from such a worldview, he does 
not merely stop there.
68
  Through other philosophical temperaments, Nietzsche shows 
that the renunciation of the will is not the only way to deal with the problem of 
pessimism.  Some ways, like that of Parmenides, are misguided; others, like the 
Heraclitean solution, allow one to transcend the Anaximandrian and Schopenhauerian 
positions. Yet, by choosing Schopenhauer as a figure of reverence, rather than as an 
interlocutor who must be debated, Nietzsche loses some of the nuance of PTAG. 
 
 
4.1.4 The Third Danger 
 
The third and final danger that Nietzsche describes in ―Schopenhauer as Educator‖ is 
petrification.  Of the three, this one receives the shortest treatment from Nietzsche, taking 
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only a single paragraph. Nietzsche nevertheless states that it ―lay concealed in the whole 
structure and skeleton‖ of Schopenhauer‘s being.69  The precursor to the danger of 
petrification is a limitation that all human beings perceive in their own inner being.  
Nietzsche sees this self-critical stance as being the ―root of all culture‖ as one longs to be 
a saint or a genius.
70
   Where this longing is absent, we find sterile, repulsive creations.
71
  
The man who no longer longs for the correction of the limitation becomes petrified, a 
danger to which Schopenhauer‘s nature  was vulnerable because of ―a strange and deadly 
dualism.‖72 Schopenhauer was both a man who sought to quiet his longings, but also a 
man who was filled with ―burning longing.‖73  While he may have sought an escape from 
the vicissitudes of Becoming, Schopenhauer never succumbed—as so many others did—
to denying its existence.   
The corresponding figure to the third danger in PTAG would be Parmenides.  
Recall that Nietzsche referred to Parmenides‘s nature as ―wholly petrified by logical 
rigidity and almost transformed into a thinking machine.‖74  The reoccurrence of the 
imagery of petrification does not appear to be accidental.  In both instances, Nietzsche is 
describing someone who is tormented by the problems of Becoming and pessimism, and 
therefore tempted to do away with Becoming altogether.  Schopenhauer‘s dualism is so 
dangerous because it offers a chance to escape from this world of impermanence and to 
be an unchanging, otherworldly thing.  Petrification is the lot of those who have accepted 
the Parmenidean escape from the Anaximandrian problem.  Although Nietzsche posits 
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Heraclitus‘s solution as superior to Schopenhauer‘s acceptance of pessimism, he can at 
least credit Schopenhauer with not totally fleeing the real world by succumbing to Eleatic 
temptation.  
Having made allusions to his earlier work on early Greek philosophy, Nietzsche 
ends this section of ―Schopenhauer as Educator‖ with an explicit reference to a figure 
whose section was never completed in PTAG: Empedocles.  Having explained the 
―constitutional dangers‖ that Schopenhauer faced, he goes on to describe the dangers that 
are inherent in the age.
75
  The health of a philosopher‘s age, according to Nietzsche, lends 
weight to his verdict on the question of the value of existence.
76
 Nietzsche says that the 
drive for truth will always seek the answer to the question ―what is existence worth as 
such.‖77  The ancient Greeks had a real advantage over nineteenth century Germans in 
that the Greeks lived much fuller lives, even lives of ―luxuriant perfection‖ and thus were 
able to judge existence as such.  The fact that they lived such lives makes their 
pessimistic diagnosis all the stronger: they are not judging life by the accidents that cause 
it to fall short, but rather in all of its voluptuousness.
78
  This argument is lifted directly 
from PTAG, where Nietzsche made it at greater length. 
 
 
The judgment of those philosophers as to life and existence in general means so 
much more than any modern judgment, for they had life in lavish perfection 
before their eyes, whereas the feeling of our thinkers is confused by our split 
desire for freedom, beauty and greatness on the one hand and our drive toward 
truth on the other, a drive which asks merely ―And what is life worth after all?‖79 
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The Greeks were more open to this terrifying possibility than modern culture, not seeing 
the philosopher as being like a comet, coming out of nowhere and inspiring terror, but 
rather a sun around which their culture can revolve.
80
  Nietzsche at this point in his career 
believed that ―absolute knowledge leads to pessimism,‖ meaning that only a healthy 
civilization would be able to handle the knowledge brought forth by philosophy.
81
  In 
fact, in the same note where he made that remark, he gives philosophy the job of drawing 
knowledge into ―an artistic conception of the world,‖ with art being the only true 
―remedy‖ for pessimism.82 
 
4.1.5 Empedocles 
 
At this point, Nietzsche invokes the answer of Empedocles as the quintessential response 
to the question of ―what is existence worth as such.‖83  Nietzsche‘s choice of Empedocles 
is interesting for several reasons. His given reason for choosing him is that Empedocles 
lived at what Nietzsche saw as the height of Greek civilization and thus, as noted above, 
was in the perfect position to serve as the arbiter of the value of existence.
84
  Nietzsche‘s 
choice of Empedocles is made more problematic because Empedocles was one of the 
figures whom Nietzsche had planned to include in PTAG, but whom he did not finish 
because of Wagner‘s rejection.  Luckily, his basic outline for the chapter still exists, 
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though it is a bit sparse.
85
 What stands out for the subject at hand is the conception of the 
world as ―one enormous living organism,‖ which is split asunder by the forces of strife, 
but reconnected, albeit ―in a furious haste,‖ by love, which is most strongly represented 
as ―sexual love.‖86  This is compared to the fable of Aristophanes in Plato‘s Symposium, 
as a ―longing for oneness‖ that has been lost.87  If we expand our focus to include 
Nietzsche‘s lecture notes, we find that this is a ―world of discord, of sorrow, of 
oppositions,‖ but that a different world order is possible through Aphrodite, whom 
Nietzsche sees as representing ―the life of sexuality.‖88  When describing Empedocles‘s 
notion of strife, Nietzsche makes a point to describe the entire process as ―purposeless,‖ a 
blind striving system, that while ordered, has no ultimate goal.
89
  This, according to 
Nietzsche, has been the basis for subsequent materialist worldviews, particularly 
Darwinism.
90
 
The language in Nietzsche‘s description of Empedocles is distinctly 
Schopenhauerian, which should come as little surprise. Schopenhauer had quoted 
Empedocles‘s description of strife as he introduced his bleak view of the constant conflict 
that the will creates.
91
  Nietzsche‘s equation of Aphrodite with the sexual impulse 
continues the identification of the Will with Empedocles‘s forces, as Schopenhauer saw 
the sex drive as being the strongest affirmation of the will to life.
92
  In fact, Empedocles 
was the figure to whom Schopenhauer gave the most thorough description in the chapter 
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of his ―Fragments for the History of Philosophy‖ regarding ―Pre-Socratic Philosophy.‖93  
Schopenhauer seems quite impressed with Empedocles‘s ability to divine that the cosmic 
force at play here is not Anaxagoras‘s mind, but rather Will.94  What Schopenhauer finds 
most impressive about Empedocles, however, is his ―decided pessimism.‖95  
Schopenhauer sees Empedocles‘s philosophy as a forerunner to Plato‘s analogy of the 
cave  and the Christian ―vale of tears.‖.96  In fact, Empedocles‘s asceticism, 
vegetarianism, and belief in metempsychosis suggests to Schopenhauer that the earlier 
philosopher was closer to ―Brahmanism and Buddhism‖ than the current trend of 
―optimistic, Jewish-Protestant rationalism.‖97   
What Schopenhauer is showing with this idiosyncratic characterization of 
Empedocles is that the very same question that Nietzsche is concerned with in PTAG—
namely ―What is existence worth as such?‖—has been a central one in the history of 
philosophy since the beginning.  Schopenhauer recognized Empedocles as responding to 
this question, giving the same basic answer as Schopenhauer himself.  Nietzsche 
managed to take this problem a few steps back, showing that it was a problem for 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, all of whom Schopenhauer largely ignored.  
Thus while Schopenhauer recognized that he was continuing a long tradition in 
the history of philosophy, he was unaware of some of the roots of the problem, roots that 
Nietzsche later examined.  Of course, Nietzsche‘s interests do not lie in merely giving an 
academic history of the problem.  The preface to PTAG lays out the plan of not giving us 
dead systems of these philosophers, but what in them one ―must ever love and honor,‖ 
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their greatness as human beings and their personalities.
98
  Accordingly, Nietzsche 
deliberately limits the number of doctrines that are described in the text.
99
 
 
4.2 The Problem of Anaximander 
 
Therefore, I see the continuation of PTAG‘s project in ―Schopenhauer as Educator.‖  
Nietzsche spends very little time in this meditation describing Schopenhauer‘s 
metaphysics, epistemology, or opinions about any of the minutiae that are scattered 
through his works.  Rather, this is another instance of Nietzsche writing about the 
personality and temperament of a great philosopher (or two if you consider the 
autobiographical nature of the work).  The similarities that I have highlighted between 
PTAG and ―Schopenhauer as Educator‖ show that Nietzsche had not only retained the 
themes of the former work, but that he saw them as perpetual issues with which 
philosophers deal.  This view continued throughout his career, culminating in his 
declaration in ―The Problem of Socrates‖ that ―the wisest men in every age have reached 
the same conclusion about life: it’s no good.‖100  Note that here Nietzsche is speaking 
rhetorically, as we have seen that neither he, nor Heraclitus could be said to have reached 
that conclusion, though both the pessimists such as Anaximander and the otherworldly 
thinkers in the Eleatic tradition had.  Moreover, ―The Problem of Socrates‖ continues the 
theme of personality influencing thought, saying that this condemnation of existence 
comes from the mouths of the wisest men full of ―doubt,‖ ―melancholy,‖ ―exhaustion 
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with life,‖ and ―resistance to life.‖101  The second danger of ―Schopenhauer as Educator,‖ 
the Anaximandrian danger, has overtaken them.   
In the following paragraph, Nietzsche makes one of his final judgments on the 
question of the value of existence:   
 
 
Judgments, value judgments on life, for or against, can ultimately never be true: 
they have value only as symptoms, they can be taken seriously only as symptoms, 
– in themselves, judgments like these are stupidities.  You really have to stretch 
out your fingers and make a concentrated attempt to grasp this amazing piece of 
subtlety, that the value of life cannot be estimated.  Not by the living, who are an 
interested party, a bone of contention even, and not judges, not by the dead for 
other reasons. – It is an objection to a philosopher if he sees a problem with the 
value of life, it is a question mark on his wisdom, an un-wisdom.
102
 
 
We see here that Nietzsche has continued the project of PTAG, identifying the 
philosophical position of those who speak on the value of life as being not a verifiable 
truth statement, but rather a symptom of the diseases of temperament which inflict them.  
This formulation of the argument is more severe than any found in his early work, but it 
is still compatible with the lessons of PTAG.  Thus, we could see the Heraclitean position 
as being the sort of minor inflammation that accompanies an infection, but which 
ultimately allows its sufferer to live a mostly fulfilled life.  While the answer may not 
necessarily be true, it at least allows for flourishing.  The Anaximandrian and 
Parmenidean philosophers, on the other hand, are sufferers of chronic and malignant 
diseases.  The former is weighed down by the worst sort of melancholia; the latter‘s spite 
for the world has reached such epic proportions that he has removed himself from it.  
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 Although Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks was never completed, it still 
managed to give Nietzsche the opportunity to explore some of his richest philosophical 
ideas.  The examination of philosophical archetypes and exploration of the problem of 
pessimism featured in this book would re-emerge in his later works, making PTAG an 
important experiment with his mature ideas.  Nietzsche‘s readings of the early Greek 
philosophers were undoubtedly idiosyncratic, but they allowed him to use these 
enigmatic figures to shed new light on the philosophical problems that were his own life-
long themes: especially the value of existence and the psychological roots of 
philosophical positions.  While Wagner may not have been able to see the value of the 
nascent manuscript, PTAG is an important work for any serious scholar of Nietzsche and 
the problem of pessimism.  
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